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Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to plague the African continent, 
despite various frameworks and agendas that the African Union has tabled and established in 
relation to countering terrorism. The continuously rising terror campaigns of Boko-Haram 
particularly in northeastern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have developed into regional 
and to a certain extent, continental threats that have undoubtedly crippled the economies and 
socio-political landscapes of the territories in which they seek to maintain control.  
Terrorism in Africa is a multi-causal phenomenon which requires a multi-dimensional 
approach.  The focus of this study is to unpack and appraise efforts by the African Union to 
address and tackle the issue of terrorism in northern Nigeria and the Horn of Africa. By 
employing Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as the theoretical framework, this study broadly 
offers an assessment and critique of the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union (AU) 
with specific reference to the inter-governmental organizations’ military-driven approach, 
particularly in its efforts to fight the threat of terrorism waged by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab.  
Moreover, this study seeks to uncover how these critiques and further recommendations may 
assist the AU to adopt multi-dimensional strategies in its efforts to combat Boko-Haram in 
northeastern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.  In contrast to orthodox approaches 
to terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies recognizes the advantages of an all-inclusive theoretical 
framework that addresses and questions pertinent issues of religion, ethnicity, and poverty 
amongst other socio-economic and political drivers and root causes influencing organizations 
such as Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab.   
Given that the findings of this study indicate that the largely military approach in both case 
studies has not ameliorated the threat of terrorism, perhaps an alternative to the military 
centered strategy should be seriously considered – an approach that seeks to address the 
primary drivers and root causes which encourage the scourge of terror waged by Boko-Haram 
and Al-Shabaab.  The study recommends that the African Union and its various counter-
terrorism institutions need to better prioritize non-military forms of intervention and counter-
operations, namely cross-border management; diplomatic engagement; addressing the 
marginalization of certain religious and ethnic minorities; and dealing with socio-economic 





Ubugrogrisi, kuzo zonke iimbonakalo zabo busaqhubeka buxananazile kwilizwekazi lase 
Afrika, nangona iinkqubo noluhlu lwezinto ezifuna ukwenziwa ezithiwe thaca YIMBUMBA 
YE AFRIKA kwinzame zokulwisa ubugrogrisi. Imikhankaso eqhubekayo yobugrogrisi 
ngakumbi eye Boko Haram kumantla empuma elizwe lase Nigeria kwakunye ne Al-Shbaaba e 
Somalia zingenelele kwinqanaba lokuba sisoyikiso kwimimandla nakwilizwekazi le afrika, 
into esingisele ekuthomamiseni ukhulo loqoqosho nobume boluntu kwezopolotiko apho 
lemibutho ifuna ulawulo khona. 
 
Ugrogriso kwilizwekazi lase Afrika sisenzo esibangwa zizinto ezahlukeneyo, okunyanzelisa 
ukuba ukuqubisana nako kube nemiba eyahlukileyo. Oluphononongo lugqamene nokucacisa 
nzulu iinzame zembumba ye Afrika ekujameleni nasekuceleni umngeni kumbandela 
wobugrogrisi kwilizwekazi le Afrika. Ngokusebenzisa izifundo ezinzulu kumba wobugrogrisi 
njenge nkcazo eyingcingane, oluphononongo lunikeza uthekelelo nencoko egwebayo 
kwinkqubo ye Mbumba ye Afrika yokulwisa ubugrogrisi, kwaye igxininisa kwimibutho 
eyahlukileyo yoorhulumente ethyalwa zezemikhosi kwinzame zokulwisa ubugrogrisi be Boko-
Haram kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab. 
 
Okubalulekileyo kukuthi oluphononongo luzama ukuveza ukuba ezincoko zigwebayo nezinye 
iingcebiso ziyinceda njani imbumba yeAfrika ekumiliseleni iinzame ezahlukileyo ekulwiseni 
iBoko-Haram kumanntla empuma yelizwe lase Nigeria kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab kwiphondo 
le Afrika. Ukungalandeli ekhondweni lendlela zokulwisana nobu grogrisi, Izifundo ezinzulu 
zobugrogrisi ziphawule ukuba semandleni kwenkcazo eyingcingane equbisana negotyagotya 
imiba yokholo, ubuhlanga kwakunye nendlala njengezinye izinto eziphembelela imibutho 
efana ne Boko-Haram kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab. 
 
Oluphononongo luyaveza ukuba lendlela yokusetyenziswa kwemikhosi kuzo zombini iindlela 
zophando aluncedanga ukunqanda ubugrogrisi, mhlawumbi enye indlela ngaphandle 
kokuqononondisa ekusetyenzisweni komkhosi kungafuneka icingisiswe, njengendlela 
yokuqubisana nomngeni ozingcambu ezisisisekelo sesenzo zobugrogrisi eziphembelelwa 
ngamaqela afana ne Boko Haran kwakunye ne Al-Shabaab. Oluphononongo lucebisa ukuba 
imbumba ye Afrika namanye amaziko alwisana nobu grogrisi batyhile phepha limbi ekubekeni 
phambili ezinye iindlela ezingeze zomkhosi ukungenelela nokuphikisana nenkqubo 




neentlanga; nokuqubisana nomngeni wokungalingani kwintlalakahle nomnotho, njengendlala 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
This introductory chapter offers an outline and overview of this study.  In order for the study to 
provide a contextual foundation and basis, a brief and compact background to the study will be 
provided which will be followed by the rationale behind the choice in advancing this particular 
field of research.  Furthermore, this chapter will briefly outline the respective problem statement 
and focus of the research.  The next section will provide a detailed discussion of the goals, 
variables, theoretical point of departure, and research questions.  In addition, the research design 
and methodology will be discussed and demonstrated.  To conclude this introductory chapter, the 
fundamental aims of each chapter within this study will be briefly mentioned.   
1.2. Background 
Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to plague the African continent, despite 
the wealth of normative structures and approaches related to terrorism and counter-terrorism that 
the African Union has tabled and established. Historically, the widely-held belief across the 
continent has been influenced by the narrative that terrorism is not an African problem – an attitude 
held by many African states to cover their lack of capacity development in countering terrorist 
organizations (Nurudeen, 2012: 1).  According to Ewi and Anning (2006: 34), terrorism in Africa 
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which occurs predominantly on a domestic scale and 
constitutes the destruction, killing, and maiming of innocent civilians in their masses.  Modern-
day terrorists within the African continent have access to a variety of weapons in their arsenal, 
ranging from small arms and explosives to nuclear and chemical weaponry.  
It is important for one to note that within the colonial African state –  which was known for its 
regular use of force to overpower the actions of interest groups and anti-colonial movements which 
were against oppressive governmental campaigns and structures – labelled the reactions of anti-
colonial movements as acts of terror (Oyeniyi, 2007:117).  A well-documented example can be 
found within the Southern African context (in countries such as South Africa) where the African 
National Congress (ANC) took up arms in its quest to liberate the majority of South Africans from 




post-independence period in Africa has resulted in an increase in terrorist activities by terrorist 
organizations.  
There have been varying arguments and explanations as to why the plague of terrorism increased 
at an exponential rate at the end of the colonial era and the beginning of independence in Africa.  
Many scholars including Elu and Price (2015: 402-403) have attributed it to poor economic 
circumstances, which are in line with the traditional theory of deprivation and poverty, poor levels 
of education, and historical conditions pertaining to slavery and ethnic conflicts.  In addition to 
Elu and Price’s argument (2015: 402-403), one cannot deny that post-independent Africa saw a 
rise in terrorist attacks as a result of successive governments in many African states which lacked 
the capacity to establish the necessary structures and key foundations required of a powerful state.  
This structural weakness opened doors for the expansion of many terrorist organizations which 
manipulated and capitalized on vulnerable post-independence governments, on widespread tribal, 
ethnic, and religious disputes, as well as on conditions of socio-economic marginalization. Thus, 
one can contend that the negative legacies of colonialism inherently destroyed the social, tribal, 
and ethnic fiber of many African states, leaving behind countries susceptible and exposed to 
extremist and radical ideologies.   
The 1970s and 1980s were tormented by cases of hijacked planes and bombings, such as the 
hijacking of the Lufthansa flight headed to Mogadishu in 1977, and the bombing of the Norfolk 
Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1980 (Kelly, 2007:17). Furthermore, as a result of domestic unrest and 
regional conflict, terror attacks in Africa have increased exponentially since the mid 1990s, as 
rebel movements and opposition organizations adopted and employed terror tactics and strategies 
to advance their social, economic and political agendas (African Union Commission on Terrorism 
in Africa, 2011).  The embassies of the United States deployed in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania and 
Nairobi, Kenya, were bombed.  Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the incident where an 
estimated 250 people were killed, leaving more than 5000 civilians injured (Aubrey, 2004:16).  
Other instances of international or transnational terrorism include the 2002 Al-Qaeda- led bombing 
of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, as well as the sequence of suicide bombings in 
Casablanca, Morocco in 2003 and the simultaneous attacks at the Sinai resort of Taba, in Egypt 




share of international terror incidents; however, it is important to note that these are instances of 
domestic and transnational terrorism which have historically plagued the continent.   
Peace and stability across the African continent, and particular in North, East, and West Africa, 
have been heavily disrupted and continue to be threatened by terrorist organizations such as Al-
Shabaab, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Lord Resistance Army 
(LRA) amongst other groups (African Union Commission on Terrorism in Africa, 2011).  It is a 
result of these circumstances and historical developments that the African Union (AU) was forced 
to establish a number of strategies and approaches intended to tackle the vicious and frightening 
trend of terrorism.  The first such an intervention can be traced back to the 28th ordinary session of 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which convened in Dakar, Senegal in 1992. It was at 
this session that the Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among 
African states was agreed upon, whereby the African Union agreed to curb and derail structures 
and organizations that employ religion, race, or other societal and traditional rationales to justify 
their repressive and extremist undertakings directed towards various states and actors across the 
African continent (OAU Assembly, 1992).  The AU, the successor of the OAU, has since adopted 
a number of other tools and mechanisms against terrorism.  Two decades after the initial transition 
of the AU from the OAU, it remains of international importance that the manner in which counter-
terrorism responses are carried out in Africa, should be assessed.   
This research study aims to explore and unpack the counter-terrorism mechanisms which exist on 
the African continent by assessing the strategies and measures employed by the African Union 
since its transition from the Organization of African Unity.  The study will assess the internal 
structures of the African Union, which are responsible for alleviating and tackling terrorism. This 
will be done by focusing on two substantially different regional environments, namely Somalia 
and the broader Horn of Africa region which Al-Shabaab emerged from and northeastern Nigeria 
and the Lake Chad Basin in which Boko Haram has waged its terror campaigns. Within the context 
of these two regions, this research will assess the structures that exist within the African Union 
which are responsible for combatting the two mentioned terrorist organizations in Africa, namely 





As previously discussed, terrorism across the African continent has always manifested itself as a 
significant and fundamental security threat. However, the dire need and contribution of 
intergovernmental organizations in attempts to address and tackle the threat of terrorism is a 
relatively new development.  It is important to note that within the historical context of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), combating terrorism was only established on the agenda of 
the OAU in the 1990s.  Prior to these developments, the OAU focused its energy on combating 
mercenarism amongst other forces of subversion threatening to expand on the continent.   
Therefore, the rationale behind choosing this area of study is that the African Union’s endeavors 
and efforts to combat terrorism will prove to be important for the preservation of domestic and 
regional security across the African continent.  In this regard, the African Union’s capacity needs 
to be complementary and exist as a nexus between the continent and the global community, more 
specifically the United Nations (UN).  The AU must serve as a catalyst to fill in the gaps in capacity 
of its member states and of its regional institutions.  In order for the AU to execute its intended 
task and duty efficiently and effectively, it must carry out introspection and eradicate its internal 
inadequacies through financial and resource capacity-building.   
The rationale for choosing Al-Shabaab in Somalia as one of the case studies of this research will 
be supported by the premise that the Horn of Africa (the region in which Somalia is located and in 
which Al-Shabaab predominantly operates) is highly susceptible to national and international 
terrorist activities (Abrahamsen, 2004:678–679).  These terror activities are perpetuated by a 
number of elements, including weak governments in the region, extreme poverty, and 
incapacitated border controls.  The rationale behind choosing Boko Haram in northern Nigeria as 
a second case study is to demonstrate the present day brutality and savagery aided by the 
establishment and continuous rise of Boko Haram – predominantly in northeastern Nigeria and the 
broader Lake Chad Basin – an Islamic sect that utilizes bombings, targeted assassinations, as well 
as violent crime across Nigeria (Brigaglia, 2012: 35) and to further assess the measures adopted 
by the African Union to combat the activities of these terrorist organizations.    
This research is important and appropriate because it offers methods to challenge and counter 




Haram and Al-Shabaab, which form a continuing obstacle for the African Union and its regional 
actors.  Furthermore, literature on terrorism and specifically on counter-terrorism methods in 
Africa suggests that in order to alleviate and ameliorate the threat of terrorism on the continent, 
current methods must be revisited, and subsequently new methods need to be developed.  In order 
for these new methods and approaches to be developed and formed, new forms of knowledge 
creation must be established.  The recommendations from the present research will contribute to 
informing on and improving policy matters of government and other relevant stakeholders by 
offering an appropriate and effective strategy to fight terrorism.   
1.4. Research Focus 
The continuously rising terror campaigns of both Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia have developed into an internal, regional, and to a certain extent, global security threat 
(Kodjo, 2018). With the ever-growing number of members, internal developments and 
sophisticated technology and weaponry, concise guerrilla strategies, and well-organized suicide 
bombings, Boko Haram and Al-Shaba’s defiance in the regions which they occupy, have crippled 
both the economies and the social-political development of the countries in which they coexist 
(Kodjo, 2018). 
The focus of this study is to unpack and appraise the efforts assumed by the African Union in 
addressing and tackling the issue of terrorism across the African continent.   Moreover, the focus 
of this research is to assess the development and undertakings of the Boko Haram group throughout 
northern Nigeria and simultaneously Al-Shabaab in Somalia, with the purpose of eventually 
proposing an approach for rectifying the crisis through a thorough assessment of the African 
Union’s counter-terrorism policies.  The foremost intention and focus of this research is to discuss 
the strengths and limitations of the AU’s capacity in dealing with the threat of the aforementioned 
terrorist organizations on the African continent.   
1.5. Research Problem 
Islamic radicalization has gradually become a global reality, which is currently directed by a 
number of influences across the board.  In a broader sense, terrorism and the terror activities 
implemented by Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram have been described as an “increasing multinational 




differing strategic modus operandi” (Nurudeen, 2012: 6).  These terrorist organizations employ a 
multitude of approaches and strategies in their quest to expand their sphere of influence, namely 
through the employment of state-based terrorism, religious terror campaigns, transnational 
terrorism, as well as biochemical-terrorism.  Furthermore, terrorist organizations such as Boko-
Haram and Al-Shabaab are notoriously known for inflicting terror through assassinations, 
hijackings, bombings, abductions and hostage-grabbing, as well as mass shootings and the 
demolition of public and private infrastructure (Berkouk, 2008: 4).   
This proposed research problematizes the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union.  
Specifically, it problematizes its military-driven strategy which merely confronts and counters the 
symptoms of the issue, an approach which is currently being employed by the African Union. Its 
aggravating influence on the stability and security of Sub-Saharan Africa will develop into an even 
more superior issue and therefore it is important that the African Union and its counterparts address 
both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism in order to suppress the security crisis waged 
by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab that continues to plague the continent. Furthermore, this research 
problematizes the limited research conducted in relation to critiquing the African Union’s counter-
terrorism strategies and approaches in relation to the aforementioned case studies.  Thus, it 
suggests that it is imperative that greater emphasis is placed on assessing, explaining, and 
critiquing the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union (AU) from a Critical Terrorism Study 
(CTS) perspective and to apply this critique as a basis in making recommendations on how the 
AU’s currently adopted strategies in combatting Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab can be improved 
respectively.   
1.6. Goals, Variables, Theoretical Point of Departure, and Research Questions  
1.6.1. Goals 
The goal of this research is to assess the development and undertakings of the Boko Haram group 
in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab throughout Somalia.  Furthermore, the broader goal of this 
study is to investigate and develop a better understanding of the performance of the African 
Union’s existing counter-terrorism policies and strategies in northern Nigeria and Somalia and to 
further propose a grand strategy that includes all stakeholders in the aforementioned regions: socio-




leaders, amongst other groups.  By using Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as a point of departure, 
the goal of the study includes assessing whether the current interventions, missions, and 
approaches of the African Union have the ability to provide sustainable and maintainable 
resolutions to the various obstacles and challenges posed by Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia.   
1.6.2. Research Variables 
Within the research of Security and Conflict Studies, it is important to note that Variable Oriented 
Research (VOR) is often rejected; the reason being that many factors and far too many 
immeasurable elements are constantly at play in counter-terrorism operations when asymmetric 
warfare is carried out by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  That being 
said, within this study the dependent variable (the variable being measured) is the effectiveness of 
the African Union’s strategy in combating and countering Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  The 
intervening variable- which is the one that enables the independent variable to influence the 
dependent variable is multivariate – it consists of a number of other variables – such as military, 
socio-economic, technological, historical, and geo-political factors and strategies.  The 
independent variable is the current strategy of the African Union in its attempts to combat Boko 
Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective areas.  In addition, this study will investigate the two 
aforementioned cases, focusing on their acts and operational procedures from 2009 to 2019. 
1.6.3. Theoretical Point of Departure 
The growing consequences of terrorism on societies across the globe have resulted in a need to 
establish new techniques and methods within the field of counter-terrorism.  As a result, counter-
terrorism theory emerged as a model or blueprint for fighting terrorist groups, and individuals 
associated with terrorist activities.  The recent developments within the realm of terrorism studies 
and specifically the methods and measures needed to counter terrorism has been well captured and 
documented (Pedhazur, Eubank & Weinberg, 2002: 141; Turk, 2004: 271; Gunning, 2007: 363). 
Within the realm of international relations, security studies and research, a number of scholars and 
stakeholders alike continue to argue that the current theories and concepts need to be reconsidered 
in order for them to include modern transformations in the nature and character of violence 




Therefore, one can argue that the most commonly known method for reconsidering the study of 
terrorism is reflected in some of the earliest successes and results of critical security studies 
literature.  Scholars extending the concept of terrorism beyond the common military narrative have 
become a growing concern in Critical Terrorism Studies.  Therefore, by rather revealing the effects 
of ecological, societal, and economic structures on the survival of communities and the masses at 
large, engagements and dialogues are more effective in expanding the political parameters of a 
formerly narrow area of study (Jarvis, 2009: 26).  For this reason, the Critical Terrorism Study 
(CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (Jackson, 2007) and Lee Jarvis (Jarvis, 2009) 
will be employed in this study in order to solve the research problem and will serve as the 
theoretical anchor for this research.   
CTS is a field of study representing terrorism-associated research and scholarship which assumes 
and espouses a skeptical assertiveness towards state-centric interpretations of terrorism; which 
does not neglect currently established terrorism knowledge production; yet still challenges broadly 
established assumptions and beliefs (Stump & Dixit, 2012).  As such, instead of being a precise 
theoretical label, this theoretical anchor is seen rather as an orientation or critical position that 
looks to uphold and preserve a particular distance from prevalent ideologies and theories.  
Moreover, it is important that one notes that CTS is built on a number of powerful critiques of the 
existing employment of orthodox terrorism studies.  These include ineffective methods and 
theories, state-centric approaches, its problem-solving positioning, and its institutional, structural, 
and intellectual relations to state-security tasks and developments (Gunning, 2007). 
1.6.4. Research Questions and Sub-research Questions 
With a background that focuses on unpacking and understanding which counter-terrorism 
strategies and policies exist on the African continent, the primary research question that this study 
aims to address and elaborate on is:   
How and to what extent have the African Union’s counter-terrorism policies contributed to 
adequately combating terrorism in northern Nigeria and Somalia?   
In order to facilitate the answering of the main research question, four supportive research 
questions have been framed.  The broader questions this research looks to answer under its agenda 




1. Does the Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (2007) 
and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain, and critique 
the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in northern Nigeria and 
Somalia respectively? 
2. Which counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ? 
3. To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in Northern 
Nigeria?  
4. How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union in 
combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shaba in Somalia?  
This study seeks to answer the above research questions through the following approach:   
Chapter 2 which serves as the literature review of this study has the task of answering the first 
supportive question.  Chapter 2 focuses on the origins, evolution, and ideological developments of 
both Al-Shabaab and Boko-Haram respectively.  The chapter focuses on the multi-functional 
regional responses to these terrorist organizations and seeks to discuss the applicability of ongoing 
and continuous interventions and missions by the African Union’s security architecture in northern 
Nigeria and Somalia.  Apart from providing detailed and informative descriptions of key concepts 
in relation to Terrorism Studies.  
While Chapter 2 seeks to provide a detailed and informative analysis on the literature review, 
Chapter 3 has the main purpose of answering the research study’s second supportive research 
question.  Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies that will be 
employed as the theoretical anchor throughout this research study.  This chapter seeks to explain 
the importance of applying CTS as a theoretical framework in order to describe and critique the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and applicability of the African Union’s current counter-terrorism 
methods, interventions and missions in relation to Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively.  
While the main research question guides Chapters 4 and 5, both these chapters have the central 
aim of answering the study’s third and fourth supportive research questions.  Chapter 4 answers 




relation to Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and by employing CTS in order to assess its counter-
terrorism approach.  Chapter 5 seeks to answer the research study’s fourth supportive research 
question by highlighting an overview of terrorism in Somalia with specific references to the 
evolution of Al-Shabaab.  More important, Chapter 5 will use CTS as an analytical framework in 
assessing the African Union’s counter-terrorism methods in relation to Al-Shaabab in Somalia.  
1.7. Research Design and Methodology 
1.7.1. Research Methodology and Collection of Data:  Qualitative Methodology 
Employing Critical Terrorism Study as the theoretical anchor of the present study serves as an 
important foundation of criticisms of the orthodox and traditional foundations of terrorism studies.  
According to Zulaika & Douglass (1996:149), the reason behind this is the list of methodological 
and analytical shortcomings, which include (among a number of other elements): an over-
dependence on secondary data and knowledge production; an absence of primary research, and the 
use of inadequate research processes and methods.  
In order to explain the counter-terrorism methods that the African Union has employed in its quest 
to counter both Boko-Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, the present 
researcher consulted various sources including academic journals, books, articles, publications, 
reports, official documents issued by the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Union 
Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), as well as online sources such as propaganda put out by 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the form of videos, imagery, and social media content.  It is 
important to note that while secondary sources were used for a large part of the research, the 
present researcher aimed to simultaneously apply both primary and secondary sources as a means 
of collecting data and information.  In addition, primary data conducted from field research, 
particularly on counter-terrorism strategies, was unfortunately unattainable by the researcher due 
to potential threats and possible risks.   
Therefore, this research benefited largely from primary data obtained from semi-structured 
interviews with experts, officials from the respective and relevant organs of the African Union 
Commission, specialists, academics, professionals and political risk analysts with substantial 
experience and knowledge in the sphere of counter-terrorism within the context of Nigeria and 




interviewed on the abovementioned research questions: preliminary interview questions are 
included as Appendices A and B.  The interviews conducted were strictly face-to-face interviews 
which took place in Pretoria, and Johannesburg, South Africa.  It must be noted, that due to the 
sensitivity of the research questions, participants who were interviewed chose to remain 
anonymous.  Furthermore, the duration of the interviews varied in time, ranging from 45 minutes 
to 2 hours in which all questions (see appendix A and B) were broadly discussed and interrogated.  
According to Neumann (2005:149), by utilizing both secondary data and expert interviews, a 
researcher intentionally ensures that there is simultaneously a “triangulation of observers” in order 
to guarantee unification of theory and reality. This occurs by including experts’ opinion in order 
to limit and minimize any biases from the researcher and a “triangulation of sources” enhances 
stringency, dependability, and findings.   
A qualitative method of research was employed throughout this study.  According to scholars such 
as Burnham et al (2008:39), a research method can be deduced as the logical structure of inquiry 
in which social scientists and scholarly professions alike engage in a particular research study.  
Neuman (2005: 137) asserts that qualitative research includes collecting in-depth information from 
a substantially limited number of sources.  One may uphold that a qualitative method to this 
research is necessary and valid since a quantitative method of research, particularly in relation to 
issues of conflict and security, as well as terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies do not take 
into account the complex, and challenging nature of many elements associated with conflicts. 
1.7.2. Research Design:  Multiple Case Study 
In the proposed study, a multiple case research study design was employed, which Burnham et al 
(2008:61) explain as a research design that focuses on groups, events, or communities in a way 
that enables an in-depth examination and production of data, information and theory.  Following 
the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies as presented by Jackson (2007) and Jarvis 
(2009), the features of a multiple case study are vividly apparent in this research, as it will look to 
discuss, in detail, the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategies and policies, by describing the 
measures the continental organization has put in place in combating Boko-Haram in northern 
Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.  The reason for selecting two case studies for this 




perspective in relation to the methods that the African Union have employed in its attempts to 
counter two of the most powerful terrorist organizations on the continent.   
In light of this research related to the counterterrorism approaches with regards to Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab, a multiple case study is a reasonable and appropriate study design especially if 
one is to take into account that this study will also be supported by a powerful theoretical 
dimension, as well as distinctly and comprehensible research questions which are necessary for 
reliable results in a multiple case study as this guarantees that the theoretical framework that will 
be employed throughout this study – in this case,  Critical Terrorism Studies – will critique the 
current realities (Burnham, 2008:56). 
1.8. Ethical Implications 
As part of this research, a series of interviews were conducted.  Interviews were not limited to time 
constraints, but were conducted according to the available time of the interviewee, and took place 
at a mutually agreed location.  It is important to clarify that all experts and specialists that were 
interviewed were allowed to decline to answer any of the interview questions that they were not 
comfortable or inclined to answer.  Furthermore, interviewees were allowed to withdraw from this 
study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher.  Key informants 
were also given the option of declining or granting the researcher permission to tape record the 
interviews as a means of collecting all information, which were eventually transcribed for analysis 
purposes.  As soon as an interview was completed, a copy of the transcript was sent to the experts 
interviewed in order to give them the opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the conversation and 
to add or clarify any points as they wish.   
In addition, all information that was provided was considered absolutely confidential.  Identities 
have been kept completely anonymous.  Furthermore, all data that was collected during this 
research will be kept safe and securely stored in the universities research lab.  Therefore, only 
researchers associated with this project will have access.  
The researcher provided a consent form that was to be filled out by all participants being 
interviewed before any interview took place.  This research study was reviewed and received 
ethical clearance through the Research Ethics Committee which oversees research conducted at 




1.9. Time Dimension 
With regards to time dimensions, it is important to note that this study will employ a longitudinal 
case study design.  The rationale for the application of this specific design is the fact that it allows 
the researcher to focus the intended research of the study and to revise in-depth the topic at hand.  
As previously mentioned, this research study will assess the African Union’s counter-terrorism 
strategies in Africa, with particular assessments of the deployment of its measures in fighting Boko 
Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia within the period of 2009 to 2018.   The 
rationale behind the choice of this specific period of time is that both Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab 
rose to prominence during these years, and continue to be present in their respective regions to 
date.   
1.10. Limitations 
This research is an examination into the counter-terrorism approach of the African Union with 
emphasis on its responsibility in implementing counter-terrorism strategies against Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab in their respective regions on the African continent.  One needs to note that issues 
related to national and regional security are highly sensitive and remain classified, therefore a 
researcher could find it difficult to effectively gather primary data on counter-terrorism strategies 
from the institutions of the African Union, such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), African 
Centre on the Study and Union Commission (PSDAUC); as well as from experts, diplomats and 
political risk analysts within the realm of terrorism studies specializing in the Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab crisis respectively.   
In addition, a limitation of this study relates to the ability of collecting primary data.  Within this 
research, the primary limitations are a result of the incapacity to conduct real and first-hand 
interviews with former supporters, members, and current members and experts related to Boko 
Haram and Al-Shabaab.  This is due to the fact that the northern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram 
significantly functions is still under a considerable amount of threat.  In addition to these safety 
considerations, these terrorist organizations may be reluctant to speak to non-Islamic followers in 
their quest to establish an Islamic caliphate.  Furthermore, travel and accommodation expenses in 
both Somalia and northern Nigeria will not be feasible.  However, such a limitation can be 




been able to conduct interviews with former members of these terrorist organizations, as well as 
work conducted by an additional body of experts such as Professor Ulf Engels, William Ells, 
Professor Hussein Solomon amongst other experts. 
In addition to these limitations, the unfortunate circumstance and situation of inaccurate data and 
information brought forward by various sources and news outlets in relation to the attacks and the 
death rates is a significant limitation.   
1.11. Research Outline 
This study will consist of six chapters:   
Chapter 1:   Introduction.  This chapter served as the introductory chapter, which introduced the 
reader to the topic of this research study by providing the background to the study, the research 
problem and research focus.  Furthermore, this chapter outlined the broader goals of this study, the 
theoretical anchor of the study, the research questions it will attempt to answer, as well as the 
specific methods used.  This chapter also acknowledged the ethical considerations necessary 
regarding the holding of expert interviews.   
Chapter 2:  Literature Review.  Moving forward, Chapter 2 is a literature review which serves as 
a guide for the research that has already been conducted on topics of terrorism, security, Boko 
Haram, Al-Shabaab and contending perspectives in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism 
studies respectively.  The chapter also briefly introduces the theoretical framework of Critical 
Terrorism Studies (CTS) which will be employed throughout this research study.  Thereupon, the 
literature review will present the origins and background of the African Union’s counter-terrorism 
policies as well as its primary institutions mandated to prevent and rid the continent of the scourge 
of terrorism.  
Chapter 3:  Theoretical Framework:  The Importance of CTS as an Alternative in the Fight Against 
Terrorism in Africa.  Chapter 3 broadly unpacks the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism 
Studies according to which the two cases will be analyzed in Chapter 4 and 5.  The chapter 
examines and critiques the limitations of the orthodoxies that exist within the highly- driven 
military approach adopted by the African Union in dealing with threat of terrorism waged by both 




More importantly, the utility and considered value of Critical Terrorism Studies within the African 
context will be discussed comprehensively.   
Chapter 4:  Boko-Haram:  Combatting Terrorism in northern Nigeria.  This chapter discusses the 
evolution of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the state of affairs that 
enabled and accommodated the emergence and further development of the group.  This chapter 
focuses on an examination of the African Union’s counteractions in relation to the Boko Haram 
issue, and employs CTS in conjunction to critiquing the African Union’s counter-terrorism 
strategies and policies to combat the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.  
Chapter 5:  Al-Shabaab:  The Nature of Counter-terrorism Strategies in the Horn of Africa.  This 
chapter will capture an overview of terrorism in Somalia.  Thereafter, it will critically examine the 
mechanisms employed by the African Union to counter terrorism in Somalia and the broader Horn 
of Africa region.  Thus, by employing the analytical framework of CTS, this chapter will focus 
specifically on discussing, addressing, and critiquing the effectiveness of the African Union’s 
counter-terrorism policies in adequately contributing to combatting terrorism in Somalia.   
Chapter 6:  Conclusion.  In concluding, this chapter serves as the final section of this research 
study.  It provides a summary of all the challenges and obstacles that have been addressed and it 
revisits the research questions that were proposed.  Furthermore, based on the concepts of CTS, 
this chapter suggests recommendations regarding increasingly efficient and applicable ways of 






CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter serves as the anchor for the remainder of this study.  Furthermore, it offers the reader 
a contextual overview and appraisal of already established studies and literature on various themes, 
topics and subject matters that are related and important to the research questions and aims of the 
present study as outlined in Chapter 1.  While this chapter will be guided by the primary research 
question of this study, it will make continuous reference to the first supportive research question 
which is:  
Which counter-terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ? 
In order to contextualize the aforementioned research question, the body of literature consulted 
will be discussed in five different categories.  The first discussion deals with the unpacking of 
contending literature which conceptualizes terrorism with specific reference to perspectives 
espoused predominantly by orthodox as well critical scholars of terrorism.  These contending 
perspectives are important in understanding the intricacies of all the factors informing the counter-
terrorism approaches currently employed by the African Union. Secondly, the subsequent point of 
discussion will deal with a brief conceptualization of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS)  and a short 
overview of the various critiques of orthodox approaches of counter-terrorism offered by CTS, 
since CTS serves as the theoretical anchor for this study. The third topic for discussion comprises 
a short outline that briefly traces back the origins, activities, and recent histories of Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab in their respective regions.   
Furthermore, it is important to note that the bulk of literature in this chapter focuses on discussing 
and appraising the endeavors assumed by the African Union, and its precursor organization, the 
Organization of African Unity in addressing and confronting the plague of terrorism on the African 
continent.  In addition, the foremost objective is to assess and analyze the strengths, limitations, 
and weaknesses that exist within the AU’s capacity to tackle the threat of terrorism across the 
African continent.  Lastly, by appraising literature published on the study of terrorism and counter-
terrorism with specific reference to the African continent, it becomes important to pinpoint the 




and those that have not.  This will play a fundamental role in defining the gaps within the current 
and published literature. 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that the methods currently adopted by the African Union 
must be revisited, and subsequently new methods must be developed.  In this way, perhaps the 
gaps found in this literature review will serve as a step in a new direction for scholars seeking to 
assess the extent to which counter-terrorism approaches employed by the African Union have been 
helpful in combating terrorism. It may also highlight the various ways in which the AU can become 
more responsive in fighting Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively. 
2.2.  Terrorism 
A fundamental issue that exists within literature is that definitions of central concepts are diverse 
and continuously contested.  For example, regardless of the fact that more than a hundred 
definitions of terrorism were formulated and assessed in the 1984 edition of the journal, Political 
Terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 1988), a universal and global definition has been continuously 
contested and unsuccessfully agreed upon. Regardless of the fact that terrorism has become a 
widely studied and debated topic over the past number of decades, specifically post- 9/11, the 
problem of definitional consensus has not been resolved (Crelinsten, 2009).  In view of this 
continuing debate, this  section of the review seeks to discuss published literature which provides 
a conceptual understanding of terrorism.  This part of the chapter also intends to offer a clear and 
concise explanation of some of the most contentious and debatable perspectives, including the 
responsibility of religion in the currently existing and on-going wave of terrorism, as well as the 
definitions of terrorism put forward by the African Union.   
As previously alluded to, there is relative amount of tension within the space of definitional 
assessment and dialogue of the concept of terrorism. An apparent problem that has led to the 
unsuccessful agreement of an internationally accepted definition is in relation to who is defined as 
a terrorist and even more importantly who is doing the defining (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 
2006).  Therefore, it becomes extremely significant to unpack assumptions that perpetuate the 
manner in which terrorism is defined, paying close attention to who does the defining, what this 
definition actually entails, and whose interests it serves.  For instance, the understanding of 




connotation (Schmid & Jongman 1988:49-51).  Another example of this analysis of who does the 
defining is exemplified through Boko Haram, an Islamic sect that was firstly established as a 
peaceful organisation in 2002 in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. It was declared a terrorist 
movement by the United States government in September 2013 after the organisation was involved 
in a number of violent confrontations with Nigerian law enforcement (Crenshaw, 2014: 66-67).  
This example further reflects Roberts’ (2015) argument that the struggle of defining terrorism and 
the formulation of a framework that determines what a terrorist is and what a terrorist is not, has 
always been in the hands of powerful states (Roberts, 2015: 62-64).     
Ganor’s (2002) argument is relatively different to the arguments provided by the abovementioned 
authors.  For Ganor, it is possible to obtain an objective definition of terrorism only if there are 
actual and real strides to confront terrorism.  Thus, Ganor argues that it is by forming a definition 
on widely endorsed and adopted international laws and principles on what actions are allowed in 
traditional wars between nations and non-government organisations that such an objective 
definition can be obtained (Ganor, 2002: 289-293).  
Despite decades of debate, dialogue and research on terrorism, no agreement on the universal 
definition of the concept has been attained (Weis, 2002; Schmid, 2011).   This is due to certain 
political and ideological manifestations, and partly a result of a number of varying disciplines 
which play a role in the study and expansion of terrorism (Sinai, 2008). While the definitional 
challenges of terrorism remain, the following section seeks to unpack the role of the African Union 
within the dialogue of developing a comprehensively accepted definition.  
2.2.1.  The African Union’s Definition of Terrorism 
The previous section clearly illustrated that as a result of different schools of thought, and of 
contending perspectives, finding and developing a universal definition of terrorism is not an easy 
task, and more important, there are a number of existing definitions for the term. More intrinsically, 
defining terrorism is a pressing need within the fight against terrorist organizations and even more 
important, within the study of counter-terrorism. The African Union has formulated a broad and 
inclusive definition of terrorism, one which does not exempt the attacks perpetuated by state actors, 
and one which has been endorsed by most of its member states.  The Organization of African Unity 




Terrorism, a definition which is still accepted by the African Union, and as such stipulates that an 
act of terror can be defined as the following: 
 (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death 
to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to 
public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and 
is calculated or intended to:  
(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, 
the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or 
to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; 
or  
(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or 
to create a public emergency; or  
 (iii) create general insurrection in a State.  
 
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, 
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any 
person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii).  
While much of the above literature suggests that there is no universally adopted definition of 
terrorism, it is clear that the majority of definitions concur that the fundamental objectives of 
terrorism is to shape an environment of terror, to perpetuate and stimulate fear, and that in most 
cases it is perpetrated to attain a form of political means.   
2.2.2.  Contending Perspectives on the Conceptualisation of Terrorism 
According to Grosscup (2006), it is clear that the definitional challenge of terrorism exists, and is 
one of the concerning aspects within the studies and research of the concept. However there is no 
doubt that terrorism is often referred to as a deliberate and organised violent activity by non-




achieve political agendas whereby often innocent civilians are victims of extremely violent actions.  
Roberts (2015), agrees with Grosscup (2006) by arguing that due to the fact that only the state has 
the right to employ force, the legitimacy of politically-aggravated extremism and violence against 
state forces by terrorist movements should be questioned and challenged, precisely when innocent 
civilians are attacked and become victims.  Equally, Crenshaw (2014:24-27) shares similar 
sentiments with the abovementioned scholars, that there is no moral or legal justification for the 
targeting of unarmed civilians.  In fact, as a result, a large number of Western perspectives 
including those of Crenshaw (2014) agree that the popular notion of ‘one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter’, is extremely flawed because it distorts the idea of freedom through 
terrorism means.   
In contrast to the views of the abovementioned authors, Cloke (2001) and like-minded authors 
argue that terrorism is, in fact, an activity which can be utilised in the course of the struggle for 
freedom.  According to Botha and Okumu (2007), one of the most popular examples of such 
sentiments is in relation to the perspective of the former apartheid regime in South Africa which 
referred to the tactics of the armed wing of the African National Congress, Mkhonto WeSizwe, as 
acts of terror.  To add to the abovementioned sentiments, Oruka (2007) defines terrorism as “the 
intentional infliction of suffering or loss on one party by another party with no authority or 
legitimacy to do so, or which appears to have authority or legitimacy but has in fact deprived the 
sufferer of the minimum ethical consent necessary to recognize such authority or legitimacy”.  
Critiques of these mainstream sentiments on terrorism revolve around three thematic issues which 
are provided by a number of authors.  Firstly, Crowley and Wikinson (2013: 96), strongly argue 
that within the on-going wave of both domestic and international terrorism, religion exists 
predominantly as a means rather than an end.  Therefore, essentially the short, medium, and long 
term objectives of Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, and terrorist organisations alike are based on political 
agendas.  As a result of the political nature of terrorism, Hoffman (2009:359-362) argues that the 
depiction of religion as a goal or an objective is a simplification that weakens the inherently 
political nature of existing terrorism and essentially prohibits the establishment of policies 




Secondly, in addition to such critique, Sageman (2014:565-570) counters the sentiments of 
mainstream perspectives of terrorism by contending that the inclination of mainstream scholars to 
intently avoid the problem of state terrorism results in undermining an essential factor of the 
subject.   
 
Though several books, webpages, and articles have been published with respect to the broad study 
of terrorism, the volume of publications on overall state terrorism in particular, is relatively low; 
most of which alludes to the notion that the issue will be the subject of another publication or 
limiting its literature and commentary to state-only supported and sponsored terrorism.  That is 
why in most cases the definitions of terrorism adopted by western governments and scholars are 
limited to non-state actors as the primary perpetrators in terrorist activities.  In some instances, the 
lack of terrorism in authoritarian regimes, regardless of their oppressive nature, and the frequency 
of terrorism in democratic states (despite the existence of spaces for peaceful outcomes) is used as 
a basis for scholars such as Taylor (2014), to reject the notion that non-state terrorism is a response 
to state terrorism.  This occurred in his response to Sageman’s “the Stagnation in terrorism 
research”.  However, in reality, one of the fundamental drivers for non-state terrorism is not the 
fact that the target state or country adopts democratic principles internally, but the fact that it has 
enforced a specific foreign policy which is rejected by the terrorist organisation (Taylor, 
2014:582).   
Thirdly, mainstream scholars studying terrorism fail to comprehend the broader historical context 
in which terrorism has occurred and continues to occur.  This is not to say that scholars on the 
peripheries of mainstream studies agree with the organized killings of innocent civilians which 
result from terrorist campaigns on the pretext of the on-going unresolved nature of the conflict.  
The simple gist of it is, that as long as a battle or conflict, for example that occurring in Palestine 
or Kashmir, continues without a peaceful resolution, there will always be desperate and hopeless 
groups of people participating in illegal and morally unjust activities which are often extremely 
violent and vicious towards the enemy group or disliked political entity (Lentini, 2008:133).  
Furthermore, Lentini (2008) argues that all contexts of terrorism are unique and particular in their 





It is clear from the above perspectives on terrorism, that studies, research, and views around the 
conceptualization of terrorism have indeed progressed over the past two decades, especially in the 
wake of the 9/11 terror attacks on the United States.  While dialogue and debate surrounding the 
conceptualization of terrorism has advanced, the theoretical perspectives and approaches used as 
tools of analysis within the terrorism debate have also progressed.   
For this reason, the following section seeks to provide a brief outline of the theoretical framework 
which will inform this research study as well as a short overview of some of the primary critiques 
offered by CTS in its mission to unpack the ideological, conceptual, and institutional 
underpinnings of orthodox counter-terrorism approaches.   
2.3.  Critical Terrorism Studies 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, this study employs CTS to analyze the identified 
research problem.  According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012:11), a theoretical framework is a system 
of ideas or conceptual structures that assists researchers and scholars to explain as well as gain an 
understanding of the broader world system.  As such, Smith (2005: 28-29) argues that the most 
suitable method to reconsidering terrorism studies and research is reflected through some of its 
initial successes and findings within the literature related to critical security studies.  According to 
Jackson (2007) and Jarvis (2009), Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) can be defined as a set of 
epistemological, ontological, and ethical commitments that involve and take into account the 
importance of challenging the processes of knowledge production within the field of terrorism 
studies; a realization and consciousness of the fundamental ontological instability of the 
‘terrorism’ classification; a series of appropriately defined research ethics and a normative 
guarantee to an emancipatory political praxis (Jackson, 2007: 244). 
 
Jackson (2007:246) contends, further, that the recent evolution of security studies within the realm 
of international relations, has seen an increase in the number of terrorism scholars and intellectuals 
alike who have removed themselves from the contemporary underpinnings of terrorism studies 
which traditionally place an emphasis on problem-solving theory and have placed themselves at 
the centre of scholarship that critically assesses terrorism.  Moreover, it is important to note that 
CTS is built on a number of powerful critiques of the existing employment of orthodox terrorism 




solving positioning, and its institutional, structural, and intellectual relations to state-security tasks 
and developments (Gunning, 2007). 
 
CTS represents terrorism-associated research and scholarship that assumes and espouses a 
skeptical assertiveness towards the state-centric and one-dimensional interpretation of terrorism 
which is often adopted through orthodox approaches and perspectives.  Furthermore, this section 
of the literature review notes that CTS problematizes the military-driven approach which is a 
counter-terrorism approach that is used by numerous multilateral organizations including the 
African Union in its mission to counter terrorism on the African continent. This approach held by 
CTS correlates with its critique of orthodox mechanisms in dealing with the symptoms of the threat 
of terror, focusing on what it suggests are “quick fixes”.  CTS in its entirety supports the notion 
that for the threat of terrorism to be suppressed, it becomes imperative that multilateral 
organizations such as the African Union employ a two-pronged strategy which addresses both the 
root causes and the symptoms of terrorism.   
While the bulk of the remainder of this chapter focuses on a broad discussion of the strengths and 
limitations of the counter-terrorism agenda assumed by the African Union, Chapter 3 will provide 
a broad theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies and its origins.  It will also provide a 
comprehensive explanation and critique of orthodox terrorism studies according to the principles 
and perspectives of CTS.  This theoretical framework will operate as the foundation for the two 
case studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab that follow in Chapters 4 and 5.  Moreover, Chapter 
3 will pave the way for Chapter 6 which will provide an examination and evaluation of existing 
African Union counter-terrorism strategies in order to provide consensus regarding which factors 
need to be reconsidered in facilitating and assisting the AU in its fight against terrorism in the Horn 
of Africa and northern Nigeria.  In subsequent sections of this chapter, the researcher will briefly 
discuss the evolution, and most recent developments of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and 
northern Nigeria with specific reference to Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively.  
2.4. Terrorism in the Horn of Africa  
In the section that follows, an overview of existing literature in relation to terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa will be offered, with specific reference to the terror activities of Al-Shabaab in Somalia.  




scholars and experts of terrorism and counter-terrorism respectively.  By providing contending 
perspectives from various authors with respect to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, this section will 
facilitate the identification of gaps that may exist with specific reference to why groups such as 
Al-Shabaab employ means of terror to achieve their goals and what solutions should be employed 
in order to suppress such a terrorist organization.  The identification of these gaps could assist 
regional and multilateral actors such as the African Union and its peace and security structures in 
the fight against terrorism across the Horn of Africa.  The first subsection will concisely lay out a 
brief historical and regional context which will be followed by a short overview of existing 
scholarship on Al-Shabaab, its origins and recent history.  The third subsection will deal with the 
scope of counter-terrorism strategies against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa.  The last subsection 
will provide an appraisal of literature dedicated to Al-Shabaab.  
2.4.1.  Historical and Regional Context 
It is important to take into account that a large amount of literature that exists on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism begins with an in-depth overview and detailed discussion that seeks to detail the 
historical and regional context of the specific case being studied (Ibrahim, 2010; Miller, 2009).  In 
addition, Elmi (2011) provides a brief overview of the historical and regional context, as well as 
the struggle by local groups for power and resources, colonial and foreign intervention and state 
repression which precipitated the rise of radical Islam and extremism in the Horn of Africa with 
specific emphasis on Somalia.  Afyare Elmi (2011) argues that it is a combination of the struggle 
by local groups for power and resources, as well as colonial and foreign interference and further 
harsh state repression which has led to the current situation and ongoing crisis in the Horn of 
Africa.  
Within the contemporary geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa, there are six political 
entities with substantial Somali populations.  The first and most recognizable is the Transnational 
Federal Government (TFG).  The second political entity currently in existence is Puntland which 
is an autonomous state which, although it recognizes the authority of the TFG, implements 
independent policies.  The third is Somaliland, an autonomous region of Somalia which has 
garnered a relative amount of peace with stable governance while seeking to gain independence.  
The fourth entity which must be noted is the Republic of Djibouti.  The Somali National Regional 




eastern Province of Kenya (Møller 2009). 
As noted above, it is important to bear in mind that there is a combination of factors that have 
contributed to the rise and expansion of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. All the above-mentioned 
political entities have played a formidable role in the establishment and formation of what is now 
known as Al-Shabaab.   
 
The next section will provide contending as well as relating perspectives on Al-Shabaab with 
specific reference to its origins; evolution and transformation; objectives and motivations; and the 
scope of counter-terrorism against Al-Shabaab by regional and multilateral organizations which 
includes the African Union. 
2.4.2.  Al-Shabaab 
 
One cannot study and assess terrorism in the Horn of Africa without providing an examination of 
the role played by Al-Shabaab.  According to Samara (2010), at its inception, the US. Government 
identified Al-Shabab (also referred to as the Mujahidin Youth Movement or MYM) as a “specially 
designated global terrorist organization”.  Al-Shabaab was initially declared a threat to 
international peace and security by the U.S. Government in 2008. The primary aim of the next 
section is to unpack the body of literature currently in existence dealing with Al-Shabaab, its 
origins and its most recent history.   
i. Origins 
From the literary bodies of various scholars inclusive of Mwangi (2012:512) and Marchal (2009), 
one can contend that Al-Shabaab was founded in 2004.  According to statistics provided by 
AMISOM (2019), the organization now has approximately 9,000 militants.  Samatar (2010:322) 
attributes the current terror activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular those that are conducted 
by Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, to Somalia’s tumultuous past, whilst their radicalization, 
extremism, and rise to prominence are associated with the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopian troops 
in 2006, according to Wise (2011:4). The support propagated by its fighters and supporters is a 
result of the rise and support of the nationalistic battle and struggle against the Transitional Federal 





Wise (2011:5) contends further that the most accurate emergence and transition of the group can 
be noted between the periods during which the invasion of Ethiopia occurred on 24 December 
2004 and early 2008.  Irwin (2015:167-168) agrees with Wise’s (2011) assertion by contending 
that the Islamist group rose to prominence as a result of its contestation and resentment which was 
felt by the majority of Somalis towards the intervention of the Ethiopian military.  Moreover, the 
arguments claimed by Irwin (2015) and Wise (2011) are supported by Masters (2013).  Masters 
(2013) argues that a combination of the Ethiopian military forces and the presence of the 
Transnational Federal Government (TFG) paved the way for the radical resentment and response 
that eventually arose. Therefore, one can attribute the creation of Al-Shabaab to the 
abovementioned factors which Mwangi (2012: 521) states also led to the concoction of nationalist, 
Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-Western, and anti-American resentment.  
ii. Evolution and Transformation 
In addition to the origins of Al-Shabaab, scholars of terrorism have attempted to examine an 
essential component of understanding the complexities that exist within the realm of terror 
activities conducted by Al-Shabaab by thoroughly examining the evolution and transformation of 
the Islamist group. Since the successful reinstatement of Mogadishu in 2004 by the TFG and 
AMISOM, Al-Shabaab has committed and executed a number of horrific and devastatingly violent 
terror attacks.  According to Elliot & Holzer (2009:224), the leaders of the group relentlessly strive 
for the resistance against the TFG and AMISOM. 
 
According to Mazska (2017), Al-Shabaab endured major changes which began in 2008.  Mazska 
concludes that Al-Shabaab has undergone three phases (from inception to December 2007, January 
2008 to April 2008, May 2008 to July 2011) and is currently in its fourth phase (August 2011 to 
the present).  In the first two phases Al-Shabaab emerged as an insurgent group with the strategic 
objective of replacing the government and later transitioned into a group with the objective of 
destabilizing the entire region.  During the third phase which is seen as an evolving period within 
the movement, Al-Shabaab intended to engage less in governance and more in violent terror 
strategies.  As a result, Al-Shabaab has now evolved into an organization which seeks solely to 





The next section provides further discussion regarding assertions made by Wise (2011:8) and like-
minded authors who assert that Al-Shabaab has transitioned from a local movement based in 
Somalia into an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization which has the intentions and objectives of 
dismantling any Western targets and spaces within its surroundings.  
iii. Objectives and Motivations 
As mentioned above, Mazska (2017) identifies four distinct phases through which the group has 
transitioned.  For each phase, Mazska questions whether Al-Shabaab’s strategic goal has been to 
overthrow the government or to coerce political concessions.  Mazska adds that in the first two 
phases, Al-Shabaab’s strategic objectives were to drive out the Ethiopian military and to further 
overthrow the Transnational Federal Government (TFG).  However, Mazska concludes that as a 
result of a change in the group’s leadership, the strategic operations, and ideological functions 
have also evolved and changed (as did its sphere of influence) to one intending to inflict violence 
and terror.  Authors of strategic analysis such as Strachan (2008) and Rousseau (2012) add 
substance to Mazska’s deductions by stating that the current goals of Al-Shabaab have moved 
away from its traditional conventional strategy of seeking to overthrow the Somali government to 
its more contemporary strategic goal of employing violence to coerce and inflict political 
concessions from foreign governments. This finding demonstrates that Al-Shabaab’s strategic 
objectives changed from attempting to replace the Somali government to a more transnational 
strategy of destabilizing the entire region.   
iv. Scope of Counter-terrorism Against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa 
In addition to understanding the goals, objectives, and the future endeavors of Al-Shabaab, it is 
important that one should explore the body of literature around counter-terrorism of Al-Shabaab 
in the Horn of Africa.  It is clear that the ongoing conflict in Somalia is related to the country’s 
historical development as described in the literary writings of scholars such as Botha and Abdile 
(2014).  Solomon (2015) asserts that it is necessary to review literature that focuses on current 
counter-terrorism approaches; as well as scholarship which critiques and reconsiders the current 
methods of intervention and counter-terrorism strategies employed by both regional and 





Further, scholars such as Buluma (2014:7) assert that the endorsement of the African Union in the 
fight against Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and specifically in Somalia, resulted in the birth of 
the African Union in Somalia (AMISOM).  AMISOM comprises trained and equipped forces from 
Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia.  AMISOM is regarded as the primary organ 
which assists the Somali security forces in reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other 
armed opposition groups.   
 
While scholars such as Meleagrou- Hitchens and Solomon (2012) have hailed AMISOM as a 
success for Somalia, arguing that its methods have resulted in the first mission whereby African 
forces have been used in an African intervention to enforce peace, many scholars such as 
Mohamud (2014) have criticized AMISOM for “failing to train and improve the Somali forces 
assisting forces with the necessary equipment needed”. Among other findings, literature by Elliot 
& Holzer (2009:227) indicate that regional actors need to increase their overall assistance capacity 
and strength in terms of resources and human capacity if a military focused approach is to be 
employed within its counter-terrorism campaign.   
 
Williams (2018) argues that while AMISOM have attempted to employ a multi-pronged strategy 
– within its military, police, and civilian components – there is still an over-reliance on a military 
centered counter-terrorism strategy that seeks to “degrade and destroy” Al-Shabaab.  In addition 
to Williams (2018) observations, Hesse (2010:72) argues that a military focused approach will not 
serve in the best interests with respect to the counter-terrorism project against Al-Shabaab.  
Instead, Hesse (2010) supports the notion of a two-pronged strategy which focuses on attacking 
both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism.  Hesse (2010) suggests that a more patient and 
rational policy strategy aligned and centered primarily on non-military action (diplomatic, 
information gathering, and economic) may grant the most successful results in confronting Al-
Shabaab.  The gaps within the currently employed approach of the African Union make it pertinent 
for this research study to employ the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) to 
critique the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies of the African Union in relation to Al-





This section illustrated the significance that a combination of historical legacies and factors within 
the Horn of Africa led to the origins, and further transformation of Al-Shabaab.  Furthermore, 
while a number of authors hail the African Union’s counter-terrorism agenda in Somalia as a 
success, many authors contend that in order for the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy to 
yield the necessary results in its fight against Al-Shabaab, a two-pronged approach needs to be 
adopted.  The following section of the chapter seeks to discuss literature specifically related to the 
historical context of terrorism in northern Nigeria, the most recent developments that have led to 
the establishment and formation of Boko-Haram and provide perspectives of the currently adopted 
counter-terrorism strategies.   
2.5.  Terrorism in Northern Nigeria   
The purpose of this section is to review some of the literature dealing with terrorism in northern 
Nigeria with specific reference to Boko Haram’s current operations in the region.  In addition, the 
focus of this section is to review literature that seeks to explain the development and undertakings 
of Boko Haram throughout northern Nigeria, with the purpose of eventually exposing gaps in 
literature which could assist regional and multilateral organizations such as the African Union in 
their missions to rectify the crisis and suppress Boko Haram.  This section of the chapter will be 
divided into three distinct categories.  The first category seeks to provide a background and 
historical context of terrorism within northern Nigeria.  The subsection that follows intends to offer 
the reader a brief overview of literature that espouses the origins and evolution of Boko Haram; 
followed by a discussion of its motivations and contemporary objectives.  Lastly, this section of 
the chapter will provide a scope of regional counter-terrorism approaches in relation to Boko 
Haram.  
2.5.1.  Context of Historical Legacy 
Many terrorism scholars including Botma (2015), have linked the rise of terrorism in northern 
Nigeria to socio-economic and historical factors in Nigeria.  While Nigeria has been independent 
for nearly six decades, the country remains divided along tribal and religious lines.  Since it gained 
independence, the country has undergone numerous military coups which are often linked to the 
ethnic and religious tensions as mentioned above (Bamidele (2012:35).  According to Botma 




Botma (2015) argues that as a result of the policy of non-intervention put into place in northern 
Nigeria by the British colonial regime, missionary schools were established in the South of Nigeria 
and not in the north of country.  This created a clear distinction between the forms of education 
that were provided in the two regions.  Today western forms of education are often rejected in the 
north by Islamic sects such as Boko Haram.  Various themes surrounding Boko Haram will be 
discussed in the following section.   
2.5.2.  Boko Haram 
The formal name of Boko Haram is Jama’atu Ahl As-Sunna Li-D’awati Wal-Jihad, an Arabic 
name which in English translates to “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s 
Teachings and Jihad.”  Furthermore, Boko Haram is a Hausa term which means “Western 
education is forbidden”.  The Islamic sect has waged a wave of terror predominantly in the 
northernmost region of Nigeria over the course of the last decade through the assistance of its 
recruits who consist of marginalized young people, depressed and disenfranchised individuals, as 
well as unemployed young people (Aina, 2016: 36).  Agbiboa (2013) asserts that the sect seeks to 
threaten the peace, stability, and national sovereignty of Nigeria by targeting Nigerian 
governmental institutions and national symbols.  While the Islamic sect initially used violence to 
attack public and government institutions, it has since extended its acts of terror to include innocent 
civilians, market spaces and religious structures.  It must be noted that the group gained global 
prominence through the #BringBackOurGirls protests on social media which was a call against 
the kidnapping of more than 270 school girls in Chibok in 2014 by Boko Haram (Alexander, 2012).   
The subsections below give a short overview of literature espoused by a number of scholars in 
relation to various areas of focus including the origins and formations; motivations and objectives; 
as well as contending perspectives on the regional responses to Boko Haram.   
i. Origin and Initial Formation 
According to Sani (2011: 2), during its infant years, the Islamist sect was popularly referred to as 
the ‘Nigerian Taliban’ as a result of its mutual anti-Western ideology as well as its strict use of 
Sharia law through violent efforts.  While Connel (2012:90) asserts that Boko Haram was founded 
in the mid-1990’s as a religious group under the original name of “Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra”, 




transition in 2009 into the insurgent group that it is known as today, under the leadership of a 
young and charismatic cleric named Mohammed Yusuf.  
An abundance of literature on Boko Haram, its origins and further transformations vary largely 
with regard to the reasons surrounding the creation, establishment, and continuous existence of the 
Islamist sect (Bamidele, 2012:33).  Various scholars are of the notion that the roots of the group 
lie largely within the “Maitatsine” doctrine (an Islamic fundamentalist manifesto introduced 
predominantly in northern Nigeria in 1945) (Bamidele, 2012:34).  On the other hand, scholars such 
as Cook (2014:45) argue that Boko Haram ascended as a result of the resurgence of Islamic militant 
movements across the globe.  Furthermore, Solomon (2012) clearly unpacks the factors that led to 
the emergence of Boko Haram.  His argument is linked to the group’s response to local grievances, 
particularly its outrage of the circumstances in northern Nigeria which include increasing 
grievances with the decreasing standard of living; the corrupt political sphere and a Nigerian state 
that perpetuates religious divisions throughout the country (Solomon, 2012: 8-9).   
Having said that, Ugorji (2016) argues that perhaps there is a very vague understanding of the 
sect’s ideology, the core causes influencing the scourge of terror waged by Boko Haram which 
include the sect’s motivations, goals, objectives, and factors which continue to contribute to the 
crisis.  For this reason, literature surrounding such inadequate comprehension will be further 
reviewed in following sections of this literature review.   
ii. Motivation, Goals, and Objectives 
Orthodox Islam is the practice deeply rooted and entrenched in the philosophy adopted by Boko 
Haram.  Their ideology is fundamentally associated to the meaning of their name.  Perhaps this 
explains the reason why the group adopted the name Boko Haram, which directly translated 
literally means “Western Education is a sin” (Onuoha, 2012:2).  However, Agbiboa (2013:429) 
discredits the abovementioned justification suggesting that the group has popularly rejected the 
translation stating that it prefers the translation “Western Education is forbidden”.  As the name 
adopted by the group indicates, its ideologies are deeply rooted in anti-Western sentiments and 
values just like those of many other Islamic fundamentalist groups.  Boko Haram is under the 
impression that Western-led education, values, and beliefs are a risk to the traditional beliefs, 




region of Nigeria (Walker, 2012:3).  According to Walker (2012) the group’s ideological mission 
is to overthrow the government of Nigeria; to further implement strict Sharia law within the secular 
state of Nigerian; and to rid Nigeria of the decadence of Western culture. 
iii. Regional Response  
Within the scholarship dedicated to understanding the origins and initial formations as well as the 
motivations, objectives, and goals of Boko Haram, there is a widespread understanding amongst 
scholars including Crowley and Wilkinson (2013:106) that Boko Haram poses a serious and 
violent threat to the security, stability, and further socio-economic and political developments in 
Nigeria and its neighboring countries. In their work, Brinkel & Ait-Hida, (2012), demonstrate that 
the current measures put in place by the Nigerian government focus primarily on confronting the 
symptoms of terrorism.  The AU, along with its security forces, including the Nigerian government 
have employed a lackluster military approach to counter Boko Haram, namely through the 
utilization of military raids; roadblocks; ineffective intelligence operations; military checkpoints; 
and extrajudicial killings.  While a military approach is necessary, it is important that an approach 
that seeks to address the root causes is put into effect.   
As a result, such a response is ineffective, and in fact necessitates an approach that confronts the 
root causes and symptoms of terrorism to resolve the crisis.  Such an approach encompasses an 
administrative-wide strategy by which the military stretches its operations with the aim of 
regulating the areas in which the group operates in order to assist the Nigerian government to 
confront the roots of the threat that is Boko Haram, as well as the circumstances that aid the 
expansion of this sect in the North-eastern region (START, 2015). 
Scholars within the realm of security studies including Solomon (2012) argue that the largest and 
highest body on the African continent with the highest capacity and influence on security processes 
and measures is, without a doubt, the African Union (AU).  Solomon (2012) further expands his 
assertions by acknowledging that since its establishment in 2002, the African Union’s primary 
objective has been to reintroduce and reinforce the already-prevalent counter-terror approaches 
and measures, as well as to facilitate the coordination between states and the regional bodies. While 
Solomon makes these claims regarding the efforts of the AU, he also acknowledges that the AU is 




terrorism.  Scholarly writings of Williams (2014) and Wilshner (2014) indicate that there has been 
a renewed sense of unity that has taken shape between African leaders in relation to the threat of 
Boko Haram in the regions that it predominantly occupies.  This reinvigorated sense of unity is 
reflected through the co-operative pledges by African leaders to wage a ‘total war’ in response to 
Boko Haram.  Wilshner (2014) links this renewed sense of unity amongst African leaders to the 
kidnapping of the Chibok girls.   
Through the literature reviewed throughout this section, it is clear that transitional threats such as 
those posed by Boko Haram are intrinsically multifaceted and demand regional cooperation, and 
widespread investment towards matters of peace and security.  For this reason, it is imperative that 
one takes into account that as Boko Haram transitions from a localized Islamist sect to a 
transnational threat; widespread cooperation and mutual intelligence-sharing among neighboring 
countries, and regional bodies will assist in curbing the organization.  Literature centered around 
regional action suggests that Boko Haram can no longer be considered simply a localized and 
regional threat. For this reason, the focus needs to be transferred to overpowering the Islamist sect 
on a broader scale by addressing both the root causes and the symptoms of the crisis posed by 
Boko Haram. 
2.6.  The African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Framework 
The essence of this section is to discuss and appraise the endeavors assumed by the African Union 
in addressing and confronting the plague of terrorism on the African continent.  In addition, the 
role of this section is to examine the literature that unpacks the counter-terrorism agenda of the 
African Union.  A further objective of the section is to present a discussion of the literature that 
exposes the strengths, limitations, and further weaknesses that are found within the AU’s capacity 
to tackle the threat of terrorism across the African continent.  Furthermore, this section seeks to 
provide literature illustrating perspectives that raise questions about the effectiveness of the 
African Unions’ counter-terrorism agenda.  This section also intends to operate as a guide for the 
two case studies of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab that follow in Chapters 4 and 5, specifically 
looking at the strategies that the African Union has adopted to counter the afore-mentioned terrorist 
organizations, respectively.  This section will be guided by the first supportive research question 
which is:  




In addition, the literature that will be referred to, supports the notion that the role and the function 
of the AU serves as the primary driver in the fight and prevention of terrorism, and thus the inter-
governmental organization acts as a catalyst with the capacity to fill in the gaps where its member 
states and Regional Economic Communities otherwise lack the strength and expertise to do so. In 
addition to much of the literature that has been reviewed throughout, this section acknowledges 
that in order to alleviate and ameliorate the threat of terrorism on the continent, the methods 
currently adopted must be revisited, and subsequently new methods must be developed. 
2.6.1.  The African Union:  A Paradigm Shift 
Ewi and Anning (2006: 33) argue that the transformation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) into the African Union (AU) in the wake of the global war on terror (GWOT) which was 
initially declared by a former President of the United States, George W Bush, could not have come 
at a better time.  The declaration came at a time when the global order was in need of unity and 
solidarity.  As a result of historical developments and terror campaigns that have plagued the 
African continent: the slaughtering of hundreds and thousands in Algeria; the US Embassy 
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; as well as urban terrorism in Cape Town in the late 1990s, 
the African Union was forced to establish a number of strategies and approaches intended to tackle 
the vicious and frightening trend of terrorism.   
The following section will offer a concise discussion of the shift away from the policies of non-
interference in the sovereignty of state security that had initially been adopted by the OAU in the 
establishment of necessary mechanisms for combating and preventing terrorism; and which was 
subsequently adopted by the African Union.  
As mentioned above, the historical developments of terror activities that continued to threaten the 
state of security across the African continent led to a mutual acknowledgement that there was a 
need for the OAU to establish the necessary mechanisms and strategies to address and deal with 
the dilemma of violent extremism.  It was only in 1992 at its 28th ordinary session which took 
place in Dakar, Senegal, under the guidance of the OAU, that African states began to move away 
from the policy of non-interference towards the adoption of a Resolution on the strengthening of 
cooperation and coordination among its member states (OAU Assembly of Heads of State & 




Furthermore, one can consider the June 1994 Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African 
relations, at the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Tunis, Tunisia as a significant 
milestone of the OAU in its initial participation in the battle against terrorism, and its holistic 
efforts of pursuing peace, stability, security, and co-operation amongst member states.  Sturman 
(2002:104) contends that amongst many other concerns, this declaration condemned violent 
extremism, and acts of terrorism which undermine values, principles, and the moral fiber of 
humanity, specifically the righteous freedoms and liberties of individuals.   
Many African scholars dedicated to the amelioration and fight against terrorism on the African 
continent, including Makinda (2003), argue that the Declaration on the Code of Conduct as 
adopted by the OAU marked a shift in the approach of responding to the threat of terrorism.  It 
shaped the standards, benchmarks, and continental framework for addressing and preventing 
terrorism in all its manifestations.  In this regard, Dugard (2011:163) maintains that this was also 
a significant step in the right direction for the African continent as such a declaration paved the 
way to identify and address the root causes of terrorism, as well as to establish an agenda and 
framework focused on interstate cooperation in Africa. This is based on agreed criteria for fighting 
terrorism. 
i. The African Union 
The transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union, according to 
Dersso (2010:113-114), did not only constitute a formal transformation, but it served as a regime 
change which included significant normative and institutional transformations, many of which 
were unimaginable under the governance of the OAU.  The capacity of the newly formed AU to 
recognize, identify, and acknowledge the urgency of uniting its efforts at the inter-governmental 
level with the intention of fighting the scourge of terrorism, was significantly highlighted within 
the Constitutive Act of the African Union, an Act that placed an emphasis on the activities 
governing the African Union. These include the respect for African bodies, human life, the 
dismissal and rejection of acts of terror amongst other subversive activities (Constitutive Act of 
the African Union, 2000).  As previously mentioned, with the purpose of consolidating and 
strengthening the responsibilities and commitments of member states as agreed upon under the 
Convention of 1999 and other global counter-terrorism approaches, the African Union Plan of 




Combating of Terrorism in Africa, in Algiers, Algeria (Intergovernmental Meeting on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, 2002). 
According to Article 2 of the OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating of Terrorism, 
Algiers Convention (2002), the principal objective of the African Union’s Plan of Action, as 
prescribed under its preamble, is to offer solid expression to responsibilities and commitments, as 
well as to encourage and enhance the capacity of member states to access and adopt counter-
terrorism tools through various approaches and measures, thereby establishing a state-wide 
beneficial counter-terrorism agenda. The Plan of Action as noted in Paragraph 9 of the Plan of 
Action (2002) embraces a realistic and sensible counter-terrorism approach that significantly seeks 
to tackle Africa’s challenges, especially those concerning security, subversion, and violent 
extremism.  In addition, the Plan of Action clearly amplifies the general and specific approaches 
that member states are required to adhere to within the realm of addressing, tackling, and 
countering the scourge of terrorism.  These include compliance with and inclusion of measures in 
important institutions and strategic structures such as police, border control, judicial procedures, 
financing of terrorism, and information-sharing (OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating 
of Terrorism, Algiers Convention, 2002).   
An additional Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism was 
adopted by the third ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Addis Ababa in July 
2004 (Nurudeen, 2012:18). Nurudeen (2012:19) notes that the proposal for the adoption of the 
Protocol was made by 28 heads of state meeting in Dakar, on 17 October 2001. The Protocol, 
which also contains provisions on the role of the African Union Commission and the regional 
mechanisms for conflict prevention, among other things, provides for adequate measures for the 
suppression of terrorist financing, human rights protection safeguards, as well as addressing the 
risks of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 
Scholars such as Solomon are very outspoken about the major concerns of the AU since its 
transformation from the OAU.  Solomon (2012) argues that since its evolution from the OAU to 
the AU, the organization’s fundamental focus has been centered on reinforcing, strengthening, and 
implementing its counter-terror mechanisms while encouraging rigorous co-ordination between its 




African Union is an instrument that exists as a nexus between the African continent and the broader 
global community, and as such, terrorism, as seen in the AU constitutive Act, Article 4(o) exists 
as a key component of the immediate global dilemma to the African Union.  
 
Furthermore, the literature espoused by Ewi and Anning (2007) addresses how the African Union’s 
counter-terrorism framework is one of the best on paper, which can be reflected in the plethora of 
interventions the continental body has employed to tackle the rage of terrorism across the continent 
since its transformation from the OAU.  While this may be the case, Fayemi (2004) suggests that 
on the other hand, the African Union’s counter-terrorism mission is continuously strained by a 
lack of available resources.  
2.6.2. The African Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy 
The African Union, on paper and as clearly shown in the previous sections, has, since its transition 
away from the Organization of African Unity, attempted to transform itself into an 
intergovernmental body that has embraced an effective and efficient counter-terrorism framework 
which has been globally applauded.  Solomon (2012) embraces the abovementioned discourse by 
arguing that such reasoning manifests itself in the plethora of interventions undertaken by the 
African Union in its drive to address and tackle the plague of terrorism on the continent since it 
moved away from its policy of sovereignty and non-intervention as prescribed under the OAU.  It 
is important that one unpacks the geo-political and economic contexts within the African continent, 
especially when attempting to gain a comprehensive understanding of the capacity to which the 
African Union is eligible to represent and govern its member states or even act independently on 
various issues of continental importance such as the scale of integration throughout the continent 
and the amount of power and sovereignty that its member states delegate to it (Ewi & Anning, 
2006).   
Following from the above argument, Fayemi (2007) concedes that the challenges embodied by the 
African Union in its quest to effectively combat terrorism are not necessarily a result of the 
monumental scourge of terrorism on the continent, but are rather due to the lack of capacity of 
African states, regional bodies, and continental organizations to respond efficiently and abruptly 
to terrorist activities.  In formulating this argument, Fayemi’s (2007), identifies numerous core 




(i) the understanding of historic perspectives of state sovereignty and independence;  
(ii) the growth and rapid escalation of regionalism in the absence of mutually inclusive 
regional principles;  
(iii) the challenges of overseeing hegemonic regionalism;  
(iv) the rise of elitism under the disguise of regional integration, neglecting the wellbeing 
of the greater African community;  
(v) the formation of structures and institutions which lack the capacity to handle and 
address these elitist mongers;  
(vi) the notion that regionalism is an externally motivated undertaking (Fayemi, 2007).   
Ewi and Anning’s earlier views (2006) support Fayemi’s (2007) later sentiments by 
acknowledging that a critical assessment of the implementation and application of the African 
Union’s counter-terrorism framework will uncover that it is being challenged by a number of the 
above obstacles.  Since the African Union transitioned away from its precursor organization, the 
Organization of African Union, it has embarked on a path of prioritizing counter-terrorism using 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as its medium by establishing coordination and cooperation 
of its member states, regional economic communities within the African continent, and 
encouraging interstate and regional collaboration in Africa (Ewi & Anning, 2006:34).   A series of 
dialogues that took place at the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, held in Algiers in 2002, resulted in the African Union 
Plan of Action which provided an agenda and roadmap for African states, in particular member 
states of the African Union to employ a series of counter-terrorism approaches.  This was discussed 
in the previous section, and will be further elaborated on in following sections.  
Moreover, according to the body of literature reviewed from the works of Nurudeen (2012), it is 
apparent that within the structures of the African counter-terrorism mission, there is a monumental 
gap between the political will on the one hand, and the financial and human capacity and resources 
that are required in order to counter terrorism adequately.  Nurudeen (2012) makes an important 
observation in relation to the counter-terrorism division within the Peace and Security department 
of the African Union by contending that among several issues inherited by the department, the 
shortage of staff and human capital is an aspect that has substantially hindered the capacity of the 




the UNOSSA (2010) expert paper which speaks directly to the unwillingness of the AU’s member 
states to supply and allocate the necessary financial, technical, and human capital required for the 
continental body to achieve its desired inputs and to meet expectations.  Perhaps the lack of 
prioritization stems from the historic belief of member states that the current security threat on the 
African continent is minute in comparison to the manifestations of poverty, health, and 
international conflicts.   
In the next section, the African Union Plan of Action which was briefly referred to above, will be 
discussed. 
2.6.3. AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa 
While the previous section aimed to introduce the counter-terrorism agenda of the African Union, 
this section aims at analyzing one of the core programs of that agenda by examining the primary 
objectives and key intentions of the AU’s Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism.  Notably, the Plan of Action was formulated with the objective of delivering a solid 
expression to the commitments and responsibilities of African stakeholders, member states, and 
relevant actors to curb and prevent terrorism, while simultaneously enhancing their access to the 
relevant counter-terrorism tools and instruments (Intergovernmental Meeting on the Prevention 
and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, 2002).   
Further, the Plan of Action is tasked with formulating robust guidelines, mechanisms and strategies 
for state-wide shared action in the fight against terrorism by integrating regional, continental, and 
international scales and standards for ridding the continent of terrorism within specific parameters 
of Resolution 1373 (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002).  In 
essence, the Plan of Action can be understood as the manifesto or the doctrine which stipulates the 
African Union’s counter-terrorism strategies and endeavors.  The Plan of Action emphasizes that 
in order for the AU’s counter-terrorism strategies to be fully effective, there must be integrated 
action as well as concrete commitment by all stakeholders and actors, particularly member states 
(AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002).  According to Ewi and 
Anning (2006:39), one of the notable achievements of the Plan of Action is the establishment and 
advancement of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which was 




fundamental importance of strengthening the capacity of its member states through joint action, 
regional cooperation and intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration.   
The next subsection will examine some of the developments and advancements of the African 
Union’s Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism since it came into existence 
by reviewing the work executed by its primary organs.   
i. The Peace and Security Council  
The African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) was launched on 25 May 2004. Nurudeen 
(2012:7) contends that the Peace and Security Council is tasked with, amongst other 
responsibilities, the obligation of making sure that the undertaking of the Plan of Action on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other respective regional, continental, and global 
mechanisms and mediums co-ordinate in harmony in order to meet the commitments to eliminate 
terrorism at a regional and continental level.   
Solomon (2015:223) notes that terrorism has continued to evolve into a monumental security 
concern and issue across the African continent, and thus, the PSC has also evolved and emerged 
as the premier organ of the AU, tasked with, amongst other security matters, the responsibility of 
preventing and combating terrorism in Africa. Furthermore, Botha and Abdile (2014) in their 
collaboration on Terrorism in Africa argue that since its establishment, the AU has evolved as a 
powerful organ of the OAU, ensuring that the standards that were prescribed at the Algiers 
Convention are being correctly and effectively prioritized.   
The importance of the role assumed by the PSC in relation to the AU Commission is noted in 
Paragraph 17, article 5 of the AU’s Plan of Action (2002), which unequivocally states the PSC’s 
core responsibilities and tasks.  It contends that the PSC is to enhance technical support on legal 
matters, in particular matters concerning the prevention of terrorism resourcing and financing. 
Secondly, the PSC is to formulate the necessary laws for the African model law on counter-
terrorism and set up guidelines that will assist member states to devise and implement the 
necessary legislation for preventing and combating terrorism; and most important, like all the other 
organs of the AU, the PSC has a key responsibility to ensure, as a matter of priority, that it follows 




member states have undertaken in the fight against terrorism, whether it is on a regional or 
continental scale (AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2002).   
ii. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism  
Headquartered in Algiers, Algeria, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism 
was officially launched on the occasion of the Second High-Level Intergovernmental Summit as 
part of the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa which took 
place in October of 2004 (Adekanye, 2006:1). Adekanye (2006:3) suggests that the ACSRT 
emerged as a component of the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council that would 
offer technical assistance to the AU on issues relating to terrorism and subsequently offer 
prevention mechanisms and measures to combat terrorism.  Zondi (2016:3) complements the 
abovementioned arguments and suggestions by contending that the objective of the ACSRT is to 
collect information, disseminate knowledge, and centralize the research and analysis of terrorism 
and the respective groups involved in terrorist activities while simultaneously engaging in a series 
of research and training initiatives with the help of regional and global partners with the sole 
purpose of addressing and tackling the scourge of terrorism on the African continent.  Many 
scholars, including Zondi (2016), argue that the ACSRT like many other Centers of Excellence on 
the African continent, will provide the required technical capacities necessary for the counter-
terrorism agenda, and will further allow the AU members to translate their roles and 
responsibilities into proactive actions. 
Experts and scholars of terrorism on the African continent including Adekanye (2006), celebrate 
the ACSRT as one of the AU’s most prolific milestones in relation to its endeavors to apply 
concrete counter-terrorism measures.  As mentioned above, with the support of the AU and its 
umbrella organizations, as well as other respective security organs, the ACSRT has been able to 
assume an active role in assisting the AU with regards to preventing terrorism.  Such a proactive 
role can be seen through an undertaking of the ACSRT as it set up a forum for the co-operation 
and integration amongst the AU’s member states and its respective regional communities through 
their Focal Points.  These previously mentioned Focal Points convened at their 5th annual meeting 




their application and execution of the ascribed Plan of Action for the period of 2010-2013.  The 
Centre has also set up a number of important meetings and dialogues at regional level which 
included Focal Points and where several decisions and agreements were considered.  At the core 
of these decisions and agreements lay the establishment of a Code of Conduct governing the 
affiliation between the Centre and the Focal points and the Threat Assessment Template (United 
Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2006: 1-54). 
Furthermore, the ACSRT played a fundamental role in assisting member states to strengthen their 
national legislations that would enable them to meet their continental requirements in 
implementing the African model law on counter-terrorism.  To that end, the ACSRT has emerged 
as an entity that has enabled the AU Plan of Action to develop its capacity in a number of ways in 
its battle against terrorism.   
2.7. Analysis of Literature 
The purpose of this section is to assess the literature dissected and consulted throughout this 
chapter.  There are a number of clear-cut observations that can be concluded as a result of the 
conducted investigation and analysis of past and current literature on terrorism, and counter-
terrorism strategies employed specifically by the African Union.  There is no doubt that beyond 
the 9/11 attacks, the evolution of both Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in the regions which they have 
terrorized, has changed the way in which the AU, its member states, scholars, and experts think 
and assess domestic and transnational terrorism.   The literature reviewed revealed the fundamental 
need to move away from the conventional and orthodox application of studying and dealing with 
the threat of terrorism, towards applying a theoretical framework that critically explains, assesses 
and addresses terrorism and counter-terrorism in its entirety.  
Furthermore, while it has illustrated that there has been some leeway in the currently employed 
counter-terrorism approaches, it has encouraged the need for scholars to re-evaluate and reinforce 
the strategies currently adopted by the African Union.  
The two subsections that follow will examine and discuss the strengths and shortcomings of the 
literature reviewed, and will conclude by identifying any gaps which exist in past and current 




2.7.2. Strength of Literature 
The literature reviewed on the subjects of terrorism and counter-terrorism specifically, have 
increasingly dominated public discourse.  The abovementioned topics have accumulated much 
attention, especially within the wake and rise of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram in their respective 
regions.  The literature reviewed has also revealed the challenges that scholars, policy makers, and 
world leaders have had in establishing and formulating a universally agreed-upon 
conceptualisation and definition of the abovementioned concepts.  Many of the authors referenced 
have demonstrated how the aforementioned concepts have transformed and continue to develop.  
The literature surveyed serves as a significant basis for the current debates and discourses that are 
currently occurring regarding one of the most challenging obstacles plaguing the global arena.  The 
literature has emphasised the rapidly increasing nature of terrorism worldwide post-9/11; has 
identified the main and common drivers surrounding terrorism coupled with some of the solutions 
to combating terrorism that have been put forward by various authors in the field of terrorism 
studies.   
Further, the literature showcases that a number of factors (failed states, instability, porous borders, 
fragile economies, weak governance, and poverty) play a role in the expansion of terrorism. 
Therefore these scholars make it clear that religious, political and economic factors are not the 
only factors that aid in the facilitation of terrorism.  This was made significantly apparent in the 
section on terrorism in the Horn of Africa with the example of Al-Shabaab predominantly 
engaging in terrorist activities in Somalia and Kenya, and terrorism in the Northern region of 
Nigeria, where Boko Haram is currently established.   
An additional strength of the literature review, lies in the examples of terrorism which have 
manifested in Somalia and Northern Nigeria, and the emerging fact of the influence of the 
historical contexts of both these regions on the state of security in the respective areas.  The 
literature outlining the background historical contexts of the regions in which these areas are to be 
found, as well as the history and transformation of these organisations, provides a solid basis on 
which future scholars of the topic can build.   
Further, literature espoused by various scholars including Zondi (2016:3), specifically in relation 




assessed stresses that as the AU transitioned from the OAU, it was forced to act as a medium that 
would enable states and Regional Economic Communities to attain their roles and responsibilities 
within the continental and global counter-terrorism framework.  Additionally, the African Union 
was forced to redefine and further reinforce its capacity within the international and continental 
realities on the African continent as a result of the systemic stratification of stakeholders and the 
dispersal of roles within the Global War on Terror.   For this reason, over an increasing period of 
time, the AU has witnessed the growth in its position as a catalyst for the setting of principles, 
norms, and standards within the fight against the threat of terrorism on the continent, and 
subsequently as a nexus between the continent and the international community.  One cannot 
neglect the fundamental importance of the AU as a significant standard-setter resulting from its 
adoption of the African Union Plan of Action, together with various counter-terrorism resolutions 
including continuing works; which manifest as the formulation of an extensive African Anti-
Terrorism Model Law.   
2.7.3. Shortcomings of Literature 
There are a number of shortcomings and gaps that can be pinpointed in the literature on terrorism 
and the subsequent countering and combating of terrorism.  The literature on terrorism emanates 
from the Middle East, whereas the volume of overall publications of the terrorist hubs in northern 
Nigeria and the Horn of Africa in which Boko Haram and Al-Shabbab are currently operating, are 
relatively low.   
Studies that have been conducted in the last two decades, specifically research conducted post- 
9/11, have presented literature that indicates that there is an abundance of literature that has been 
advanced in relation to terrorism and counter-terrorism measures across the globe.  This review of 
literature also suggests that there is a need to revisit the current counter-terrorism strategies 
currently employed in the Horn of Africa with respect to the combating of Al-Shabaab, and in  
northern Nigeria with respect to countering Boko Haram.  This literature review has also 
highlighted a few deficits:  firstly, the absence and lack of analysis and assessment of primary 
sources is a fundamental deficiency in the field of terrorism studies; secondly, the relatively low 
percentage of researchers who have conducted field research and have had primary and personal 




critiquing research on terrorism studies.  This is a reflection of the insubstantial number of pertinent 
publications centred on empirical research and of the absence of assessed quantitative and 
qualitative field study.   
There are a number of gaps that arise in the literature review which include the inability to explain 
how individuals shift from being dissatisfied and discontented towards embracing violence as a 
means of political gain.  The issue at hand again is the comprehension of terrorism as reflected in 
the literature which is still unable to provide clarity on why individuals become terrorists whilst 
others do not participate in acts of terror.  This review of literature also highlighted the 
engagements and dialogue occurring within and among scholars of terrorism with respect to the 
component of ‘root causes’ of terrorism.  The literature has indicated that over the past few 
decades, the root causes are not fixed and unchanging, but rather they are fluid, complex and 
continuously evolving and transforming (Walker, 2012:9-12).  Due to the fact that some areas of 
investigation and review face a number of problems in the gathering of primary information, new, 
unconventional and alternative approaches and strategies must be developed and initiated.  Some 
of the examples provided in this literature review can be seen as useful and relevant for initiating 
and further developing strategies for countering terrorist organisations within their historical, 
political, and social backgrounds and contexts.  
Crowley and Wilkinson (2013: 96) suggest that there has been “shortfall of serious scholarly 
analysis of counter-terrorism”.  New, comparative, and relative studies centred on counter-
terrorism strategies and methods would permit the growth and expansion of the most relevant and 
adequate practices which will lead and enhance peaceful collaboration between nations and 
regions. New manifestations of terrorism categorised by decentralisation and dispersion of 
‘networks’ necessitate research and studies on the type of counter-terrorism methods and practices 
that would best aid in solving the problems they present. 
Perhaps, in order to evade counterproductive methods, it has become extremely necessary to study 
how terrorist organisations view the actions of states and governments, and whether policy 
formulators foresee the consequences of their actions on the beliefs and principles of terrorists.  
Governments also must learn from past occurrences and experiences, and strengthen intellectual 




more research and attention should focus on the ways terrorist organisations monopolise the mass 
media.  This is a fundamental approach in employing new and significant counter-terrorism 
procedures.  Furthermore, the ability for media representation to aid in the rising of tensions, 
conflict, and subsequently violence, is an extensive space for research.   
Long-term sustainable and impactful methods for countering terrorism necessitate a 
comprehension of the pathways into and out of these terrorist organisations.  Research is required 
to review the processes and drivers of individual and collaborative mobilization.  This will aid in 
better comprehending how these procedures relate to their counter-terrorism strategies and 
capacities.  This literature review highlights that in the study of terrorism and countering of terrorist 
organisations and their campaigns respectively, literature is dominated and monopolised by a 
discursive frame that is dissected from the perspectives of western culture and epistemology.  It is 
extremely necessary to enrich research and studies in the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
through the development of new and innovative epistemological perspectives.  Therefore, 
comprehension of terrorism and countering terrorism needs to be researched, studied, and debated 
from non-western epistemological approaches.    
2.8. Conclusion 
This literature review introduced the reader to concepts and terms relating to terrorism, and the 
various contending conceptualisations and perspectives on the issue.  It exhibited how these 
concepts have manifested, transformed, and evolved. In addition, the brief literature on CTS 
exposed that many of the studies and much of the research published in relation to the strategies 
of countering Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have been centred around state-centric methods of 
countering these groups, while ignoring, to a larger extent, the role of non-state actors in this 
project of counter-terrorism.   
This chapter has also reviewed literature that has been published on the aforementioned topics in 
relation to the study of terrorism and the regional responses to terrorism in the Horn of Africa and 
northern Nigeria respectively.  While certain scholars emphasise that it is imperative that a focus 
on the root causes is adopted in order for progress to be made within the discipline of counter-
terrorism, others posit that only destroying the symptoms will suffice.  Literature indicates that 




infrastructure occupied by terrorist organisations, as well as minimising their support systems, has 
the ability to destroy terrorist sects such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab and that this will bring 
about a conclusion to the crisis .  
This chapter of the research study uncovered the origins and background of the African Union as 
it transitioned from the Organization of African Unity.  Further, in this chapter, the AU’s counter-
terrorism policy, its primary principles and main mandates to prevent and rid the continent of the 
scourge of terrorism, were examined.   
Chapter 3 will provide a theoretical framework that further explores the limitations and 
shortcomings of the counter-terrorism strategies currently employed by the African Union.  In his 
attempts to answer the second supportive research question, the writer of Chapter 3 seeks to clearly 
demonstrate that as a theoretical framework, Critical Terrorism Studies as espoused by Richard 
Jackson (2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009), is the most suited approach and has the appropriate scope 
to identify, explain, and critique the counter-terrorism strategies which are currently employed by 
the African Union in relation to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in the regions in which they are 





CHAPTER 3:  THE IMPORTANCE OF CTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST TERRORISM IN AFRICA 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
Chapter 2 served as the foundational anchor for the remainder of this study.  It offered a contextual 
background, an overview of the study of terrorism, as well as contending perspectives on the 
conceptualization of terrorism.  In addition, the previous chapter reviewed literature that critiques 
the various counter-terrorism approaches currently employed by a number of stakeholders within 
the African continent.  The aim of this study is to offer an assessment of the counter-terrorism 
agenda of the African Union (AU) from a Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) perspective and to apply 
this critique as a basis for making recommendations on how the AU can improve its current 
counter-terrorism approaches with specific reference to the inter-governmental organization’s 
military-centered approach in its fight against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in northern Nigeria 
and the Horn of Africa, respectively.  This chapter is guided by CTS as the theoretical framework 
according to which the two case studies will be analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5.  The research 
question that will guide this chapter is:   
Does the Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson (2007) 
and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain and critique 
the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in Northern Nigeria and 
Somalia respectively? 
In order to answer the aforementioned supportive research question, this chapter will focus on 
three specific points of departure with specific focus on CTS and its inherent relation to the success 
of the AU in alleviating the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and in northern Nigeria.  The 
first part of this chapter offers an overview of orthodox approaches within the field of terrorism 
and will further examine the limitations of these traditional approaches to terrorism in order to give 
an assessment of the main problems and challenges informing the conventional and contemporary 
study of terrorism and counter-terrorism, respectively.   
The second point of departure deals with the development of CTS and employs the contributions 
and commitments of CTS in critiquing the orthodox field of terrorism studies which inherently 




counter-terrorism policies, frameworks and mechanisms.  Therefore, this part of the chapter seeks 
to analyze and express some of the most important commitments that inform CTS, while 
simultaneously distinguishing CTS from its orthodox counterpart.  Perhaps even more important, 
this section of the chapter seeks to provoke debate and an inherent discussion of the overarching 
assumptions, research foci, strategies, challenges, obstacles and future trajectories within the field 
of Critical Terrorism Studies.  This section of the chapter briefly provides the potential 
contributions CTS could make as both a theoretical framework and an approach to critiquing the 
orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism currently adopted by the African Union in 
the two case studies considered in the research.  
The final section deals with an analysis of the method of applying CTS and its considered value 
within the African context.  The main goal here is to explore in what way CTS provides a suitable 
and encompassing theoretical basis, not only by critiquing existing AU counter-terrorism, but also 
by creating inclusive and reasoned counter-terrorism approaches.  This section of the chapter states 
its final case for CTS as the necessary theoretical tool for the AU in its fight against the threat of 
terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria by proposing a set of ethical, epistemological, 
and ontological considerations and commitments.   
3.2.   Orthodox Approaches to Terrorism 
Within the realm of orthodox approaches to terrorism, a large concentration of analysis is placed 
on the legitimacy of the state as well as countering any actors or elements that challenge the 
authority and legitimacy of the state.  Orthodox approaches to terrorism provide a precise 
distinction between state and non-state entities or actors, and suggest that non-state actors are 
illegitimate actors, while state actors are the only legitimate forces (Bayo-Ogunrotifa, 2012:16). 
Furthermore, Bayo-Ogunrotifa, (2012) contends that orthodox approaches to terrorism place 
emphasis on the type of violence utilized by individuals or terrorist groups, as opposed to 
attempting to understand the various factors and reasons to why it occurs to begin with. Orthodox 
approaches are usually regarded as mainstream approaches because of their adoption of western 
models of freedom, liberty, the rule of law, as well as their as state-centric commitments (Bayo-
Ogunrotifa, 2012: 17). The most prominent theories within the orthodox strand in international 




This study adopts a skeptical approach towards the orthodox approaches of studying terrorism and 
counter-terrorism, respectively, and therefore it is important that a re-evaluation of the current 
orthodox approaches should be undertaken.  The examination of these approaches is not restricted 
solely to research based on terrorist organizations (in this particular context, Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab) but it considers international and global forms of intervention and assistance within the 
geographical areas in which these groups exist and seek to wage their terrorist campaigns.  Within 
the assessment and critique of orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism, Critical 
Terrorism Studies does not necessarily seek to emerge as the immediate “fix” that will suddenly 
cure the threat of terrorism on the African continent. The assessment of orthodox approaches to 
terrorism detailed below will serve as a path in the necessary direction within the fields of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism.  
3.2.1.  Realist Perspective into Terrorism 
As a mainstream theory, realism has been a dominant force within intellectual discourse on 
terrorism for a number of decades.  Firstly, realism contends that the primary and key force within 
global politics is the state, and for this reason there is no actor that is of more importance beyond 
the state.  In addition, realism argues that governments are continuously engaged in a protracted 
effort in attempts to ensure the survival of their states (Hoffman, 2013).  Another position assumed 
by realists within the orthodox school of thought lies in the state’s selfish striving after its national 
interests; the primary pursuit being securing national security.  From a broader perspective, as 
alluded to above, the theory argues that the state is the only legitimate actor and any perspectives 
opposing the authority of the state are deemed illegitimate (Bayo-Ogunrotifa, 2012: 16).   
This conceptualization outlined above gives the researcher the impetus required to argue that 
within the realist perspective, terrorist organizations such Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are 
considered to be illegitimate non-state actors who challenge and oppose the authority of the state 
through their continuous growth and the expansion of their terror campaigns which seek to destroy, 
kill, and maim the public masses while simultaneously crippling the socio-economic 
infrastructures within the borders of the states which they occupy.   
Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012: 16) argues that within the realm of International Relations (IR), it is 




by states in pursuit of securing the national interests is always inevitable.  Based on this primacy, 
one could argue that the realist orthodoxy contends that acts of terror can only be undertaken by 
non-state agents.  For Richmond (2003), this view dismisses any notions that consider the 
existence of state terrorism within the realm of international relations, and therefore he infers that 
the state is entitled to monopolize the employment of force which is necessary in its pursuit to 
preserve power and its general interests, as was previously alluded to (Richmond, 2003:289-291).   
As a result of this broadly adopted assumption, realism perspectives focus on terrorism as a 
phenomenon that is solely embraced by illegitimate non-state actors whose objectives are to 
terrorize the state and its internal and external structures. This is embodied in Bruce Hoffman’s 
definition of terrorism.  For Hoffman (2013), terrorism can be defined as “acts perpetuated by a 
sub-national or non-state entity” (Hoffman, 2013).  Hoffman’s views are further embraced by other 
well established intellectuals within the realist school of thought, including Caleb Carr (2002) who 
adopts the infers that, by definition, “terrorism is warfare deliberately waged against civilians with 
the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that agents of such violence 
find objectionable” (Carr, 2002).   
One can argue that at the core of these definitional sentiments are the events of 9/11, which led a 
number of scholars who study terrorism from a realist perspective to embody the notion that 
terrorism is undertaken by violent and vicious non-state actors, who often receive funds through 
transnational criminal networks and renegade states, employing acts of terror for political, 
ideological, economic, and cultural purposes.  Among these scholars, Laqueur (2006) opines that 
these acts of terror are usually motivated by and carried out as a means to achieve a particular 
ideological outcome in pursuit of attaining self-determination and sovereignty.   
Furthermore, Bruce (2013)) contends that the aforementioned definitional underpinnings of 
terrorism as a result of the occurrences on 9/11 have encouraged western governments, 
intellectuals, mainstream media, as well policy formulators to devise a subjective and skewed 
definition of terrorism; one which considers terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience” (Bruce, 2013).   




and organizations who resist the legitimacy of the state as “terrorists” was seemingly constructed 
to aid specific interests and means within today’s global hegemonic relations.  This inevitably led 
to the employment of violent and dangerous counter-terrorism strategies including military 
intervention and forceful regime changes brought to bear against groups, structures, and 
governments that were in resistance and in opposition to their global interests.   
3.2.2.  The Orthodoxies of Terrorism Within Liberal Circles 
Corresponding with mainstream and traditional approaches to terrorism, lies the liberal approach 
to terrorism. This strand of thought assesses the ways in which states are able to co-exist within a 
stable, secure, and ordered global system whereby war is not the byproduct of international 
relations.  Intellectuals of liberalism, including Walt (2003) opine that non-state actors are crucial 
actors within the international system, and thus, equal emphasis should be placed on them along 
with state actors.  Walt (2003) argues that while states are sovereign entities, it is important to take 
into account that other actors such as multi-laterals, multi-national corporations, terrorist 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other International and transitional structures 
play an equally important role in international relations (Walt, 2003:19-22).  An important belief 
postulated within the liberal perspective in its aim to reduce the increased likelihood of terrorism 
and related forms of conflict is the need for shared economic and socio-political interests between 
states and institutions.   
Fiala (2002) posits that the liberal approach associates terrorism and acts of terror conducted by 
terrorists and the organizations which they ascribe to, as efforts that threaten and breach the limits 
of stability and cohesion of states in the international system.  In other words, one can argue that 
liberalism sees terrorists as individuals or groups who oppose any endeavors to establish economic 
and security cohesion, and in doing so, reject the idea of establishing an international system of 
economic and socio-political interdependence.  In view of liberal terrorism approaches, Parker 
(2003) extends this view by asserting that terrorists can be considered criminals who commit acts 
of terror and not central actors who exist within the realm of international relations.   
By debunking the aforementioned underpinnings within the liberal strand of thought, it becomes 
apparent that while there are seeming differences between Liberalism and Realism in relation to 




to terrorism within the international system.  According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012: 17), both these 
approaches emphasize the importance of conserving the interests of the state within this 
international system and the various factors that need to be considered when ensuring that these 
interests are protected.  Further, both these strands of thought adopt the notion that terrorism is a 
phenomenon undertaken solely by non-state actors.   
An important aspect to consider when re-examining the current orthodoxies that exist in the field 
of terrorism and counter-terrorism lies within the very crux of those orthodox approaches which 
attempt to ensure that Western states monopolize the definitional processes and classifications of 
terrorists and terrorist organizations.  For Jackson, Smyth, & Gunning (2009), this has allowed for 
an increasingly false perception that military intervention and other destabilizing efforts 
undertaken by Western states against its own citizens and other weak states across the globe are 
legitimate; at the same time strengthening the falsehood that terrorism by definition, can only be 
employed by illegitimate non-state actors who seek to threaten the interests and powers of the 
state; and also international cooperation and stability.   
A review of some of the fundamental assumptions that are adopted within the primary orthodox 
approaches, leads one to realize that the ontological, epistemological, and methodological bases 
upon which orthodox approaches are founded, do not seek to address currently established social 
and power relations which exist to protect and preserve the monopolization of western interests. 
Rather, there is an increased desire to delegitimize any actors who question and oppose the 
falsehood disseminated through these orthodoxies.   
Following on the above discussion, the next subsection seeks to deliberate upon and debunk the 
strengths, weaknesses, and faults of the currently adopted orthodoxies employed in the fight 
against terrorism, with particular reference to counter-terrorism on the African continent.   
3.2.3.  The Insufficiency of Orthodox Approaches to Terrorism 
By critiquing the political orthodoxies, more specifically those of realist and liberal perspectives, 
one can categorize the state as a possible perpetrator of terrorism, and therefore one can argue that 
the orthodox approaches to terrorism and counter-terrorism do in fact constitute state terrorism 
(Al-Kossimi, 2019: 3).  An important argument which informs this section of the research suggests 




increases acts of violence employed by states, in this context, within the African continent.  This 
argument is an extension of the notion that influential multilateral and regional networks which 
play a role in regional security (such as the African Union) consider citizens to be threats to the 
national security of states, and for this reason, justify undemocratic counter-terrorism mechanisms 
and strategies that prioritize state security above the democratic liberties of citizens.  Before a 
discussion into the importance of terrorism studies can adopt a critical approach, it is important 
that a detailed discussion on the shortcomings of orthodox approaches, in particular the 
insufficiencies of “problem-solving” strategy, be highlighted.   
Following on the above discussions, one can argue that within the discipline of International 
Relations, the focus of terrorism scholarship on problem-solving relates to the existing approaches 
to countering terrorism, which are broadly divided into militarizing/realist; criminalizing and 
liberal mechanisms.  According to Vermeulen (2014:32), the militarizing approach refers to the 
conceptualization of terrorism as a subject of unconventional warfare and its considered approach 
to preventing terrorism lies within the deployment of military forces as a means of achieving the 
intended objectives of alleviating the threat of terrorism.   
In addition to the militarizing approach, Vermeulen (2014:32) argues that a second approach 
(considered by scholars and experts within the orthodox school of thought) can be classified as 
one of criminality which is accounted for across both domestic and international spectrums. These 
scholars and experts emphasize the need for domestic and international law to prosecute 
individuals and organizations who practice acts of terror.  Domestic contributions consist of 
considering the importance of intelligence-gathering as a counter-terrorism strategy.  Katzeinstein 
(2002:53) opines that within the criminalizing perspective, there have been important debates 
around the balance of liberty and security; in turn questioning and addressing the limitations and 
boundaries of democratic torture.   
The last approach which Vermeulen (2014:33) addresses, falls within the liberal perspective.  As 
mentioned in the previous section, this approach alludes to treating terrorism as a symptom of 
underlying factors rather than understanding terrorism as a technical issue to be curbed, countered, 
and eliminated.  Nossel (2004:131) asserts that while conservatives and realists rely on the 




diplomacy as a strategy; utilizing foreign aid and the spread of western values in the pursuit of 
managing and eliminating the threat of terrorism.  
While the above approaches offer different models of causality, it is clear that a noticeable 
“problem solving” approach informs all of them.  Therefore, it is a result of such perspectives and 
orientations that have enabled the emergence of Critical Terrorism Studies within the broad field 
of terrorism studies.  In an attempt to answer the first supportive research question, the rest of this 
chapter will illustrate that the currently adopted “problem-solving” counter-terrorism strategy 
employed by the African Union against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab is not plausible nor is it 
yielding the necessary results.    
In moving forward with this chapter, it is important that a distinction between Problem-solving 
theory and Critical theory are unpacked.  Cox (1981) asserts that Problem-solving theory “takes 
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into 
which they are organized, as the given framework for action” (Cox, 1981: 128-129).  As such, Cox 
(1981) contends that the fundamental objective of problem-solving is to ensure that these relations 
and institutions function coherently and efficiently by constructively dealing with potential causes 
and issues of concern.  As such, one may consider problem-solving theory to be analytically 
leaning, whereas, Critical Theory, on the other hand is holistic in nature.  Leysens argues that under 
the Coxian lens, Critical theory places emphasis on the development and expansion of a number 
of state forms in reaction to the alterations in the manner in which social actors relate to the 
construction, and in response to the reorganization of the global order (Leysens, 2008: 3).  In 
addition, Leysens (2008), maintains that forms of state play a role in shaping various modes of 
production as well as social actors.  In relation to todays world order, the globalization of 
production has played a fundamental role in reducing the autonomy of the state.  An argument and 
development that Cox (1981, 1987) projected.   
Considering therefore, that one of the objectives of this chapter is to apply the central commitments 
of CTS to identify, explain, and critique the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies by 
multilaterals (in this particular context, the African Union) an important strategy within the realm 
of Critical Terrorism Studies is its capacity to disregard and oppose the orthodoxy of political 
realism and liberalism. This is done by extending the notion of ‘counter-terrorism’ beyond the 




considered in order to curb the problem of terrorism; however it is even more important to have a 
comprehensive understanding of this threat, in order to adopt in-depth approaches rather than those 
within the orthodoxies of liberal and realist thought such as criminality-  and military-driven 
approaches which currently enjoy great emphasis.   
It is in within this line of thought that this research as outlined in the following section considers 
Critical Terrorism Study (CTS) as a particularly useful theory in critiquing traditional and orthodox 
counter-terrorism agendas and methods.  While arguing that terrorism is as much a social construct 
as it is a physical act, CTS (unlike most traditional and orthodox approaches) embraces terrorism 
in relation to a much broader sociological and historical outlook.  By placing emphasis on the 
unequal distribution of wealth, power, and state resources as well as the hegemonic status assumed 
by the West, CTS tackles, addresses and seeks to explain the multi-causality of terrorism in all its 
complex manifestations (Maszka, 2017: 97). 
3.3.  Critical Terrorism Studies 
Following on the above section, this section seeks to describe the theoretical commitments of CTS 
and employ CTS to analyze the identified research problem.  According to Conelly, Li, Macdonald 
and Parpart (2000:54), a theoretical framework is a system of ideas or conceptual structures that 
assist researchers and scholars to explain or gain an understanding of the broader world system. 
According to Jackson (2007) and Jarvis (2009), CTS can be defined as a set of epistemological, 
ontological, and ethical commitments that involve and take into consideration  
“the politically established nature of terrorism knowledge; a realization and 
consciousness of the important ontological volatility of the term ‘terrorism’; and a 
series of appropriately defined research ethics and normative considerations to an 
emancipatory praxis” (Jackson, 2007:244).  
So, from an ethical point of view, CTS takes into account the importance of always defending and 
honoring the commitments of the research study at hand, as well as the informants and observers 
being studied.  In addition, as a theoretical framework, CTS adheres to the values and principles 
of universal human security, as opposed to orthodox views of national security whereby the state 
presides over all other actors.  In addition, ontologically and epistemologically, Critical Terrorism 




terrorism studies, and more important, the socio-economic and political production of terrorism 
knowledge; for example, understanding the nature of terrorism and the drivers which influence the 
behaviors of terrorist organizations.  Further, ontologically and epistemologically, CTS is 
characterized by a broad skepticism towards the ‘terrorism’ label by arguing that the term has 
always been judgmental in nature, rather than being an analytical term.   
As such, Smith (2005) argues that the most suitable method to reconsider terrorism studies and 
research is reflected through some of its initial successes and findings within literature related to 
Critical Security Studies.  Vermeulen (2014: 23) asserts that there have been a number of scholars 
who have made valuable and substantial contributions within the literature of Critical Security 
Studies (CSS), namely Keith Krause, Michael Williams, Ken Booth, and Richard Wyn Jones who 
owe much of their writings to the vision of Robert Cox within the scope of critical theory in 
International Relations.  Vermeulen (2014: 23) contends that Critical Security Studies has made 
considerable progress since the mid-1990s, particularly in relation to debates centered around 
security within International Relations theory.  Waever (2004) and Van Munster (207:235) 
maintain that critical positions within the realm of security studies have been centered on the work 
of three schools in particular, namely the Aberystwyth/Welsh School; the Copenhagen School; 
and the Paris School.   
Smith (2003:19) argues that the Aberystwyth School is one of the most significant schools where 
the innovations of Critical Security Studies have materialized.  The defining work within this 
school of thought can be accredited to the abovementioned scholars, namely Krause, Williams, 
Booth, and Wyn Jones.  The anthology Critical Security Studies illustrates how this school of 
thought has played a pivotal role in the development of Critical Terrorism Studies in that it suggests 
that scholars, researchers, and experts of security should move away from assessing and viewing 
the world through a state-centric lens.  Much like CTS, Critical Security Studies acknowledges 
that while the state may be part of the solution in issues of security, it also often poses as a threat 
and an inherent problem, in particular within the African context. This will be demonstrated in 
Chapters 4 and 5, in relation to some of the root causes and key drivers influencing Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism.  In brief, the Aberystwyth School of thought proposes a 
theory of security that focuses on the triangulation of security-community-emancipation, 




relates to the emancipation and ‘liberation’ of the community at large.   
In addition to the Aberystywth School, the Copenhagen School has positioned itself as an 
important springboard for scholars of Critical Security Studies.  Buzan’s (1983) work, People, 
States, and Fear is central to the current position of this school of thought within security studies.  
According to Vermeulen (2014), the Copenhagen School is centered on three fundamental ideas: 
securitization; security complexes (which refers to the regional level of security analysis) and 
sectors (which involves differentiating between military, societal, economic, and political 
security).   
The Paris School also offers an important contribution to Critical Security Studies and involves 
the interrogation of empirical assessments of strategies, practices, and processes adopted by 
various actors and security agencies.  In view of this, one may assert that the commitments of this 
school of thought are reflected within the principles adopted in CTS in that it aligns security with 
the ability of actors to manage borders, control threats, and to define threatened actors (Focault, 
1994).   
Further, Vermeulen (2014) argues that the constant challenge of CTS and the study of terrorism 
will remain inescapable and complex.  Therefore, corresponding to Vermeulen’s (2014) assertion, 
Dixit and Stump (2012:207) suggest a number of methodological approaches that may be 
advantageous within Critical Terrorism Studies literature.  Firstly, the ontological position of the 
researcher must be clear in its assessment of the relationship between the observer and the 
observed.  In this particular context, the relationship between the African Union and the two cases 
under investigation, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab must clear.  Secondly, the terms ‘terrorism’, 
‘terrorists’, and ‘terror’ must be clearly conceptualized, analyzed, and critiqued as socio-political 
drivers (Dixit & Stump, 2012:207). 
Moreover, Jackson (2007:246) contends that the recent evolution of security studies within the 
realm of international relations, has seen an increase in the number of terrorism scholars and 
intellectuals who have removed themselves from the orthodox underpinnings of terrorism studies 
traditionally emphasizing problem-solving theory, and have placed themselves at the center of 




Against this background, it remains important that one should reiterate the nature of problem-
solving theory.  Cox (1981) argues that problem-solving theory maintains that there are various 
actors and global issues that must be prioritized.  Corresponding to Cox’s (1981) assertions, 
Williams (2014:31), asserts that within security studies, this was inherently illustrated in the belief 
that Sovereignty is the “indicator of civilization”, and that sovereign states are rational actors, and 
therefore, tensions and conflicts between states should be the primary problems that must be 
“solved”.  Cox’s (1981) and Williams’s (2014) underpinnings of problem-solving theory 
correspond with the very nature that the theoretical framework of CTS opposes – the over-
identification with the state-centric approaches to security, and more particularly, terrorism.  In 
addition, Jarvis (2009:12) adds to this debate by arguing that problem-solving theory perceives 
terrorism as an unconventional war that can only be dealt with by means of military response.   
Therefore, given this shift, it is important that one notes that CTS is built on a number of powerful 
critiques of the existing employment of orthodox terrorism studies.  These include the ineffective 
methods and approaches including state-centric approaches, its problem-solving positioning, and 
its institutional, structural, and intellectual relations to state-security tasks and developments 
(Gunning, 2007: 363-365). Critical Terrorism Studies emerged as a result of a collective concern 
about the claims and shortcomings of orthodox approaches to terrorism.  This subset of terrorism 
studies insists on unpacking the ideological, conceptual and institutional underpinnings of 
terrorism.  Of particular importance to this study, is the fact that CTS has an important objective 
of challenging the processes of knowledge production within the field of terrorism studies 
(Gunning 2007; Silke 2009; Jackson, Smyth and Gunning 2009, Herring 2008).  As an approach, 
CTS interrogates and challenges the “labelling” and widely-held assumptions within the field of 
terrorism by applying its ontological and epistemological commitments (Al-Kassimi, 2019:27).  
While orthodox approaches may have their considered faults and strengths, this researcher 
maintains that a realistic and sustainable approach must still be formulated. 
According to Gunning and Toros (2009:92), CTS confronts the widely-held opinion of terrorism 
as a phenomenon whereby individuals or particular groups are reduced to what is often a subset of 
their general behavior, by stating that terrorism takes place in the broader context that includes 
political struggles and challenges. It is in view of this broader context that these scholars see the 




include diplomatic dialogue and engagement; nationalism and xenophobic attacks; and the 
provision of economic and political services such as security, administration, education, and food 
(Gunning & Toros, 2004: 233-235).  For Jarvis (2009) amongst other scholars of CTS, this may 
correspond with the assertions made above, that CTS discards the politics and notions of naming 
and labelling particular groups or individuals as terrorist.   
A primary focus of this chapter as previously alluded to is to analyze the Critical Terrorism Studies 
critique of orthodox methods, approaches, and strategies which are associated with traditional and 
orthodox schools of thought; as well as contending that acts of violence employed by the state 
(state terrorism) against its own populations and other states have been largely neglected by 
scholars within the field of orthodox studies.  
The following sections will attempt to debunk and explain terrorism using CTS as a theoretical 
framework.   
3.3.1.  Critical Terrorism Studies’ Explanation of Terrorism 
As previously alluded to on numerous occasions throughout this study and specifically in reference 
to this chapter, CTS adopts an overall skepticism towards the term or label of ‘terrorism’ primarily 
because many scholars within the field of critical security studies including Sluka (2002) have 
identified that, in reality, the term has always been applied within a judgmental rather than an 
analytical spectrum.  For scholars of CTS such as Vermeulen (2014), terrorism is a social construct 
and not a brute fact. Vermeulen (2014:35) acknowledges that while heinous acts of physical 
violence are experienced as brute fact, its broader socio-political definition is decided by social 
agreement as well as by inter-subjective practices and research.   
It is important to take into account that CTS does not in any way define terrorism in a manner that 
neutralizes certain actors while legitimizing the employment of violence to others, simply because 
they are conducted in particular circumstances.  Rather, CTS interprets terrorism primarily as a 
method or an approach of political tension and violence that can be conducted by both the state 
and non-state actors (Jackson, 2007: 248).   Thus, Tilly (2004:5) argues that terrorism is a “strategy, 
not a creed”.  Equally, Tilly (2004:6) expands on his argument by contending that terrorism is not 
a one-dimensional phenomenon but rather a complex strategy that consists of the intentional 




Tilly (2004) asserts that, similar to the act of war, terrorism is an extension of politics through the 
employment of violent measures.   
The definition provided by Rapoport and Alexander (1982) defines terrorism as the employment 
of violence targeting a group of innocent civilians with the intention of coercing them in the 
direction of a particular political, religious, or ideological end.  While scholars of CTS, including 
Jackson (2010), acknowledge that this is one of the more objective explanations of terrorism, it 
still adopts terminology that is ambiguous by nature.  For Jackson, the issue stems not only in the 
definitional choice of terrorism, but within the very nature of terrorism itself.  Therefore, Jackson 
(2010) argues that because terrorism is a social construct, it cannot be objectively defined.   
Schmid (2004: 202) and scholars of CTS alike argue that it is of vital significance that one take 
into account that terrorism is not an ideology or form of politics in itself, but rather it is a 
mechanism which is utilized at a particular period by certain actors for specific political objectives.  
One of the fundamental underpinnings of CTS is its intention to unpack and debunk 
comprehensively the political and strategic reasons and justifications as to why certain actors 
decide to conduct terrorist activities, and the means by which they abandon the use of terrorism as 
a political approach, specifically within a political and historical context.  Therefore, one can argue 
that for this reason CTS insists on embracing political, historical, and cultural dynamics in order 
to gain an understanding of the adoption of terrorism by terrorist organizations as a means to an 
end.  Jarvis (2009) contends that as a result of the expansive role that labelling has played within 
the field of terrorism studies, CTS is determined to question and address the nature as well as the 
politics of representation by seeking answers as to ‘why, when, how, and for what’ reasons 
particular groups and individuals end up being named or identified as terrorists or terrorist 
organizations. 
In addition, CTS postulates that the orthodoxies that exist within state-centric terrorism studies 
have proven to be ineffective at best.  Jackson (2007:24) argues that within Critical Terrorism 
Studies, an assessment of the political and strategic roots of terrorism remains essential within 
counter-terrorism agendas of actors in order for the issue of terrorism to be dealt with effectively.  
CTS maintains that its ability to interrogate the political and historical underpinnings of those who 




commitments, Jackson (2007:25) argues that CTS embodies the importance of including a broad 
understanding of the nature and impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism.   
3.4.   Applying Critical Terrorism Studies and the Importance Thereof 
By referring back to the body of scholarship included in this chapter, it becomes clear that CTS 
represents terrorism-associated research and scholarship which assumes and espouses a skeptical 
assertiveness towards state-centric interpretations of terrorism.  While CTS does not neglect or 
reject currently established terrorism knowledge-production in its entirety, it still challenges 
broadly established assumptions and beliefs, primarily those within orthodox circles (Stump & 
Dixit, 2012).  Therefore, one can contend that instead of being a precise theoretical label, CTS can 
be seen as an orientation or critical position that looks to uphold and preserve a particular distance 
from prevalent ideologies and theories.  As Joseph (2009) puts it, “CTS scrutinizes orthodox 
terrorism literature, the discourse it generates and the institutions that produce it”. Therefore, this 
field of study completely rejects any definition of terrorism that embraces elites, marginalizes 
women and other vulnerable groups, dismisses central actors such as states and promotes 
Eurocentric, western-centered or masculinized productions of knowledge.   
Furthermore, scholars within the field of critical terrorism such as Maszka (2017) embrace the 
above assertions by arguing that CTS seeks to broaden the study and field of terrorism by 
embracing subjects that are otherwise rejected by leading scholars and researchers in the field of 
orthodox terrorism studies.  These include the broader social context of state and political violence, 
as well as aspects of gender in relation to terrorism. In this way, CTS seeks to deepen the research 
surrounding terrorism by unpacking and exposing the essential ideological, institutional, and 
material interests of the field of terrorism.  An important observation which was briefly alluded to 
above, is that CTS is founded upon an analysis of the epistemological and ontological assertions 
of the field of terrorism.  It seeks to unpack and address the objectives of knowledge within the 
field of terrorism studies, and more broadly, the social and political production of terrorism 
knowledge (Maszka, 2017:34).  The aim of CTS is not merely descriptive in nature, nor does it 
see a particular field of terrorism studies as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’.  Its purpose is to address, 
interrogate, and challenge the dominant commitments of conventionally held interpretations of 




The second value that CTS holds is that any discussion or dialogue in relation to terrorism should 
be interdisciplinary in nature and take into account a number of necessary social, political, 
historical and ideological power structures in order to gain an understanding of the reasons why 
actors commit heinous acts of terror (Maszka, 2017:97).  This approach held by CTS correlates 
with its critique of orthodox mechanisms which deal with the symptoms of the threat of terror, 
focusing on what it suggests are “quick fixes”.  According to Solomon (2015:224) such an 
observation is exemplified within the reality of orthodox counter-terrorism mechanisms across the 
African continent.  Solomon (2015) argues that traditional terrorism approaches focus their efforts 
on dealing solely with terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram rather than scrutinizing the 
legitimacy of political elites in Abuja or Mogadishu, the capital cities of the two states in which 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab currently operate.   
A number of authors including Herring (2008:198) suggest that there is a significant need for 
critical terrorism studies within global politics.  Earlier in this chapter it was pointed out that 
mainstream or conventional terrorism studies neglect class dynamics of terrorism and overlook 
and omit the acts of state terrorism conducted often by Western states against individuals, 
particular groups, or in certain cases against other states; while contending that any opposition to 
the state by non-state actors is illegitimate.  Furthermore, Herring (2008) suggests that it is 
necessary that critical terrorism studies move away from mainstream terrorism studies across all 
aspects.  Scholars such as Herring consider that Critical Terrorism Studies should be employed as 
a tool that confronts the manner in which terrorism has evolved and transformed into an instrument 
of power and privilege adopted by states of the West.  
Further, in this chapter, the present researcher also advocates the consideration and advancement 
of a counter-terrorism approach and framework that embraces the commitments of CTS.  It is from 
this point of departure that one may consider that one of the most dominant critiques of orthodox 
approaches to terrorism studies by CTS is in relation to the “problem-solving” logic as was 
mentioned above.  Furthermore, while CTS is founded upon skeptical attitudes towards 
mainstream and orthodox assumptions, it is important to take into account that the skepticism of 
widely-accepted knowledge by CTS does not negate a complete rejection of these political 




Therefore, in this study, the researcher acknowledges the importance of applying CTS as a 
theoretical framework that assesses and critiques the counter-terrorism strategies currently upheld 
by the African Union in its attempts to deal with and ameliorate the threat of terrorism espoused 
by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and Al-Shaabab in the Horn of Africa.  Moreover, within the 
theoretical scope of CTS, this researcher acknowledges that the militant activities of the terrorist 
organizations in the geographical regions of the two cases being studied within this research, have 
developed to encompass more than just the nation state.   
In the current chapter, the writer maintains that within the lens of CTS, a number of factors must 
be accounted for when attempting to understand terrorism and subsequently considering necessary 
counter-terrorism strategies.  By applying Critical Terrorism Studies to the cases of Boko Haram 
and Al-Shabaab, this study will demonstrate some of the weaknesses that lie within the African 
Union’s widely-held state-centric and military-centered approach to the scourge of terrorism, 
which can be seen in the cases of Boko Haram northern Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, 
respectively. Therefore, through the employment of CTS as a framework, one can posit that the 
poor results yielded by the broadly emphasized military strategy employed by the mandated 
African Union security agencies, namely AMISOM and the Multinational Joint Task Force, are a 
clear indication that a state-centered approach founded upon the endorsement of military 
interventions is a very limited and short term strategy.  Therefore, it is inevitable that the researcher 
should employ CTS to critique the state-centric and militarized approach assumed by the African 
Union in its efforts to curb Boko Haram.   
This section had the primary objective of reflecting upon the advantages of incorporating CTS 
within the analysis of the current approaches to understanding the scourge of terrorism in 
northeastern Nigeria as well as in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa.   
3.5.  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the political orthodoxies that currently exist within terrorism studies 
and their presence as the dominant theories supporting the currently adopted approaches to 
dismantling the scourge of terrorism, particularly with regards to the fight of terrorism on the 
African continent, do not constitute a plausible approach.   




As a theoretical approach, CTS seeks to engage in the critical assessment of the ontology, 
epistemology and political praxis of terrorism studies and counter-terrorism approaches, and aims 
to present and establish various considerations and interpretations into a recognized area of study.  
Supported by the body of scholarship provided throughout this chapter, it is clear that CTS presents 
itself as a valuable theoretical framework in providing the necessary assessments and critiques 
within the field of terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, particularly with regards to the 
approaches adopted in addressing the scourge of terror waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  
When attempting to ascertain why Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab’s activities and efforts in northern 
Nigeria and the broader Horn of Africa have not yet been curbed or ameliorated, it becomes 
necessary to apply the principles and commitments of CTS.  Therefore, by applying CTS as the 
theoretical framework, research reflected in this chapter showed that CTS is the necessary 
approach and alternative to assessing, explaining, and critiquing the currently employed counter-
terrorism strategies in Chapters 4 and 5.  In addition, this chapter demonstrates the importance of 
Critical Terrorism Studies as a theoretical framework in understanding the scourge of political 
terror with a specific analysis of two particular cases on the African continent.  Through the brief 
application of CTS to the two cases being studied, this chapter has illustrated that terrorism on the 
African continent came into existence as a result of a number of historical factors, in particular the 
legacies of the colonial project.   
The chapter concludes that the limited and temporary successes in alleviating terrorism in northern 
Nigeria as well as in the Horn of Africa and driving Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab out of some of 
their strongholds, is an issue that must be addressed and assessed critically, taking into account a 
number of perspectives that have been neglected as a result of the domination and monopolization 
of orthodox and traditional approaches to terrorism studies.  Supported by the perspectives of 
Counter Terrorism Studies, this writer insists that terrorism as a mechanism to achieve socio-
economic and political gains can be, and often is, undertaken by both state and non-state actors.   
By committing to the principles of CTS, in this chapter, the researcher argues that it is necessary 
for the African Union to move away from the inherited orthodox and state-centric approach of 
countering terrorism which it has held since its transition from the Organization of African Unity, 




of the threat of terrorism. 
In Chapter 4, this theoretical framework will be applied to the first case study, which is the 
assessment of the scourge of terrorism in northern Nigeria, and will be applied to an assessment 
and analysis of the approaches and strategies adopted by the African Union in dealing with Boko 
Haram through the lens of CTS.  Chapter 4 will subsequently recommend how these critiques can 
assist the African Union in reconsidering its state-centric and military driven approach to 







CHAPTER 4:  BOKO HARAM:  COMBATING TERRORISM IN NORTHERN 
NIGERIA 
4.1.  Introduction 
In Chapter 3 the researcher posited a theoretical framework for critiquing orthodox approaches to 
terrorism and highlighted the value of employing Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) as an approach 
to identifying, explaining, as well as critiquing the counter-terrorism strategy currently employed 
by the African Union.  Chapter 4 applies that theoretical framework by providing a critical 
perspective on the military driven, state-centric and largely symptom-based counter-terrorism 
approach adopted by the African Union in Nigeria in order to combat Boko Haram.  In addition, 
this chapter seeks to provide recommendations on how critiques of such a counter-terrorism 
strategy can inform sustainable efforts to curb and combat terrorist organizations such as Boko 
Haram.  In this chapter, the researcher will strive to assess and critique the counter-terrorism 
strategies currently employed by the African Union, and therefore it will be guided by the third 
supportive research question which is:   
To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in northern 
Nigeria? 
In keeping with the theoretical framework of CTS, the writer of this chapter will first discuss the 
evolution of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the state of affairs that 
enabled and accommodated the organization’s emergence and further development.  CTS will be 
applied in order to assess and analyze Boko Haram’s growth from its previously recognized local 
‘rebellion’ status to the current position it holds as a terrorist group with substantial socio-
economic influence with an ability to undertake deadly and grievous acts.   
Moreover, in this chapter the applicability of current interventions and missions in relation to Boko 
Haram in Nigeria, will be explored and discussed, with the African Union as the primary focus of 
this analysis.  Therefore, this chapter will examine the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategies 
and policies by analyzing and subsequently critiquing its approaches to countering and combating 
the terrorism threat posed by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.  The final focus of this chapter will 
be to address whether or not the African Union, as a continental body, has embraced a ‘lame duck’ 




4.2.  Boko Haram:  The State of Affairs that Enabled its Evolution and Expansion 
When employing the theoretical framework of CTS, the researcher, in the next phase of this 
chapter, acknowledges the major importance that history plays and the process by which identity, 
diversity and related dynamics are converted into conflicts that require a thorough assessment. 
This is done in order to achieve an historical and all-inclusive understanding of what, over the past 
decade, has informed and led Boko Haram – and  comparable groups, movements, and 
organizations throughout the African continent – to act and behave in the manner in which they 
do.  By minimizing and diluting the state-centric and symptomatic approach and incorporating the 
expansion of socio-economic, political, religious and cultural factors which inform much of the 
frustrations of Boko Haram, CTS acknowledges the importance of assessing both the symptoms 
and root causes that have informed the extent of terrorism that is waged by Boko Haram in northern 
Nigeria.  
Furthermore, according to Onuoha (2012), it is important to take into consideration that when 
Boko Haram initially emerged, it was seen as a non-violent movement.  There have been 
substantial disputes about the origins of Boko Haram. Onuoha (2012) contends that the precise re-
emergence of Boko Haram in 2009 has been synonymous with controversy.  Onuoha (2012) argues 
that a large body of literature traces the genesis of the sect to 2002, when  Mohammed Yusuf  
emerged as its first leader.   
Conversely, records disclosed by Nigerian forces reveal that the origins of the sect date back to 
1995, as a result of the formation of the Ahlulsunnawal ‘jama’ Ahhijra sect at the University of 
Maduigiri, Borno State, which was led by Abubakar Lawan.  As mentioned above, Onouha (2012) 
is consistent in his assertion that the sect began and flourished as a non-violent movement until 
Mohammed Yusuf took over as leader of the sect in 2002.  Throughout its emergence and 
evolution, the sect has been popularised through a number of names including, the Muhajirun, 
Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and Jama “atuAhlissunnahlidda” awatiwal Jihad.  
Today, while the sect is globally known as Boko Haram, which, when directly translated from the 
Hausa language, according to Onouha (2012) literally means “western education is sinful or 
forbidden”; it rejects that particular description and prefers to be referred to as the Jama 
“atuAhlissunnahlidda” awatiwal Jihad” meaning a “people committed to the propagation of the 




Moreover, according to Silke (2014), while there has been a contestation of the references in 
relation to the actual name of the sect, its fundamental ideological objectives have remained 
resolute and clear, namely to establish Nigeria –which positions itself as a secular state – into a 
caliphate – an area or space centered and governed under the control of a Muslim governor or 
leader known as the caliph.  Boko Haram does not recognize Western ideological thinking, 
civilization, and ways of life, proclaiming that any way of life that is not in adherence to Islam 
should be prohibited (Onouha, 2012).   
Silke (2014) suggests that it is important to acknowledge the many factors that have aided the 
transformation of the modus operandi of the sect’: from non-violent to the adoption of its extremely 
brutal tactics in its endeavour to meet its objectives such as alleviating economic disparities, 
political marginalization, widespread poverty, and arguably an expansion of its ideology amongst 
the abovementioned factors.  Viewed through a Critical Terrorism Studies lens, one can argue that 
ideology is the fundamental influencer and initiator of terrorism.  According to Bayo-Ogunrotifa 
(2012), a popular component of Critical Terrorism Studies is that it acknowledges that an 
abundance of activities advanced and incorporated by terrorists are often encouraged by socio-
economic, political, as well as ethnic, cultural and religious factors.  Within the Nigerian context, 
these factors include high rates of poverty and unemployment as a result of socio-economic 
disparities; political and religious alienation emanating from the consequences of the legacies of 
colonialism; and the drive to establish a Sharia form of governance.   
 In addition, CTS can also be accredited with the fact that it acknowledges that terrorists often fight 
for the acknowledgement and approval of their ideological beliefs, as well as for separation and 
independence.  Therefore, one can argue that Boko Haram positions itself as a group that largely 
places an emphasis on the expansion of its ideology.  In addition, one can also contend that it 
harbors the latter agenda too, aligning its ideological expansion with its fight for independence and 
separation from the greater Nigerian society and secular state.  
The Nigerian State and Boko Haram’s ideological expansion are the primary points that comprise 
the following subsection 
4.2.1. The Nigerian State and the Ideological Expansion of Boko Haram 




both the role that it has played in contributing to the expansion of Boko Haram, as well as an actor 
in countering it.   Silke (2014) contends that in 2009, greatly encouraged by their Islamist caliphate 
ideology, the sect commenced an anti-government revolt, which was also informed by 
dissatisfaction with ongoing political corruption.  The sect was, to a greater extent, curbed by 
Nigerian security forces and succumbed to brutal extra-judicial killings which resulted in the death 
of the sect’s charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf.  Scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies as well 
as other experts including Silke (2014), acknowledge the grave consequences of the brutal killing 
of Mohammed Yusuf and suggest that this occurrence could have triggered and further encouraged 
the group’s violent extremism that is seen today.    
Furthermore, it is important to take into account that Nigeria is considered one of Africa’s most 
ethnically diverse countries, with more than 300 ethnic groupings within its borders.  According 
to Vermeulen (2014:117), history shows that colonial powers never fully considered the extent of 
their actions when deciding on borders. Nigeria is an existing example that drawing artificial 
borders around certain geographical areas does not mean that the individuals within that particular 
territory will consider themselves a nation and will be willing to coexist in unison.  Historically, 
Nigeria has comprised three dominant ethnic groups:  the Igbo residing in the south-east region of 
Nigeria; the Hausa-Fulani in northern Nigeria; and the Yoruba in south-western Nigeria 
(Nwabueze, 2013).  A consequence of colonialism was the amalgamation of Northern and 
Southern Nigeria, which meant that these ethnic groups who had previously existed apart from one 
another, were forced to assimilate and co-exist (Ochonu, 2014).  
 
An important reality that one should consider in the contemporary context of Nigeria resulting 
from the results of colonialism, is the religious identity that exists which is dominated by the 
Christian South, and the Islamic North regions of the country.  Nigeria, as is the case with most 
other African countries, is proof of the consequences of the division of nations and groupings by 
former colonial powers (Vermeulen, 2014: 82).  So when one applies the theoretical framework of 
CTS, one can argue that orthodox and traditional terrorism studies have placed far too much value 
and emphasis on state-centric approaches to terrorism, while some of the primary root causes were, 
in fact, a result of the colonial project.  Many of these factors, including the formation of the 




fundamental role in the development of Boko Haram’s ideological underpinnings, which seek to 
overthrow the currently secular state of Nigeria.   
 
This researcher maintains that the political, historical, and socio-economic developments of the 
Nigerian state must be considered when assessing the emergence and establishment of Boko 
Haram.  It is clear that historical factors stemming from the previous century, as alluded to above, 
have led Boko Haram to employ the strategies and tactics that they currently employ, in order to 
achieve their intended objectives.  So, when viewed from a CTS perspective, one can argue that 
the historical influences on the ideological development and expansion of Boko Haram may have 
been neglected within the traditional and orthodox approaches to understanding terrorism in 
Nigeria and more specifically, in the case of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.  In addition 
to this sentiment, Vermeulen (2014) amongst other scholars of CTS, calls for the use of the 
‘terrorism’ label to be reconsidered, as it refers to particular individuals and groups.  An additional 
critique of the orthodox and mainstream considerations of terrorism lies in Vermeulen’s (2014) 
assessment of the disputes and conflicts that exist between religion, ethnicity, and regionalism 
within the context of Nigeria.   
Therefore, through the application of CTS, in this section the researcher has assessed the current 
state of Nigeria as well as the ideological underpinnings that have influenced the rise of Boko 
Haram into the deadly organization that it is today. In addition, it is important that the approaches 
to Boko Haram by multilateral institutions and regional actors such as the African Union, should 
be revisited.  While this research indicates that sovereignty is a very sensitive issue, it contends 
that equally, peace and security of the continent should be considered.  Therefore, it is inevitable 
that this research should employ CTS to critique the state-centric and militarized approach 
assumed by the African Union in its efforts to curb Boko Haram.   
In the following section the nature of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture will be 
examined, particularly in relation to Boko Haram.   
4.3.  Understanding the Nature of the African Union’s Peace and Security 
Architecture 
From the onset of the re-emergence of Boko Haram and its transition from a predominantly 




sect’s new agenda offered a grave danger not only to Nigeria, but to the wider region.  This is due 
to the increasing regionalization of Boko Haram’s presence.  The organization’s ‘strong-hold’ of 
Borno State shares borders with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.  The consequence of extensive 
porous borders has allowed Boko Haram to expand its strategic terrorism to spill over into the 
neighboring states of the Lake Chad Basin, namely Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.  Porous borders 
and poor state capacity in the Lake Chad Basin have allowed Boko Haram to expand its scourge 
of terrorism through the following: the ability to move its finances freely without being traced; the 
mass movement of its new recruits from each of these countries; and the easy flow of illegal arms 
and weapons. All these factors have made it easy for Boko Haram to conduct cross-border attacks 
and raids into its respective neighboring countries.  Furthermore, the collapse of Libya in 2011 
gave Boko Haram the opportunity to establish links with various other organizations in the Sahel, 
namely Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar Dine, based in Mali.  These newly-formed 
relationships played a significant role in increasing Boko Haram’s threshold and military 
capabilities.   
So one may question the reason why the African Union did not immediately act upon the 
resurgence of Boko Haram or why there was a lack of initial mutual co-operation between Nigeria 
and its aforementioned neighboring countries (Abugbila, 2017: 237).  Perhaps the answer lies in 
the deficit and the lackluster initiative of the African Union’s security institutions.   This, in turn, 
encourages one to take the necessary steps to interrogate the entire African Peace and Security 
Architecture as a means of understanding and further assessing this continental body’s ability to 
ameliorate and flush out the threat of Boko Haram, in order to achieve peace, stability, and 
democratic legitimacy in Nigeria and its neighboring states.  
The African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) serves as the umbrella term for the 
central instruments of the African Union which are dedicated to promoting peace, security and 
stability within the African continent.  In 2001, the Organization of African Unity, with support 
from its member states, took a collective decision to integrate the fundamental and pivotal 
mechanisms of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution into the 
African Union, a resolution which was established in 1993 (Engel & Porto, 2009:11).  Since its 
adoption at the 36th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in Lomé, Togo in 2000, the Union has made 




progressively using them for the sole purpose of conflict prevention, management, and resolution 
as envisaged in the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union (Brubacher, Damman, & Day: 
2017). 
Further, in response to, and in line with the provisions of the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
and the Protocol aimed at the initiation, establishment and further implementation of the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC Protocol), the AU is recognised as the institution accountable and 
responsible for tackling these obstacles and as a result, has initiated and established its new African 
Peace and Security Architecture (African Union Commission, 2015: 8). 
According to Desmidt (2019:83), with the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security 
Architecture, a number of internal entities were born which operate as the institutional apparatus 
of the AU and the REC’s daily and regular interventions, peacekeeping, and conflict management 
activities throughout the continent.  The APSA has been described by Desmidt (2019) as an 
extremely dynamic structure which comprises a number of components. Firstly, the Peace and 
Security Council is an organ which serves as the decision-making unit for the prevention, 
management, and resolution of conflicts.  Secondly, the African Union Commission is liable and 
accountable for the implementation of the decisions taken by the PSC.  Thirdly, the African 
Standby Force (ASF) acts as a multidimensional organ of APSA covering elements of policing, 
military, as well as civilian-oriented operations.  Next to the ASF lies the Panel of the Wise (PoW) 
which serves as an advisory constituent of the APSA.  This operation deals predominantly with 
diplomacy and strategic dialogue.  Lastly, the APSA is composed of the Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS), which forms part of the AU’s early warning system and seeks to provide 
speedy and timely information that will indicate any potential threats to the PSC and the AU 
Commission.  
4.4.  Assessing the AU’s Response to the State of Affairs that Enabled the Evolution, 
Development, and Expansion of Boko Haram 
While in the previous section the African Union’s Peace Security Architecture was examined, in 
the following sections the AU’s response to the root causes that enabled the evolution, 
development, and expansion of Boko Haram will be assessed.  In this section the advantages of 




issues of religion, ethnicity, poverty, and regional politicization will also be emphasized. 
Throughout the remaining sections of this study, it is strongly argued that organizations such as 
Boko Haram should be researched, assessed and analyzed by employing an all-inclusive 
theoretical framework such as CTS which identifies and acknowledges the importance of tackling 
and addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism.    
The nature of the crisis of Boko Haram in Nigeria for the Nigerian government and regional 
stakeholders, in particular for the African Union, has been an enormous challenge.  The manner in 
which these entities have attempted to deal with the threat of Boko Haram by addressing and 
attacking the symptoms of the issue through military and state-centric approaches are largely 
rejected within the Critical Terrorism Studies school of thought.  The African Union, in co-
operation with the Nigerian government, implemented a security-based military approach – 
namely through military raids; roadblocks; intelligence operations; and military checkpoints – 
which disregarded the socio-economic, political, and cultural responses, necessary in the fight 
against Boko Haram.  
In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 contended that “the strategies utilized by the 
African Union in dealing with Boko Haram have not resulted in the necessary results”.  Participant 
3’s sentiments are perhaps a reflection of those of the majority of scholars and experts who have 
been critical of the symptomatic approach embodied by the African Union in its fight against Boko 
Haram.  Participant 3 critiqued this orthodox approach by stipulating that “the starting point is to 
acknowledge that your role as the African Union should not only be to just put in the ‘band aid’ as 
it were”.  As the interview proceeded, Participant 3 argued that “the responsibility of the African 
Union’s forces and institutions on the ground should be to actually work on the root causes and 
the existing faultiness in Nigerian society” (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018).  This is very 
much an approach and outlook that is shared by many scholars of CTS including Vermeulen 
(2014), who contend that the symptomatic and military-driven counter-terrorism approach 
employed by the African Union and its counterparts has proven to be ineffective in dealing with 
the grievances of Boko Haram and the larger issue at hand, which in turn has encouraged large 
portions of various communities throughout Nigeria to embrace the ideological underpinnings of 




Umar (2013, 38) maintains that a fundamental challenge in tackling the root causes of the Boko 
Haram issue lies in the current organizational make-up of the sect, particularly as a result of the 
extra-judicial killing of one of its prominent leaders, Mohamed Yusuf in the mid-2000s.  This 
change in organizational structure has made dialogue between counter-terrorism actors and Boko 
Haram extremely complex.   
In the following subsections of this research, the African Union’s response will be assessed by 
analyzing and subsequently critiquing its symptomatic approach which predominantly comprises 
a widely-militarized strategy for combating Boko Haram throughout Nigeria.   
4.4.1. Addressing the Symptoms of Terrorism Approach: A Military Driven Response 
As alluded to above, there have been various factors leading to the development and growth of 
Boko Haram.  When one assesses the current situation in north-eastern Nigeria from a CTS 
perspective, it becomes apparent that the Nigerian government as well as external stakeholders (in 
particular the African Union-mandated Lake Chad Basin Commission-led Multinational Joint 
Task Force) have employed a one-dimensional approach to the issue of terrorism in Nigeria and 
have neglected to employ a two-pronged strategy that seeks to address and tackle both the 
symptoms and root causes of the Boko Haram crisis.   
The growing regionalization of Boko Haram on the African continent led to the African Union’s 
conclusion that a collective and comprehensive strategy was needed in order to defeat the threat.  
One such coalition which was established and is currently playing an active role in attempting to 
curb Boko Haram, is the Multinational Joint Task Force which is deployed under the leadership 
of the Lake Chad Basin and mandated by the African Union Peace and Security Council.  As will 
be discussed below in more detail, the MNJTF was established to fight the internal threat of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria.  The MNJTF, like many ad-hoc operations, aligns itself with the AU’s Common 
African Defense and Security Policy, which is outlined in Article 3, Section (e) and Article 4, 
Section (d) of the AU Constitutive Act (Desmidt, 2019).  Williams (2018), argues that from a 
political point of view, these coalitions demonstrate the importance of the idea of collective 
security and self-reliance which are core principles of the African Peace and Security Architecture, 




In view of the above, it is important to note that these ad-hoc coalitions, and in this particular case, 
the MNJTF; in tackling the threat of Boko Haram, operate beyond the confines of the official 
framework of the eight Regional Economic Communities1 and the two Regional Mechanisms 
which were established to support the formation of the African Standby Force (AFS).  To add to 
this observation, Albert (2017: 126) argues that the MNJTF is not one of the recognized REC’s 
for peace and security operations in Africa.  Albert (2017:126) further extends the aforementioned 
argument by insinuating that the MJNTF is merely an extension of the member states of the Lake 
Chad Basin (LCB). Albert’s (2017) argument encourages one to further interrogate why these 
countries would initially avoid endorsing the African Peace and Security Architecture to 
implement their own Peace and Security structures.   
 
It further begs the question why these LCB nations opted initially to neglect the two prominent 
and integral security communities around them.  These security communities include ECOWAS 
of which Nigeria, Niger, and Benin form part, and the Economic Community of Central African 
states (ECCAS) which Chad and Cameroon are members of.  The next subsections will briefly 
outline some of the core approaches the MNJTF has employed as part of its military-centered 
approach.   While the MNJTF has been hailed for being able to successfully flush Boko Haram 
out of some of its strategic territorial bases, its operations are a reflection of the highly military-
driven approach that embodies the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy, not only in Nigeria 
but across the African continent.  This strategy has been highly criticized as yielding short-term 
results to terrorism inflicted by Boko Haram.  Within its counter-terrorism campaign, the African 
Union and its troop of contributing countries have continued to employ a symptomatic approach 
in their efforts to subdue Boko Haram, comprising predominantly the deployment and utilization 
of armed forces to establish military checkpoints and raids; working with intelligence services; 
and providing physical security and protection, all of which will be briefly reviewed in the next 
subsections.   
                                                 
1Arab Maghreb Union; The Community of Sahel-Saharan States; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; 
East African Community; Economic Community of West African States; Intergovernmental Authority on 




4.4.2. Establishment of Check Points 
A simple and apparent strategy employed by Boko Haram is to make use of main roads as a means 
to reach its intended targets.  The MNJTF and its forces have established a number of checkpoints 
as an approach to track, frustrate, and disorganize Boko Haram’s movements.  Individuals, groups, 
and vehicles deemed suspicious are rigorously searched and undergo a physical screening (Umar, 
2013:41).  According to Umar (2013: 41), this process and approach has yielded below-par results.  
Umar argues that these check points have yielded these poor results due to a lack of resource 
capacity as well as to poor management and administration. This enables Boko Haram to avoid 
detection and continuously carry out its grievous attacks against its intended targets, both locally 
and beyond its Nigerian territories.    
4.4.3. Intelligence Operations 
The MNJTF, in collusion with Nigerian national security services, has employed intelligence as a 
means to curb the threat of Boko Haram.  The employment of such an approach has yielded relative 
success in curbing Boko Haram, including the arrest of a number of key members and has reduced 
the organization’s sphere of attack.  While intelligence-gathering and -sharing by both the African 
Union and Nigerian forces has led to killings and the recovery of lethal weaponry of Boko Haram, 
Umar (2013:42) argues that this approach has yielded limited results because the organization has 
a high membership turnover as a result of its ability to replace killed or arrested members at a 
quick rate.  Conversely, these operations have also increased military-civilian tensions as many 
MNJTF forces have been accused of killing and maiming innocent civilians in the process.   
 
In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 criticized the AU’s counter-terrorism approach 
by arguing that “if you look at most of the AU members, you will find that most of their law-
enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies are not equipped with dealing with this thing of 
counter-terrorism” (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018).  These views shared by Participant 3 
(2018) correspond with McQuaid and Patricio Asufra-Heim’s (2015) assertions that the Nigerian 
government itself has continued to disregard the underlying contextual realities that inform much 
of the communities of the north-eastern region of Nigeria.  This has ensured that the affected 
communities across northern Nigeria remain hesitant to share the necessary intelligence – which 




Nigerian law-enforcement agencies as well as with the African Union-mandated security agencies.  
In agreement with Participant 3’s (2018) assertions, Aina (2016: 70) contends that while the 
MNJTF as well as the Nigerian government may possess decent military equipment, the joint task 
force has not demonstrated the ability to use advanced technological intelligence and intelligence-
gathering in its strategic operations to subdue Boko Haram in its entirety.   
The above-mentioned sentiments coincide with the arguments and criticism that will be put 
forward in the next section which offers a broad criticism of the strategy employed by the African 
Union in its efforts to counter the menace that is Boko Haram.  In accordance with the 
commitments of CTS, perhaps one can argue that the operations employed by the African Union 
have been limited and to a certain extent unsuccessful because they have failed to address the root 
causes of the issue, such as the alleviation of poverty, eradication of conflict and tension, as well 
as tackling the rising unemployment rate throughout Nigeria. 
4.5.  The AU’s Response to Boko Haram:  The Failure to Address the Root Causes 
As Boko Haram has developed from a localized insurgency into an organization with a regional 
and violent footprint, the Nigerian government as well as the African Union, particularly 
multilateral security agencies such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the 
Multinational Joint Task force which are primarily mandated by the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union, have been entrusted with presiding over the peace and security affairs related 
to the African continent (PSC, 2015: 33.).  By applying CTS as the theoretical framework, in the 
next phase of this chapter, the clear-cut symptomatic and military-driven strategy centered around 
orthodox and traditional approaches to terrorism currently being employed by the African Union 
in its response to conflicts will be discussed, examined, and critiqued; and in particular the acts of 
terror inflicted by Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria. 
The manner in which the Nigerian government and the security agencies which are mandated by 
the African Union have attempted to tackle the threat posed by Boko Haram have proven to yield 
limited success.  The extremely brutal strategies employed by the African Union security agencies 
have proven to be counterproductive.  The heavy reliance on extrajudicial killings – for example 
the killing of the Boko Haram’s first leader, Mohammed Yusuf; the arrest and maiming of innocent 




airstrikes – as an approach to tackling the actions perpetuated by Boko Haram – have perhaps 
triggered and further encouraged the group’s violent extremism as well as its current militant 
capacity.   
In an interview conducted in Pretoria, Participant 3 argued that these “tactics are a reflection of the 
symptomatic counter-terrorism approach” (Interview, Participant 3: 17/07/2018) that scholars of 
Critical Terrorism Studies fundamentally reject.  Furthermore, from a CTS perspective, one may 
contend that such an approach embodies a ‘lame duck’ attitude that in fact many scholars of CTS 
including Solomon (2015) argue, fails to address the underlying root issues that encourage 
individuals to join and endorse the ideological underpinnings of groups such as Boko Haram.  For 
example, Solomon (2015) argues that “military solutions alone are not working”.  The 
Multinational Joint Task Force together with the Nigerian government, disregard salient socio-
economic and governance issues that continue to play a role in the vast unemployment and poverty 
rates – a consequence that Boko Haram been able to take full advantage of in its recruitment 
strategies.   
Perhaps for scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies, a difficult challenge for the African Union and 
its security agencies lies within the process of identifying, addressing, and tackling the root causes 
of the Boko Haram crisis.  One such factor is a result of the shift within the organizational structure 
of Boko Haram since the extra-judicial killing of its first leader, Mohammed Yusuf.  The group 
now functions and operates in cell-like structures and therefore, dialogue between the Nigerian 
government, the African Union and the leadership of Boko Haram has proven to be difficult.   
If one is to observe the current counter-terrorism dilemma that the African Union is facing through 
a CTS lens, one can argue that that the AU is currently being challenged by a lack of stakeholder 
cohesion as well as by the innate inability to maintain backing from the entire continent in relation 
to matters of security; particularly issues related to terrorism and counter-terrorism. In the same 
light, Abugbila (2017) contends that “despite the slow start, the African Union has implemented a 
fairly progressive counter-terrorism framework, pushing the LCBC states to co-ordinate their 
responses to close loopholes and shut down potential safe havens”.   
Within the context of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, an additional observation is that perhaps 




member states.  In addition to such an observation, one can argue that the AU finds itself with no 
member state that is willing to assume a leadership role in relation to the security predicaments 
and challenges that it finds itself in, particularly with regard to terror-stricken areas such as Nigeria.   
Chapter 2 briefly discusses the fairly progressive counter-terrorism framework considered and 
adopted by the African Union which, according to Abugbila (2017), seeks to “push states to 
coordinate their responses to close loopholes and shut down potential safe havens”.  Contrary to 
Abugbila’s assertions, Allison (2015) argues that the AU has in fact been unable to assume a 
leadership role in its entirety in the fight against Boko Haram as a result of its considerations of 
the sovereignty of its member states’.  Allison’s (2015) assertions were reaffirmed by the President 
of Chad, Idriss Deby, when he stated that “we have seen too many meetings and no concrete 
action”, and “today, there are four countries affected by Boko Haram, but tomorrow it may be a 
continental problem” (Al Jazeera news, 2015).  Many experts and critics of the security operations 
of the African Union have postulated that the organization continues to suffer from drastic capacity 
dilemmas, unable to produce either the necessary human capacity or the financial resources 
required to deal with terrorism.   
More moderate critics including Damme (2015) assert that the African Union’s ‘lame duck’ 
approach to the issue in Nigeria, among many other security problems, cannot be seen as entirely 
the fault of the organization.  Many of the countries in which it seeks to intervene and play a 
leading role by assisting with issues of grave violence, including Nigeria, have often not embraced 
the efforts attempted by the African Union.  If one were to recall the discussion that was put 
forward above regarding the responses of Nigeria to the brutal actions of Boko Haram, one can 
deduce that both President Jonathan and President Buhari’s initial stance on the idea of an African 
Union-led approach was not entirely embraced.  As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the 
insurgency, Nigeria was completely opposed to the intervention of any external forces proclaiming 
that the Boko Haram issue was solely a domestic issue.  Jacobs (2015) confirms that the initial 
attitudes and denials of both the former and current presidents of Nigeria made it more difficult to 
curb the predicament of Boko Haram; and limited any intervention attempts and counter-terror 
measures put forward by the African Union in its quest to minimize and combat developments 
aiding the group’s further expansion.  Perhaps, one can argue, that if the African Union as well as 




northern region would not have been plagued by the current scourge of terror and many lives would 
have been saved from the grievous and brutal harm typified by the tactics of Boko Haram.   
While the Multinational Joint Task force has yielded substantial territorial gains in its fight against 
Boko Haram, the AU’s Peace and Security Council has failed to assist it in prescribing 
interventions that are focused both the on socio-economic development of the communities in 
which Boko Haram operates, as well as on attacking its territorial basis through a military-driven 
approach.   
By employing the theoretical framework of Critical Terrorism Studies, in the next section of this 
research study, the African Union’s role and in particular the manner in which it has responded to 
the challenge of Boko Haram will be further discussed and critiqued.  While the AU-mandated 
and LCBC-led MNJTF has achieved relative success in flushing out Boko Haram from a number 
of strategic territorial bases, it has also previously been gravely critiqued by a number of experts 
for its lackluster approach to the threat of Boko Haram. In the following section, the AU’S 
responses to many of the root causes that have enabled Boko Haram’s evolution, expansion, and 
further development, will be analyzed.  Therefore, the AU’s strategy in combating socio-economic 
disparities; the move to implement a Sharia form of governance; neglect and political alienation 
of the Muslim dominant populations of the northeastern regions; and the terror financing of the 
organization, will form the basis of the following section.  
4.5.1. Critiquing The AU’s Symptomatic Response to Boko Haram 
“There can be no such thing as a purely military solution to an insurgency because 
insurgency is not primarily a military activity.” –General (Sir) Frank Kitson, British Army 
(Umar,2013: 47) . 
The above statement by General (Sir) Frank Kitson of the British Army is a reflection of the 
limitations that exist within the military-driven approach currently adopted by the African Union 
in its efforts to combat Boko Haram in Nigeria.  The African Union’s response to the threat posed 
by Boko Haram is defined by tackling and addressing the symptoms of terrorism.  Instead of 
working with the Nigerian government to establish institutions that are dedicated to eradicating 
poverty, minimizing unemployment, developing schools, and alleviating the issue of homeless 




military-centered counter-terrorism strategy.  The failure to design such institutions is a reflection 
of the African Union’s disregard of the importance of tackling and addressing the root causes of 
the issue of terrorism in north-eastern Nigeria.   
This position corresponds with the commitments and sentiments of scholars of CTS who argue 
against the traditional forms of countering terrorism, which primarily focus on the employment of 
force to resolve terrorist activities.  Scholars such as Solomon (2015) offer a body of critique which 
insists that the employment of armed forces by the African Union to destabilize the activities of 
members of Boko Haram, is a very short-term approach.  While it has proven to have flushed Boko 
Haram out of its strategic territorial bases, the sect has time and time again re-emerged more 
deadlier than before; an example of the consequences of simply tackling the symptoms of terrorism 
while neglecting its root causes.  Further, from a Critical Terrorism Studies perspective, this 
reflects and exposes the orthodox and lackluster approach to terrorism rejected by CTS which 
informs the African Union’s fight against Boko Haram.  In addition, while the Nigerian 
government has been transparent about the inaccuracy of casualty figures, it is apparent that there 
have been high rates of civilian casualty as a result of the militant operations employed by the 
African Union.   
These realities affirm the assertions made by scholars of Critical Terrorism Studies who critique 
the African Union’s militant approach by contending that limiting the territorial capacity of Boko 
Haram through the employment of military strategies alone, as practiced by the Multinational Joint 
Task Force, only takes into account the symptoms of the wage of terrorism espoused by Boko 
Haram.  While this approach by the MNJTF will limit the operating space for Boko Haram, a 
critique shared by scholars of CTS acknowledges that the sect has been able to continuously launch 
violent attacks successfully, as has been the case in Maiduguru and surrounding areas in north-
eastern Nigeria.  Furthermore, by taking into account the commitments of CTS, one can argue that 
this widespread and continuous violence espoused by Boko Haram is a manifestation of the 
disregard of the root causes by the African Union and its allied security forces.   
To add to the critique, one can contend that Boko Haram’s ideological underpinnings have 
continued to gain widespread support as is evident in its continued rise in membership.  Perhaps 




of citizens who feel politically and socio-economically alienated.  Grounded in traditionally 
orthodox approaches to terrorism, scholars of CTS contend that the African Union’s military-
centered and symptomatic strategy for countering Boko Haram needs to be endorsed by the 
domestic population if it wishes to isolate Boko Haram and yield the necessary and successful 
results.  In order for the African Union’s mandated security agencies, in this particular instance 
the MNJTF, to tackle Boko Haram in counter-terrorism operations, it remains imperative that the 
issues and concerns of the domestic population should be considered.  The critique espoused 
through the commitments of CTS that the orthodox approach of dealing with Boko Haram through 
military intervention alone cannot defeat the organization, is proven through the continuous rise 
of the sect throughout West Africa.  It is important to take into account that Boko Haram operates 
from an asymmetric position.    
Moreover, the currently-adopted counter-terrorism measures by the African Union fail to 
recognize that an approach which includes tackling some of the socio-economic and political 
factors driving the Boko Haram sect and also which curbs radicalization, is completely necessary.  
For scholars of CTS, this is what defines a two-pronged approach.  The one-dimensional approach 
adopted by the MNJTF which has involved the killing of innocent civilians, has led to widespread 
discontent and a valid backlash amongst communities in the north-eastern regions of Nigeria and 
turn has resulted in the rise in support for Boko Haram.  The continued rise of Boko Haram 
membership since its re-emergence in 2009 is indicative that such an approach has been received 
with widespread resentment.  The above argument also supports the position by counter-terrorism 
experts such as Participant 3 (Interview, 17/07/2018) who critiqued AU security forces such as the 
MNJTF and its application of force in fighting Boko Haram, by suggesting that “for military 
operations to yield the necessary and positive results, the military needs to be able to acquire and 
sustain the support of civilians in the north-eastern regions of Nigeria in order to isolate the terrorist 
activities implemented by Boko Haram”.  
While these military interventions by the African Union have forcefully dispersed Boko Haram 
from some of its territorial bases, it has enabled the sect to re-emerge violently in other parts of 
the country and in the West African region.  This military-centered approach facilitates the 
establishment of newer and stronger cells in other parts of the region which have even resulted in 




parts of Benin.  This supports the critique that this researcher attempts to postulate through the 
application of Critical Terrorism Studies, by suggesting that that the African Union’s military-
focused approach is a reflection of the detrimental consequences of a one-dimensional strategy 
that excludes measures seeking to address the fundamental root causes of the expansion of Boko 
Haram.  Rather, this approach has led to the further expansion of both the ideological 
underpinnings and radical asymmetrical forms of warfare that inform the actions of Boko Haram 
today.    
By assessing the African Union’s highly pro-military approach, one may offer a further critique of 
this orthodox strategy by contending that it is does not address the multi-causal crisis such as the 
Boko Haram threat.  Furthermore, the extra-judicial killings and mass killings of innocent civilians 
by security forces have consequently ignited a recruitment campaign for Boko Haram, as many 
individuals felt largely betrayed by the Nigerian government and the African Union’s security 
forces, as a result of the killing of innocent civilians.  As such, it is clear that such an approach 
only serves to eradicate the immediate threats espoused by Boko Haram at the expense of a long-
term and sustainable strategy to ameliorate the violent activities of the sect.     
Within the military-driven approach, the AU has also neglected a number of other root causes.  
Ochonu (2014), like many other experts, contends that the historical social influences accepted in 
colonial Nigeria, are similar to, if not the same, factors and elements that Nigeria believes to be 
the root cause of the ongoing instability, violence, and conflict in the current context of Nigerian 
society.  However, Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012) also extensively proclaims that an orthodox approach 
to countering Boko Haram through the deployment of armed forces, illustrates the disregard of the 
historical and socio-political factors that inform and shape the nature of Boko Haram’s 
organizational structure and ideological underpinnings.   
By applying CTS to critiquing the measures employed by the African Union in countering Boko 
Haram, it is clear that the military-driven approach deals solely with the symptoms.  This is why 
scholars of CTS, including Bayo-Ogunrotifa (2012), suggest that when studying the growth and 
development of Boko Haram, one should look deeper than the state-centric, and militaristic 
elements and incorporate a body of research centered around understanding the effects of 




which have led to the rise and expansion of Boko Haram.  Only then will the African Union be 
able to implement a successful counter-terrorism approach.   
i. A Disregard of the Socio-Economic Disparities Between North and South 
Corresponding to the afore-mentioned ideological underpinnings of Boko Haram , as well as the 
historical legacies and consequences that have encouraged Boko Haram to carry out its ideological 
objectives through grievous acts of terror, one may contend that a recurring theme in states across 
the African continent, including Nigeria, include socio-economic factors, inequalities and 
disparities which have played a role in the rise of the subjugation and marginalization of particular 
groups in Nigeria.   As previously alluded to in this research, there are deeply entrenched socio-
economic disparities in existence between the North and South of Nigeria.  When one assesses the 
Nigerian context, it is evident that these socio-economic divisions are without a doubt some of the 
most pertinent factors and root causes that have propelled the establishment, emergence, and 
expansion of Boko Haram. As previously mentioned, the increasing unemployment rates in the 
Northern region, specifically amongst young people who constitute the greater portion of the 
population, serve to drive the agitations that are evident in the region, as well as the combination 
of the abovementioned socio-economic issues and the predicament of radical Islam, which 
guarantees a better life and wellbeing for martyrs (Rogers, 2012).  
Usman (2015) attributes the increase in youth membership of Boko Haram to the failure and 
incapacity of the Nigerian government and its multilateral counterparts – such as the African Union 
– to effectively decrease youth unemployment rates, particularly in north-eastern Nigeria.  Like 
many African countries, young people comprise the majority of the population, and Nigeria, like 
many of its African counterparts, finds itself with an abundance of graduates who are discovered 
roaming the streets looking for unavailable jobs (Usman, 2015: 90-94).  The currently-employed 
African Union strategy fails to recognize and acknowledge that while some young people in 
Nigeria receive formal tertiary education, their qualifications, more often than not, come with no 
value, and as such they opt to pledge allegiance to Boko Haram (Vermeulen, 2014: 101).  In 
addition to the above argument, there are many perspectives related to the rationale behind 
pledging loyalty to such a brutal and violent organization, including frustration resulting from the 
inability to secure employment.  In simple terms, one may argue that education in Nigeria is 




elite establish themselves in privileged positions.  Further, the above assertion is supported by 
Ucha (2010) who argues that an educational qualification does not guarantee any form of 
employment in Nigeria.  Like many societies, a rise in unemployment rates accelerates poverty, 
and in turn triggers the rate at which crime and violence increase.  Ucha (2010) contends that it is 
in fact the victims of this unemployment upsurge that are left with no choice but to opt in the 
direction of kidnappings, armed robberies, and a number of other violent activities, most notably 
in the name of Boko Haram.   
Akanni (2014) contests that, like many African countries, unemployment is a fundamental factor 
that has shaped the socio-economic climate of Nigeria.  Outcomes of the present research study 
critique the African Union for its failure to assist the Nigerian government in implementing socio-
economic policies that are resolute in directing mechanisms which seek to alleviate unemployment 
and related socio-economic obstacles.  According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the 
unemployment rate in Nigeria increased from 20.42% in the fourth quarter of 2017 to 23.13% in 
the fourth quarter of 2018.  
As previously mentioned, while economic issues are a nation-wide problem, the northern region 
of Nigeria, which is Muslim-dominated, is largely affected by socio-economic disparities.  This is 
worrisome, taking into account that the northern region makes up a large portion of Nigeria’s oil 
production and exportation.  The statistics mentioned above are a reflection of the high levels of 
poverty that plague this particular region.  By applying CTS to the socio-economic disparities that 
inform the northern-most region of Nigeria, one can contend that these factors are a representation 
of some of the core roots and causes that have led much of Nigeria’s young to adopt extreme 
religious views and subsequently join organisations such as Boko Haram.   As previously 
mentioned, there is an abundance of young gradates who roam the streets of Nigeria in search of 
jobs that the Nigerian government is capable of providing, but is unwilling to do.  It is not 
surprising that the majority of Boko Haram’s members comprise young people within Nigerian 
society.   
In view of this, CTS offers a critique that as the Nigerian government and the African Union 
continue to neglect the day-to-day realities and struggles of its population, in particular of its young 




flourish (Gottlieb, 2013).  Moreover, a number of scholars including Umar (2013) argue that Boko 
Haram’s ideological underpinnings are not exclusively about rejecting the idea of Western 
education, but also about addressing the failure of the Nigerian government to provide the 
necessary services and opportunities for the Nigerian populace.  This has been a point of 
contestation that has allowed Boko Haram to mobilize and radicalize the unemployed, unskilled, 
and largely poor youth to join the organization in its campaign to establish an Islamic Caliphate, 
thereby eliminating the secular state of Nigeria.  Boko Haram has logically positioned itself as an 
alternative that could bring about socio-economic progress and change for the poor, the 
unemployed, and the unskilled.     
By focusing on flushing out Boko Haram by means of military force, the African Union and its 
security forces have failed to tackle the socio-economic gaps that have made the sect the appealing 
alternative that it is today for those living in widespread poverty.  A critique supported by this 
research maintains that by focusing on the symptoms of terrorism espoused by Boko Haram, the 
African Union’s mandated MNJTF has failed to deal with the issue of youth unemployment, 
poverty eradication, and education accessibility amongst other socio-economic issues impacting 
the predominantly Muslim dominant northern region of Nigeria. Furthermore, grounded on 
traditional orthodox theory, the African Union’s symptomatic terrorism approach turns a blind eye 
to the importance of assisting the Nigerian government in implementing programs and policies 
that seek to encourage young Nigerians, and all those who feel the need to endorse Boko Haram 
ideologically to explore entrepreneurial and innovative routes that would create employment and 
increase job security.   
ii. Neglecting Rampant Corruption and Political Alienation 
In line with the abovementioned sentiments, one can argue that the widely-propagated argument 
by many African scholars and intellectuals, that the Western style of governance was not plausible 
in Africa to begin with, has been largely neglected and under-analyzed within the realm of 
traditional and orthodox terrorism studies.   Nigeria’s political and historical context serves as an 
illustration that speaks directly to the disparities that exist between the general Nigerian population 
and the governing political elite.  Like any society that vividly turns a blind eye to the socio-
economic hardships of its citizenry, the Nigerian ruling system has succumbed in many ways to a 




nor believes in, the political, economic, and legal systems in place (Forest, 2012).   
Adetoro (2012) supports the above proclaimed critique of the Nigerian government by arguing 
that corruption continues to impact negatively on the internal and moral fabric of Nigerian society, 
where there are corrupt occurrences entrenched in literally every system and structure that is 
governed by political authorities, including the country’s national security forces.  It is no surprise 
that the citizenry at large have grown frustrated with the Nigerian government, together with the 
armed forces of the African Union deployed to curb the threat of terror espoused by Boko Haram.  
This has made Nigeria fertile ground for Boko Haram to wage its war against armed forces of both 
the Nigerian government and the African Union’s mandated security agencies.  
Furthermore, Forest (2012) reminds one of the common practice and party protocol of power 
rotation which exists between the southern Christian electorate, and the northern Muslim 
constituency.  Political analysts in Nigeria, including Johnson (2011), argue that since the 
unfortunate death of former President Umaru Musa Yar’adua, there have been continued 
frustrations as a result of the political discomfort from northern electorates.  This dissatisfaction 
attained prominence due to the general sentiment that the administration of former president 
Goodluck Jonathan who reigned from the Christian southern elite was illegitimate because it did 
not adhere to the mutual party protocol of power transition, which according to the northern elites, 
should have kept a northern individual in power.   
These sentiments were equally shared by Maselane in an interview conducted in Pretoria in 2018 
who acknowledges that “there has been an unwritten political agreement in Nigeria that if a 
president comes from the South, the next one is going to come from the north.  So Yaradua did not 
finish his term, so the north expected the next president to come from the North to finish the term, 
but then there was President Goodluck Jonathan who came from the South”. Maselane states, 
further, that in his view “when Boko Haram started, it had the support of political leaders because 
they wanted to undermine President Goodluck Jonathan and they wanted to render the North 
ungovernable” (Interview, DD Maselane, 30/06/2018).   
One can argue that this led to the unfortunate and unintended consequences which Maselane 
describes: “…where the animal they allowed to grow, then decided to bite back to a point where 




supported it became victims of Boko Haram” (Interview, DD Maselane, 30/06/2018). 
By adopting CTS as the theoretical framework at the center of the debate, one can contend that the 
adoption of the federal model of governance in Nigeria was established without considering the 
socio-political tensions including ethnic and religious divisions which consequently led to a large 
portion of the population advocating for the implementation of Sharia law as an alternative to the 
Western model of governance (Ozoiogbo, 2008:3). Such a development has led advocates of CTS 
to criticise the African Union’s orthodox approach to countering Boko Haram by arguing that it 
overlooked the gap that the sect identified and used to its advantage as a result of the socio-political 
circumstances in Nigeria.  Therefore, proponents of CTS argue that the promotion of Sharia law 
as an alternative form of governance by Boko Haram has become appealing to citizens who reside 
predominantly in the northern regions of Nigeria because Boko Haram took advantage of 
advocating the implementation of Sharia law as a solution to the failures of the secular Nigerian 
government.  This is another example of how Boko Haram has been successful in expanding its 
ideological objectives by appealing to the roots of the issues that face Nigerian society.   
In addition to the call to implement Sharia law in the northern-most region of Nigeria, efforts by 
former President Obasanjo and his administration to include Boko Haram and its leaders in a 
discourse that would presumably lead to conciliation, negotiations, and civil talks, were initiated 
in September 2011 in Maiduguri between former President Obasanjo and members of Boko 
Haram.  The initiative was eventually supported and embraced too, by then President Goodluck 
Jonathan.  While this approach could have yielded successful results, scholars including Ejiofor 
(2015) criticize the African Union for not playing a fundamental role in mediating talks between 
Boko Haram leadership, and the Nigerian, Chadian and Cameroonian governments who had 
suffered attacks at the hands of Boko Haram and as a result the meeting yielded poor results as the 
degree of trust between the respective stakeholders dwindled.  Boko Haram had presented a 
number of demands to Obasanjo, including the termination of arrests and killings of its members; 
remuneration in the form of compensation to the families of its members who had been killed and 
injured by Nigerian forces; and the prosecution of security authorities responsible for the killing 
of its leader Mohammed Yusuf (Ejiofor, 2015).  
iii. Failure to Contain the Terror-Financing of Boko Haram 




rooted in the terror-financing of Boko Haram. Abugbila (2017) believes this is greatly supported 
by wealthy members, as well as by politicians who allow the group to sustain and develop its 
structures and mechanisms for the overall operation of the group’s strategic areas of arms and 
weaponry procurement, training, and compensation of its members.  Agbiboa (2013) suggests that 
previously, the Nigerian government was unable to trace the sources of Boko Haram’s terror-
finance.  However, the arrest of a number of Boko Haram members in 2012 exposed that the 
primary funding of the group had come in the form of donations not only from its members but 
from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliated groups in the United Kingdom 
and Saudi Arabia.  Other experts also believe that Boko Haram’s main source of funding is gained 
in the name of Al-Qaeda, as well as from the Al Muntada Trust Fund (Agbiboa, 2013: 42).   
Former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, openly expressed the fact that there have been 
groups of Nigerian authorities within the Nigerian government who have supported Boko Haram 
in various capacities; funding and the distribution of economic resources being some of the forms 
of support (Murtada, 2013).  Like many terror organizations, Boko Haram derives its finances 
through the robbing of local banks, with an estimated number of 30 bank attacks ascribed to the 
group in 2018 alone (Aina. 2016:43).  
Therefore, it remains important to critique the current strategy of the African Union which fails to 
trace the sources of Boko Haram’s terror-financing and its lucrative underground economy.  In an 
interview conducted in Pretoria in July of 2018, Participant 2 gave an account of the importance 
of ‘going after’ Boko Haram’s financial tools.  “Coming back to terror-finance which I would base 
my counter-terror strategy, is to go after its money.  I am a big advocate.  I have seen it work.  
Once you take their money, they can’t do anything.  You disrupt them.” (Interview, Participant 2, 
09/07/2018) 
This is a fundamental strategy which has been neglected by the African Union’s mandated security 
agency – in this particular instance, the MNJTF – in fighting Boko Haram.  This does not involve 
extra-judicial killings but as Participant 3 stated, “a strategy that allows us to trace, neutralize and 
disrupt the flow of money of terrorist organizations” (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018).  
Perhaps the African Union is ill-equipped to tackle and neutralize the financial flow of Boko 




members, you’ll find that in terms of their law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies are 
not equipped to deal with this thing of counter-terrorism and tracing and neutralizing the flow of 
money of these organizations such as Boko Haram” (Interview, Participant 3, 17/07/2018). 
4.6.  Does the African Union Have the Capacity to Defeat Boko Haram? 
Boko Haram has plagued the northern region of Nigeria and its neighboring countries and this 
research has provided evidence as to why it is considered one of the deadliest terrorist 
organizations in the modern world.  In its ruthless pursuit of forming an Islamic Caliphate across 
the African continent, its members have wreaked havoc by employing grave tactics which include 
the bombing of public spaces, kidnapping schoolgirls and the assassination of political officials 
(Abugbila, 2017).  As was previously argued, while the Nigerian government had initially been 
ineffective in preventing the lawlessness that was perpetuated by Boko Haram, the formation and 
efforts of the African Union Multinational Task Force have proven to be relatively successful in 
various ways.   
There have been many concerns regarding whether the MNJTF would lead to the deployment of 
troops competent in dealing with the Boko Haram sect or if it was just another method to disguise 
troops who were already engaged in the war against Boko Haram (Aina, 2016: 70).  However, 
regardless of these concerns, soldiers from neighboring countries including Chad, Niger, Benin, 
and Cameroon assisted Nigeria in effectively combating and recapturing a number of strategic 
territorial bases that had been seized by the sect, thereby demonstrating that the collaboration of 
African national armed forces serves to be effective in that capacity.  
Ever since the formation of the MNJTF, African nations have continued to work together to tackle 
the issues surrounding terrorism.  One cannot deny that apart from many of its shortcomings, the 
joint efforts among African countries under the umbrella of the African Union, has had a 
monumental impact.  However, this research offers a critique of the bittersweet successes of the 
African Union’s security agencies, particularly of the MNJTF’s ability to flush Boko Haram out 
of strategic territorial bases.  It critiques this military approach and argues that this strategy has 
proven to be symptomatic and at best, short-term.  This writer maintains that while there has been 
widespread determination of African nations accompanied by the support of international 




AU together with the LCBC have failed to implement structures and initiatives that can assist the 
Nigerian government to address and tackle some of the most prominent root causes necessary 
when fighting Boko Haram.  
Therefore, while the largely military-driven strategy by the African Union and its security 
agencies, specifically the MNJTF, has been praised by a number of observers across the African 
continent including Abugbila (2017), outcomes of this research suggest that the continental body’s 
military-driven approach will continue to aggravate the already sensitive issue and encourage 
Boko Haram to continue its violent acts of terror in Nigeria.  The clear neglect and disregard for 
the root causes in particular by the MNJTF as has been outlined throughout this chapter, are factors 
that have led to the re-emergence of Boko Haram.  So one may contend that the orthodoxies that 
exist in the current AU’s strategy will continue to regionalize the insurgency.  This researcher 
maintains that while the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture forms a substantially strong and 
advanced counter-terrorism agenda, it has yet to have any clearly evident success in preventing 
and annihilating terrorism on the African continent.   
4.7.  Conclusion 
This chapter has critiqued the orthodoxies that exist within the symptomatic and military-driven 
counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the African Union in its efforts to fight the scourge of 
terrorism waged by Boko Haram in Nigeria.  The strategies employed by the African union were 
further critiqued for failing to address the root causes, namely: existing socio-economic disparities; 
political and religious alienation; the drive to establish a Sharia form of governance; and failure to 
contain the terror-financing of the organization.  The strategies were critiqued for aligning with 
orthodox approaches to terrorism, while neglecting a two-pronged strategy that seeks to address 
both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism as broadly espoused in the commitments of Critical 
Terrorism Studies.    
In line with the critique provided throughout this chapter, outcomes of this research suggest that 
from a regional perspective, the African Union will require a paradigm shift forged by the manner 
in which member states co-operate with one another in order to withstand, address, and further 
combat the threat that is Boko Haram.  The critiques offered in this chapter are proof that 




multifaceted and multi-pronged strategy should be at the core of dealing with such a threat.   
Further, the critiques of the currently employed African Union strategy show that an enhanced 
African Union strategy and collaboration with the Nigerian government and its neighboring 
countries is necessary to reduce the cross-border supply of weapons, and money; as well as to limit 
the ease with which terrorists are able move across the region.  In addition to such improvements, 
the advancement of its intelligence apparatus, the analysis, gathering, and sharing of information 
among member states who pledge allegiance to the fight against Boko Haram, are equally 
important.   
Continuing the discussion of the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy, in the next chapter 
the commitments and principles of CTS are applied by arguing that it is necessary for the African 
Union Mission in Somalia to move away from its predominantly state-centric and military- 
consumed counter-terrorism approach to a two-pronged strategy that focuses on addressing and 
tackling both the root causes and symptoms of terrorism.   
Chapter 5 applies this theoretical framework to the case study, which is the assessment of the 
scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on Somalia; as well as an 
assessment and analysis of the approaches and strategies adopted by AMISOM in dealing with Al-
Shabab through the lens of CTS.  Chapter 5 subsequently recommends how these critiques can 
assist the African Union in reconsidering its state-centric and military-driven approach to counter 





CHAPTER 5:  AL-SHABAAB:  THE NATURE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM 
STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, Chapter 4 provides a broad critique of the orthodox 
approaches to terrorism which inform the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy with 
particular emphasis on the manner in which armed forces such as the Multinational Joint Task 
Force have adopted a largely symptomatic and military-driven approach in dealing with Boko-
Haram in Nigeria.  While this is the reality in Nigeria and its surrounding neighbors, a similar 
reality can be highlighted in the Horn of Africa and the nature in which the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) has opted to combat Al-Shabaab who continues to threaten the stability of 
an already fragile and weak state. 
By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, in this chapter, the researcher seeks to assess, 
explain, and critique the roles of regional and multilateral actors particularly the broader efforts of 
the African Union in responding to the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, with major focus 
on Somalia.  By applying CTS as the theoretical anchor, the researcher hypothesizes, in this 
chapter, that the traditional state-centric counter-terrorism approach employed in the Horn of 
Africa focuses primarily on militaristic measures, consequently excluding and undermining the 
importance of a two-pronged strategy to address and tackle the root causes that have given rise to 
Al-Shabaab’s scourge of terror in the region.  Therefore, in line with the primary objectives of this 
research, this chapter will be guided by the fourth supportive research question of the study, which 
is:   
How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union 
in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?  
 
In this chapter, an overview of terrorism in the Horn of Africa will be offered, with particular focus 
on the causes and drivers that have enabled and encouraged terrorism in this country.   In 
conjunction with the nature and drivers of terrorism, this chapter will highlight the strategic 
terrorism waged by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and in the broader Horn of Africa.  Thereafter, this 




particular emphasis on the approaches adopted by the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM).  While the present researcher acknowledges that there has been substantial progress 
in the coordination and implementation of counter-terrorism efforts, by AMISOM, he takes into 
account that the Horn of Africa continues to be confronted by a number of issues including 
terrorism, substantial intra- and interstate conflict, increasing socio-economic and political 
discontent and marginalization, and significantly, a lack of state capacity to deal with the scourge 
of terror; much of which is a consequence of the actions exerted by Al-Shabaab in the region.  
Therefore, the final focus of this chapter is to offer a broad critique of the counter-terrorism 
strategy currently employed by the African Union in the Horn of Africa.   
 
The critiques provided in this chapter suggest that much like the case of Boko-Haram in Nigeria, 
attempting to merely treat the symptoms – which has been the primary approach adopted by 
AMISOM and corresponding AU security agencies – does not serve as a viable long-term option, 
nor is it a plausible solution. 
5.2.  A Critical Understanding of the Nature and Drivers of Terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa 
 
As has been illustrated in the previous chapter in relation to the emergence of Boko-Haram, Al-
Shabaab too, has a rich history of its own.  While Chapter 2 provided a short historical account of 
the Horn of Africa, this section applies Critical Terrorism Studies in the pursuit of understanding 
the historical circumstances and drivers that inform the current realities of Somalia and the broader 
Horn of Africa, with specific emphasis on the socio-political, economic, and historical legacies 
that have influenced the establishment, emergence, and further expansion of Al-Shabaab in the 
region.  In addition, an important observation that CTS advances in both case studies, is that both 
the geographical areas in which these terrorist organizations operate – in this particular context, 
Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa – is informed by a unique history which was influenced 
by various international and external stakeholders whose legacies are still discernible in the current 
realities of their societies.   
The next subsection will provide an account of some of the most salient drivers and root causes 
that have propelled the expansion of Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa Region, 




politics, the resistance to the establishment of AMISOM in Somalia, as well as widespread mal-
administration and weak governance. 
5.2.1.  Objectives and Ideology 
In line with the underpinnings of Critical Terrorism Studies, it is important to reiterate that as a 
theoretical framework, CTS maintains that terrorist organizations are often founded, amongst other 
factors, upon a set of ideological objectives and beliefs.  Therefore, Gartenstein-Ross (2009) 
asserts that Al-Shabaab’s ideological objectives can be divided into three strands: its inception and 
evolution; from the al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI) to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU); and finally 
Al-Shabaab; as the organization is commonly known today. While all three evolutionary stages of 
the organization emphasized the establishment of a Sharia-led state, the visions of the AIAI and 
the ICU were nationalistic, in that they focused on the territories within Somali borders and the 
establishment of a country in which Somalis were the dominant ethnic group.  According to Mingst 
and Karns (2006:100), the second strand relates directly to Al-Shabaab’s affiliation and allegiance 
to Al-Qaeda.  Mingst and Karns (2006) suggest that this move is proof of Al-Shabaab’s primary 
concern which is to participate in the broader global jihadist movement.  Curran (2011) asserts that 
the message overtly conveyed by Al-Shabaab in its public statements is one that signifies the move 
away – in Somalia’s climate of nationalistic socio-political struggles – to a wider struggle within 
the context of worldwide jihad.  The last strand can be understood as the organization’s capacity 
to administer and govern.  
To this end, Vermeulen (2014) along with other scholars of CTS, argues that it remains important   
that the African Union, in its attempts to fight and combat Al-Shabaab, continuously follows and 
addresses the ever-changing ideological underpinnings that inform Al-Shabaab’s motivations and 
objectives.  By monitoring and following the evolving ideological underpinnings of Al-Shabaab 
through the lens of CTS, the present researcher suggests that the African Union and its security 
agencies will be better able to understand the inner workings, the developments, and nature of 
terrorism waged by Al-Shabaab.   
5.2.2.  Power Politics 
Along with the ideological underpinnings and objectives that inform the scourge of terror waged 




inflicted by Al-Shabaab today is a result of what he terms “power politics” (Williams, 2018: 7).  
The fall of the Siad Barre regime and essentially of the central government of Somalia in the early 
1990s, resulted in a chain of political power struggles centred around resurrecting both the state 
and national institutions and further maintaining control over these institutions.   
 
In agreement with Williams’s (2018) assertions, Menkhaus (2014) argues that Somalia’s political 
environment has been influenced by what he terms “non-state security providers”.  Therefore, Al-
Shabaab depicts itself as an entity able to provide security, governance, and justice for the local 
populations in which it operates in the absence of legitimate state governance or what many 
political pundits including Rotberg (2003) consider ‘weak states’.  Rotberg (2003) argues that 
states may be categorized as ‘weak’ or as ‘failed’ based on an array of factors, namely geographic, 
physical, or fundamental economic constraints, as well as on issues of internal instability, mal-
administration, and political corruption amongst other pertinent factors.  Rotberg (2003) contends 
that weak states generally consist of a combination of ethnic, religious, clan-centered and other 
inter-communal conflicts and differences.   
 
By applying the principles of Critical Terrorism Studies and interrogating the dominant 
interpretations of weak states – much like the one provided by Rotberg (2003) – one is able to 
classify Somalia as a weak and fragile state as a result of its numerous regions which have been 
governed by non-state actors – such as AMISOM and Al-Shabaab – who have been in a position 
to govern through various measures including coercion and to a certain extent, popular support.  
The control assumed by these alternate “non-state security providers” is often largely violent, 
especially in the case of Al-Shabaab, and this, therefore, further supports the classification of 
Somalia as a weak state.   
 
A notable example of these power struggles for consideration is the rise and establishment of the 
Union of Islamic Courts which ran up against the interests of the TFG.  In 2006, the Union of 
Islamic Courts emerged and further expanded into the brutal organisation known as Al-Shabaab.  
According to Peck (2007), there was mutual consensus amongst the Somali public which embraced 
the revival of public order by the militias, primarily as a result of the non-existence of state 




however, was flushed out by an Ethiopian intervention task force.  The political leadership of the 
Courts was forced to retreat in Eritrea, while the armed wing continued its operations in Somalia.  
In addition, scholars of CTS such as Vermeulen (2014) argue that the Ethiopian intervention 
generated and garnered immense support for Al-Shabaab, as many Somali nationals considered 
Ethiopia their arch-enemy.  By examining these circumstances through a CTS lens, this researcher 
asserts that such national sentiments and power struggles were crucial factors in cultivating 
conditions for Al-Shabaab to successfully mobilize and organize both nationally-oriented and 
jihadist-centered fighters in order to yield the effective hybridization of national jihadism and 
liberation it has come to represent and symbolize.   
5.2.3.  Identity Politics 
 
Much like the struggles for political power in Somalia which opened up a gap for Al-Shabaab to 
mobilize, an important factor that one needs to consider in the reality of Somalia is contained in 
the clan-divisions.  It is common knowledge that in the final years of Siad Barre’s dictatorship, the 
Somali state was divided into contending and somewhat belligerent clan-centered factions (Wise, 
2011:3).  Throughout the colonial era, six major clan families dominated strategic spheres of 
Somali society. Within the colonial economic structure, clans transitioned from competing for 
natural resources such as water, livestock and arable land to contesting for political authority linked 
to economic incentives (Mohamed, 2009:7).  One of the observations obtained by applying CTS 
to this subsection is that the weak state of Somalia’s socio-political order is a result of the evident 
clan divisions.  While individuals within Somali’s society are referred to as ‘Somalis’, Vermeulen 
(2014) asserts that most people prefer to be addressed according to their clan names.  This loyalty 
is a clear indication of the importance of considering CTS as framework for assessing the socio-
political conditions, in particular by naming issues of clan contestations as potential salient drivers 
and root causes that have influenced the expansion of Al-Shabaab and its terrorism campaign.   
 
These considerations are important in order to provide an all-inclusive explanation and critique of 
the approaches and methods for countering terrorism.  Therefore, in this study it is maintained that 
it is necessary to link CTS to this point of departure, as CTS embraces pluralistic perspectives in 
relation to the assessment and analysis of the terrorism phenomenon; more so within the context 




capacity to trigger the grievances of various clans which in turn manifested in the very foundations 
from which Al-Shabaab indirectly emerged. The aforementioned observation leads one to argue 
that perhaps the lack of nationhood in Somalia, a country deeply embroiled in clan divisions, is a 
factor that might have been disregarded by orthodox and traditional intellectuals of terrorism, and 
that the state-centric approach leads experts, intellectuals and scholars alike to simply assess the 
Somali state while neglecting the salient factors and underlying drivers that may have led to the 
emergence of Al-Shabaab.  
 
5.2.4.  AMISOM’s Presence as a Potential Driver 
 
Along with the socio-political drivers that have been considered above, the researcher asserts that 
perhaps the establishment and current presence of AMISOM in Somalia needs to be taken into 
account when considering some of the key drivers that have influenced the establishment and 
continuous expansion of Al-Shabaab’s scourge of terror.  This argument is supported by Ligawa 
(2018) who maintains that the arrival of AMISOM in Somalia sent a series of aggravated waves 
across Al-Shabaab’s cells within the Horn of Africa.  Therefore, as it stands, the current researcher 
maintains that while AMISOM has played a fundamental role in countering Al-Shabaab, it has 
also played a pivotal role in perpetuating the organization’s violent acts of terror.  
In addition to the assertions above, Hassan (2012) suggests that many of the interviewees who 
were interviewed as part of the study, Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of 
Al-Shabaab and Youth; had built up extreme discontent towards AMISOM as a result of the intense 
bombing of towns across Somalia which led to the destruction of both property and life.  Hassan 
(2012) argues that many young people in Somalia joined Al-Shabaab in order to seek revenge and 
protect themselves from the military attacks of the armed forces of AMISOM.  In addition, there 
had been increasing discontent as a result of a range of human rights abuses including gang rapes, 
gender-based violence and the unwarranted killings of innocent civilians which had been 
conducted by AMISOM armed forces.   
When one applies CTS to the abovementioned assessments, it is important that the terror attacks 
and activities waged by Al-Shabaab should be understood against the background of the scale of 
attacks waged against them.  In addition, through the application of CTS to the study, one may 




a pertinent role in perpetuating the aggravated response by Al-Shabaab and subsequently serves 
as a consequence of the reality that informs much of the brutal attacks that have been executed by 
Al-Shabaab.   
While this research by no means attempts to justify the rationale behind Al-Shabaab’s attacks, it 
remains of the utmost importance that Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism should be understood and 
considered according to the current context in which it operates.  Crouch (2018) asserts that this is 
a crucial dynamic that must be taken into account in order to understand Al-Shabaab’s employment 
of violence towards Somalis and the Somali state.  Furthermore, within the lens of CTS, this 
researcher asserts that gaining an insight into the rationale behind Al-Shabaab’s grievous acts of 
terror opens up the opportunity to explain and critique the current methods and approaches to 
countering Al-Shabaab.  The researcher, therefore maintains that by adopting CTS, one may begin 
to link the rise in violent extremism as espoused by Al-Shabaab to the military threat enforced by 
the armed wing of the African Union Mission in Somalia, along with its armed allies.   
However, it is important to remain clear that this writer does not postulate that Al-Shabaab would 
reconsider and employ less harmful strategies, had circumstances been more conducive for it to 
do so.  The argument throughout this study does not maintain that the rise of Al-Shabaab is solely 
a result of the consequences of the establishment of AMISOM and its military approaches.  Rather, 
through this research, the researcher acknowledges that the currently adopted military-driven 
strategy employed to counter Al-Shabaab has played a role in the expansion of Al-Shabaab’s 
strategic terrorism and therefore, must be reconsidered as it has proved to encourage Al-Shabaab 
to engage.  In corresponding to the commitments of CTS, scholars, researchers and experts are 
able to consider other forms of productive strategies, namely the importance of political dialogue 
in addressing the socio-economic and political issues that have encouraged members of Somali 
society to seek an alternative in Al-Shabaab.  Emphasis on dialogue allows for the opportunity to 
attach substantive importance to the demands and needs of civilians.   
5.2.5.  Mal-administration, Weak Governance, and a Neglect of Socio-Economic Issues 
In support of the above-mentioned causes and drivers, Gatuiku (2016: 24) proposes that the weak 
nature of governance and state administration, particularly in the case of Somalia, can be attributed 




borders across the region as a dominant cause and driver.  Mal-administration has led to an increase 
in porous borders in the region, which has consequently facilitated the rise in the free flow of 
weapons and undocumented individuals who tend to be a threat to the national security of 
particular states.  An additional argument regarding the abovementioned drivers and causes of 
terror in the Horn of Africa is the spread of radical Islam as a vehicle to address the vivid poor 
socio-economic conditions and widespread poverty which has been a contributing factor to the 
socio-economic marginalization of a significant portion of Somalia’s population.  
Furthermore, CTS scholars, including Vermeulen (2014), argue that in the case of Somalia, 
perhaps the division between tradition and modernity has played a role in defining the complex 
political environment and the struggle for power.  The division has resulted in a sense of 
illegitimacy and intrinsically a leadership deficit, which has made it tough for the parties involved 
to reach a mutual understanding and beneficial compromise.   In addition, external variables, 
existing across both regional and international lines, have played a fundamental role in the 
deterioration of the political climate, primarily as a result of the employment and implementation 
of state-centric and military-focused channels and approaches to achieving sustained security and 
political stability in Somalia and the greater Horn of Africa.   
 
This section has illustrated that a number of factors must be taken into account when attempting 
to understand the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa, when viewed through the lens of 
CTS.  Therefore, it remains important that the AU should move away from its one-dimensional 
military and state-centric approach and move towards employing a multi-pronged strategy that 
focuses on both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism in Somalia and the broader Horn of 
Africa region.  Furthermore, this section of the chapter indicates that all the factors and drivers 
discussed above (ideological objectives, political power struggles, clan loyalty, and the neglect of 
socio-economic issues such as poverty, a lack of education, and unemployment as a result of mal-
administration and poor governance) have led to the emergence of the ideological underpinnings 
that inform the nature of Al-Shabaab’s terror campaign.  
5.3.  Understanding the Nature of the AU’s Responses to Al-Shabaab 
The previous section of this chapter was an attempt to unpack the nature and impact of some of 




In addition, the section included an account of some of the fundamental elements that inform the 
structural make-up of Al-Shabaab and the factors and drivers that have propelled the organisation 
to undertake some of the grievous acts of terror in the Horn of Africa.   Therefore, from this point 
of departure, one can assert that by assessing the situation on the Horn of Africa through the lens 
of CTS, one cannot and should not turn a blind eye to the vast challenges and continued obstacles 
the region inherently faces; many of which are a result of weak governance and mal-
administration; infrastructural under-development and stagnation; poverty and social 
marginalization; intermittent brutal conflict, and other sources of human insecurity stemming 
fundamentally from the plague of transnational terrorism and organized crime in the region.   
 
Governments across the region, in particular those who are member states of the African Union, 
have often lacked the capacity to address decisively the scourge of terrorism that continues to 
plague the Horn of Africa region.  It is important to note that the broader region of the Horn of 
Africa has been at the center of multilateral and bilateral counter-terrorism-related discussions and 
efforts since the early 1990s.  Schwartz, Shetret, and Millar (2013: 102) point out that while the 
dialogue in the early 1990s in the region was extensively focused on the transnational security 
risks stemming from Yemen as a result of the dangers posed by Al-Qaeda cells firmly established 
around the broader sub-region, at the present time the conversation and strategic efforts are focused 
on Al-Shabaab and in particular its complex and dynamic regional presence.   
 
Furthermore, it has been well-documented that in the last decade, regional capacity assistance and 
technical support provided to the Horn of Africa have fundamentally failed to place substantial 
emphasis on the importance of civilian counter-terrorism approaches and methods (Schwartz, 
Shetret, and Millar, 2013).  Therefore, within the framework of CTS, this study argues that this is 
a fundamental and key strategic approach in the field of counter-terrorism, yet the African Union 
and its member states have often under-utilized this approach, opting to adopt a military-driven 
approach which has largely been the case in the battle against Al-Shabaab.  When one discusses 
and understands the nature of the African Union’s means of combating and countering Al-
Shabaab, it is important that one should consider two points of view:  firstly, understanding both 
the contestation against and the grievances of Al-Shabaab from a local point of view; and secondly 




perspective.  Both are of equal importance and will form a fundamental component of this section 
of the chapter.   
 
Moreover, this research suggests that the formation and implementation of the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) proved to be an important development in the fight to curb Al-
Shabaab.  The African Union Mission in Somalia was formed as part of an integral body, actively 
operating under the jurisdiction of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19 January 
2007 and subsequently approved under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744 on 
20 February 2007. Its inherent objective was to combat any security threats in Somalia, in 
particular the continuously developing and complex issue of Al-Shabaab in the region (Ramdeen, 
2017:5).   According to AMISOM (2014), the peacekeeping mission can be identified as the 
successor of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace and Support 
Mission to Somalia, or IGASOM, which was initially set up as an Inter-Governmental Authority 
on Development protection and training mission in Somalia.      While the mandate of the African 
Union’s Mission in Somalia had been relatively broad, its primary objective was to assist the 
Somali National Army (SNA) and the transnational government in its fight against Al-Shabaab 
(AMISOM, 2016).  Moreover, when viewed in this light, it is clear that the current context of the 
region is informed by a range of complex variables.  
In order to comply with the theoretical underpinnings of CTS, the next subsections of the chapter 
will provide an assessment of the current approaches and methods employed by the African 
Union’s forces, with a particular focus on the components that inform AMISOM and the nature of 
its strategies in combating Al-Shabaab.   
5.3.1.  Assessing AMISOM’s Response to the Scourge of Terrorism 
As noted in the above section, AMISOM is a dynamic operation with a vigorous and broad 
mandate.  It is a multidimensional operation that executes a number of various tasks.  According 
to Hesse (2016:574), the African Union Mission in Somalia has three fundamental components 
which have a common purpose of establishing peace and stability in Somalia: the Military 
Component which remains the armed wing of the mission; the Police Component of the Mission 




Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and Sierra Leone who are tasked with assisting with basic police 
operations, such as crime prevention, and the prevention of human rights violations.  In addition 
to the police component, AMISOM includes the Civilian Component, which seeks to deal with 
political, humanitarian, gender-based, and civil society concerns (Williams, 2015).  
5.3.2. Components of AMISOM  
i. Military component   
Since its implementation, AMISOM’s military component has undertaken a number of activities 
that are in line with its mandate which is to impose military power; conduct counter-insurgency 
and stabilization operations.  Some of the activities within AMISOM’s operations include the 
following: 
- Force protection procedures such as clearing supply routes and reinforcing base 
defenses;  
- Securing key and strategic supply routes through the deployment of troops;  
- Civil-military coordination operations deployed to assist local civilians with 
accessing basic needs which include medical health care, water, and the 
purchasing of food; 
- Engaging in well structured and coordinated dialogue with clan representatives; 
and most important within the context of this research study, offensive 
operations against known Al-Shabaab elements (Crouch, 2018: 37).   
While the mandate of AMISOM’s military undertakings may appear to be well-organized, the 
military component of the mission has often come under major scrutiny and criticism – much of 
which will be discussed in the following section – as a result of perceptions about its stalled 
military offensives in its fight against Al-Shabaab.  Williams (2018) argues that AMISOM’s ability 
to conduct effective military operations is hindered by an enemy (Al-Shabaab) that chooses to 
engage in asymmetric warfare, as opposed to a conventional military contestation.  Some of 
AMISOM’s most recent military operations exemplify Williams’s (2018) assertions.  A case in 
point can be attributed to Operation Jubba Corridor of 2015 which was an operation established to 




launched Operation Antelope in 2016 as a means to re-establish over 150km of roadways in order 
to establish four strategic trade routes in the HirShabelle region.  Both of these operations stalled 
prior to their achieving their intended objectives.  More recently, AMISOM launched a further 
joint operation – Operation Safari Hunter – in order to eliminate Al-Shabaab and reclaim territories 
under the organisation in the Lower Jubba River area.  While this operation showed signs of 
improved coordination owing to its capacity to integrate a number of important forces, the 
operation was unsuccessful in achieving its objectives (Crouch, 2018:6).    
Some of the unsuccessful military objectives undertaken within the military component of 
AMISOM in pursuits to destroy and degrade Al-Shabaab, have enabled Al-Shabaab to maximize 
its lethal attacks on AMISOM territory and bases with devastating effect.  The militant 
organisation is aware of the increasing danger its brutal forms of offensive pose to AMISOM 
troops.  Al-Shabaab’s commanders have continuously employed these tactics to their advantage.  
According to Borasora, Walter & Filipec (2017:134), while the increase in troops from 2012 was 
necessary, it becomes even more important for the AU and its troop of contributing states to 
increase its military strength and personnel across the spectrum, in order to strengthen the volume 
of the military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia.  Therefore, one can argue that 
AMISOM can only garner success if its troops are provided with the necessary adequate training 
and resources.  It is unrealistic to expect the military wing to possess a threat to one of Africa’s 
most superior terrorist organizations while fighting with the current inferior weaponry and poorly 
trained military personnel at its disposal.  
Zadock (2016) argues that the military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia should 
serve as a pivotal ally to the Somali National Army by providing the necessary leadership needed 
to steer the operation in the successful direction.  However, as will be examined and further 
critiqued below, AMISOM troops have often been caught up in various scandals including the 
selling of military equipment to locals. Often this equipment ends up in the hands of Al-Shabaab 
members.  Such discrepancies have left many doubts regarding the legitimacy of the mission and 
they render the efforts of AMISOM extremely counterproductive.  
ii. Police Component  
In addition to the armed wing of AMISOM, Kimani (2013), contends that the police component 




fundamental role in peace-building and political stability processes in Somalia.  Since its 
formation, AMISOM’s police component has worked closely with the United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) in order to assist the Somali Police Force (SPF) to develop into a 
powerful and effective force.  According to the AU Commission (2015), this was done through 
various ways, namely through the establishment of various police structures which sought to serve 
as an advisory, mentoring, and training task force offering a broad range of policing services such 
as human rights observance, and crime management in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Jowhar, and 
Beledweyne.  
While the police component of AMISOM has demonstrated some significant and important 
developments since its inception, the Mission’s Police Component has struggled with a number of 
challenges often related to an inability to reach its objectives as a result of limited human capacity 
in various police units throughout Mogadishu.  Therefore, when viewed through the lens of CTS, 
this researcher argues that in order for the Police Component of the mission to be highly successful 
and to execute its intended objectives at full capacity, there must be an injection of highly 
competent staff members as well as of the necessary equipment needed for the Formed Police 
Units (FPU) to be able to respond to the security threats that have plagued Mogadishu since the 
inception of Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations in the region.   
The above assertions are supported by Ligawa (2018), who emphasizes that the shortage of skilled 
and specialized trainers within AMISOM has created an integral challenge which has at times 
destabilized and delegitimized the work of the Police Component.  Furthermore, Williams (2018) 
argues that amongst its training challenges, the component has suffered severely as a result of 
inexperience and issues related to language barriers.  An approach that this study has highlighted 
through the application of CTS, is the importance of non-military forms of intervention, namely 
through civil engagement, and potential dialogue between the various stakeholders involved.  
Therefore, a proposed approach would be the integration of personnel capable of speaking the 
native languages of Somalia which would strengthen the ability of the National Security Forces to 
liaise and communicate with local populations.  
iii. The Civilian Component 
In addition to the important work that the Police Component seeks to undertake in Somalia, the 




dynamics.  Further, it also serves as the political decision-making body in Somalia, acting on behalf 
of the African Union Peace and Security Council (Ligawa, 2018:202).  Neus (2013:67) contends 
that since its inception, the Civilian Component has suffered from a series of multi-dimensional 
peace operations due to a shortage of civilian capabilities such as a lack of specialists, experts, and 
professionals trained to deal with the structures and process of the rule of law; as well as 
institutions dealing with issues of securitization, in particular police as well as justice and 
corrections personnel.  According to Williams (2018), AMISOM is certified to have 70 foreign 
civilian personnel, of which 14 are consultants and 58 of them are national members of staff.   
Ligawa (2018:202) contends that much of the staff incapacity and slow civilian recruitment 
process can be equated to the tendency of staff members to leave the institution once they have 
gained the necessary valuable work experience.  This leaves a massive gap in expertise.  Another 
observation made in Ligawa’s (2018:202) study is that a large portion of the civilians are often 
trained in accordance with the preference of the donor rather than that of the needs of the mission 
itself.  As such, one could contend that there is a dire need for the African Union to reconsider the 
compensations of the staff members within its civilian operations and provide the necessary 
guidance and training in accordance with the necessary demands of the African Union Mission in 
Somalia.  One cannot deny the critical and important role that this particular component of the 
mission plays on behalf of the African Union Peace and Security Council.  
AMISOM’s civilian component comprises six units:  
(i) The Political Affairs unit which is tasked with assisting the AU PSC’s regarding 
political decision-making in Somalia.   
(ii) The Public Information unit which is mandated to distribute information related to 
AMISOM’s activities.   
(iii) The Humanitarian Liaison unit which is responsible for liaising with various 
humanitarian agencies.    
(iv) The Protection, Human Rights and Gender unit which seeks to implement the AU’s 
agenda on human rights and gender-based practices.   
(v) The Security Sector Reform unit which is mandated to undertake AMISOM’s key 
security matters.   




civilian component in that it is mandated to facilitate the implementation of 
AMISOM’s overarching mandate across all local political levels (Williams, 2018).   
 
By applying CTS as a theoretical framework, one can argue that this is a case in which AMISOM 
could assert its capacity as an entity capable of addressing the basic needs of civilians; an 
opportunity, however, that AMISOM and its forces fail to take advantage of.  In support of the 
above argument, Mohamud (2014) contends that much of the negligence and decline in strategic 
awareness by AMISOM and its forces at critical times – such as the example provided above – in 
its fight against Al-Shabaab can, in part, be linked to the Mission’s disregard for the importance 
of a people-centered approach – one which seeks to take into consideration the basic needs of the 
civilians and the population at large, as opposed to continuously attacking the symptom that is Al-
Shabaab.   
Viewed in this light, one cannot deny that AMISOM has played a substantial role by its attempts 
to curb the militant organisation.  In addition, while the discussion in this chapter does not dispute 
the relative success achieved by AMISOM, the following section reflects the application of Critical 
Terrorism Studies in order to provide a critique of the abovementioned approaches to countering 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.   
5.4.  A Critique of AMISOM’s Role in Fighting Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa 
While AMISOM and its regional partners have been able to push back Al-Shabaab from a large 
portion of its strongholds, the Mission still faces major drawbacks and challenges as a result of its 
largely militarized approach which has, to a large extent, ignored some of the key drivers that 
encourage Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism; namely the problematic nature of its armed forces; a 
clear lack of state capacity and mal-administration; competing national priorities as a result of clan 
divisions; and the failure to develop institutions dedicated to addressing the socio-economic 
disparities which inform the realities of the current state of Somalia.   A critique of the current 
counter-terrorism measures in the Horn of Africa will uncover that merely treating the symptoms 
– which has been the primary approach of the African Union and its allies – no longer serves as a 
viable option.  
By employing CTS as a theoretical framework to unpack, explain, critique and move away from 




peacekeeping and counter-terrorism mechanisms in combating Al-Shabaab, the researcher is able 
to gain an increasingly nuanced perspective on the understanding of the dynamic drivers and root 
causes of the scourge of terrorism in the Horn of Africa.   By applying Critical Terrorism Studies 
within this research study, a greater focus can be brought to bear on addressing the various root 
causes and drivers that have propelled Al-Shabaab to undertake the grievous acts of terror.  Such 
an approach would mean a shift away from a largely militarized approach and entail an 
increasingly holistic approach focusing on both the symptoms (attacking the military operations 
and leadership structures of Al-Shabaab) and the root causes (addressing the socio-economic 
grievances and disparities as well as political marginalization) of the Al-Shabaab issue in Somalia 
and throughout the broader Horn of Africa region.  
In this chapter, much like the previous chapter, the importance of a military strategy is not 
dismissed; however, it proposes an equal or greater emphasis on a multi-pronged approach that 
seeks to tackle and address the multi-dimensional grievances of Somali society. Crouch (2018) 
suggests that the African Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in parts of the African continent has 
frequently been driven on the premise of “degrade and destroy”.  Therefore, by opposing this 
approach to terrorism in the Horn of Africa, it is suggested in this research that employing a critical 
lens to terrorism – in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region – would allow for the 
implementation of a multi-pronged approach which focuses on de-escalating violence, supporting 
reconciliation, as well as addressing and tackling the root socio-economic issues that underpin 
much of Somali society.  Crouch (2018) asserts that once the symptoms and root causes become 
the focus of analysis (as opposed to merely the military destruction of a particular stakeholder), 
counter-terrorism approaches begin to shift towards more productive methods.   
This section of the research concurs with Crouch’s (2018) assertions by suggesting that through 
the lens of CTS, one is able to begin to view the socio-economic issues, human rights abuses, and 
civilian deaths (amongst other grievances felt throughout Somali society) as the result of historical 
consequences which have been further perpetuated through the orthodoxies of a military 
intervention.  Therefore, in the following subsections of this chapter, CTS will be further employed 
in order to provide a critique of the currently held counter-terrorism measures reflected within the 
orthodox approaches to Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism.  The subsections below offer a critique 




AMISOM’s largely “degrade and destroy” military approach has, for the most part, disregarded 
some of the most salient underlying causes of Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism.  
5.4.1.  AMISOM’s Incapacity to Deal with Somalia’s Political Crisis 
Williams (2018) argues that within the broader context of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region, 
a viable and effective political strategy is necessary to address the root causes and key drivers of 
the Al-Shabaab issue.  Corresponding to the above-mentioned argument, this researcher asserts 
that within the wider context of the issue presented by Al-Shabaab particularly in Somalia, lies a 
political crisis driven by debates around the necessary systems of governance and state-building 
institutions.   
This research, then, offers a critique of the orthodox and traditional approaches that have been 
adopted by AMISOM in its pursuits to diminish and eliminate Al-Shabaab, by asserting that it has 
at times taken precedence over the safety and security of civilians within Somali communities.  In 
relation to Crouch’s (2018) aforementioned assertions, Participant 1 offers a corresponding 
critique of the mission’s counter-terrorism approach by maintaining that “AMISOM has not been 
very effective in reforming and re-establishing the necessary political processes in Somalia” 
(Interview, Participant 1, 07/07/2018).  Thus, by employing CTS as the framework to assess and 
critique AMISOM’s capacity to implement a political strategy to address some of the pertinent 
drivers of Al-Shabaab’s scourge of terror, one can contend that it remains important that AMISOM 
should ensure that Somali nationals are at the forefront of any political dialogue, rather than being 
recipients of political decisions forcefully implemented by foreign donors and external 
constituencies.   
However, by applying CTS in order to critique the measures employed by AMISOM in countering 
Al-Shabaab, it is clear that its focus on “degrade and destroy” – the counter-terrorism approach as 
termed by Crouch (2018) – has neglected the root causes and key drivers that inform the wider 
grievances that have encouraged Al-Shabaab’s violent contestation for political and state power.  
Similar to the case of Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria, political and economic marginalization 
of portions of Somali’s population –  namely young people –  have forced the young of Somalia 
and the broader Horn of Africa to opt to join Al-Shabaab as a result of poor and corrupt political 
administration and governance; a factor that has largely been ignored by AMISOM under its 




strategy for its incapacity to address the scourge of terror waged by Al-Shabaab by means of 
political dialogue.  While one acknowledges Al-Shabaab’s refusal to co-operate by means of non-
violent political engagement, AMISOM’s complete disregard of this option has led Al-Shabaab to 
maintain its violent military contestation.   
i. A Critique of AMISOM’s Military Component:  A Lackluster Security and 
Stabilization Approach 
 
Regarding the importance of AMISOM’s military unit, Ligawa (2018) contends that the 
establishment and expansion of AMISOM’s military component has generated a sense of relative 
security throughout previously Al-Shabaab-controlled territories which has enabled the peace 
process in the country to start taking shape.  For civilians in various Al-Shabaab territories, a sense 
of accountable governance and institutional legitimacy has been instilled as a result of the 
expansion of AMISOM’s military component.   
 
While one cannot gainsay the optimism stressed by Ligawa’s (2018) assertions, in this study 
AMISOM’s military component is assessed from a critical perspective by applying the 
underpinnings of CTS.  Viewed in this light, it is important to take into account that AMISOM has 
often drawn criticism for its inability to secure stability within the jurisdiction of primary routes 
and roads in areas and regions that it had captured from Al-Shaabab, which has meant that civilians 
still face the risk of being either killed or violently intimidated as well as being subjected to 
extortion and heavy taxation by members of Al-Shabaab; all of which has resulted in the continued 
rise of economic hardship.   
Although Ligawa (2018) expresses the above-mentioned sense of optimism in relation to the 
military presence of AMISOM in Somalia, Participant 4, in an interview conducted in Pretoria, 
voiced concerns regarding many of the obstacles that remain for the troops currently on the ground 
in Somalia.  Participant 4 asserts that there are still “the terrifying bombs that are still being 
detonated throughout the streets of Mogadishu and surrounding cities and villages” (Interview, 
Participant 4, 22/07/2018).  Corresponding to Participant 4’s assertions, Williams (2018) contends 
that AMISOM’s military component is informed by a lack of pertinent strategies necessary to 
stabilise the territories which it has recaptured from Al-Shabaab, and thus, Al-Shabaab has 





Therefore, to add to the critique, while AMISOM has been relatively successfully in achieving its 
military objectives, namely recapturing the most strategic population centers and trade routes that 
were previously under the control of Al-Shabaab, through the commitments of CTS, one can argue 
that the state-centric and military-driven approach has failed in curbing Al-Shabaab’s asymmetric 
strategies and persistent tactics of destabilization and harassment.  Therefore, from a Critical 
Terrorism Studies perspective, this researcher argues that AMISOM’s drive to execute its 
predominantly military strategy in destabilizing and eradicating Al-Shabaab, has failed to establish 
and build legitimate institutions dedicated to addressing and tackling pertinent security challenges 
– that Al-Shabaab continues to inflict on civilians – as well as on effective structures committed 
to delivering basic needs and services.   Further, in applying CTS to critiquing AMISOM’s 
lackluster stabilization and offensive efforts, one can argue that the mission’s limited capabilities 
are a result of its limited non-military components and its neglect to incorporate civilians and local 
leaders in its counter-terrorism approach.   
ii. AMISOM’s Disregard of Human Rights Abuses  
Amongst other criticisms that still haunt AMISOM to date, are accusations of human rights abuses 
including allegations of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation by its forces which were released in 
a September 2017 Human Rights Watch report.  This non-governmental organisation detailed a 
series of accounts of sexual abuse, violence, and exploitation largely committed by AMISOM 
forces against Somali women and young girls in many of its bases in the capital of Mogadishu.  
The soldiers representing the African Union are said to have employed a number of strategies to 
lure vulnerable women and young girls into performing sexual activities and other unspeakable 
actions (Human Rights Watch, 2017:44).   
The report offers an in-depth critique of AMISOM by conducting a series of interviews in attempts 
to expose the African Union’s soldiers for the horrifying crimes they committed.  Thus, scholars 
of CTS including Allison (2014) argue that one cannot detach AMISOM’s supposed success from 
its failure to protect the most vulnerable.  By further applying CTS in order to critique AMISOM’s 
disregard for human rights, this researcher asserts that such an assessment makes it difficult to hail 
AMISOM as a success story in the fight against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, let alone in the horn of 




oppressing the very civilians that it is tasked to protect and defend.  Allison (2014) sums up the 
actions illustrated by AMISOM forces as a “reason for the abused victims to join militant 
organizations such as Al-Shabaab because such actions portray the ‘good guys as the bad guys’”.   
As was contended in this research study in Chapter 3, by employing Critical Terrorism Studies as 
the theoretical framework, approaches to terrorism that marginalize women and other vulnerable 
groups are firmly rejected in the present study.  For this reason, while this research acknowledges 
and supports AMISOM’s dedication to prioritizing the safety and security of women and young 
girls; and its inclusion of marginalized groups in its peace processes under its Women, Peace, and 
Security (WPS) agenda; CTS is used in this study to criticize much of the human rights abuses 
perpetuated by AMISOM armed forces.  The Mission has failed to fully embrace its “zero-
tolerance” policy and is yet to formulate an accountability framework which could see harsher 
consequences for perpetuators.  However, the researcher acknowledges that this is not entirely an 
AMISOM problem, but an issue related to the AU Commission’s lack of agency in establishing 
an overarching directive consisting of records and screening processes for AMISOM’s personnel 
who have been found guilty of perpetuating human rights abuses.     
The CTS critique of AMISOM is in relation to the human rights abuses including gang rapes, 
sexual exploitation and discrimination, as well civilian deaths as a result of drone strikes that 
AMISOM troops, regional forces and various proxy militia have continued to perpetuate since 
2009.  While AMISOM has made relative strides in advancing a Women, Peace, and Security 
agenda dedicated to prioritizing the safety and security of women and young girls; and including 
women and young girls in its peace processes, this research agrees with the commitments and 
sentiments of various scholars of CTS who argue that AMISOM has failed to establish an effective 
and overarching mandate that explicitly deals with gender issues amongst other human rights 
grievances. For this reason, the Mission will continue to be met with serious enmity by those 
victims and civilians that it claims to be protecting. This has further reduced its capacity to claim 
the moral high-ground over-Al-Shabaab, allowing victims of human rights abuses to strongly 
believe Al-Shabaab’s narrative that AMISOM and its allies are the reason for substantial human 
rights violations.    
iii. AMISOM’s Territorial Negligence and Disregard of the Importance of Local 
Governance  




its fight against Al-Shaabab, a conclusive defeat over Al-Shabaab has not been achieved.  The 
reality is that instead of suffering defeat, Al-Shabaab’s armed units have often opted to evacuate 
and withdraw to smaller, more remote, rural cells which have allowed the organisation to regroup 
and re-strategize in order to re-emerge as the formidable and brutally dominant regional presence 
it is today.  Subsequently, other radicalized groups and well-trained and experienced fighters 
within the structures of Al-Shabaab are able to continue carrying out attacks across the Horn of 
Africa (International Crisis Group, 2017).  According to Abshir (2018), AMISOM has prioritized 
the objective to remove and eradicate Al-Shabaab by means of military force, and therefore has 
neglected the importance of local governance and reconciliation in many of the areas recaptured 
by AMISOM.   
This rhetoric was further extended in the above-mentioned interview with Participant 4 who 
blamed the strengthening of Al-Shabaab’s regional presence on the negligence of counter-
terrorism forces and multilateral organizations fighting terrorism in the region, more specifically, 
AMISOM.  Participant 4 notes that: 
“… anybody who is trained militarily, you know that if you flush out your enemy, 
you don’t leave a vacuum in that area, you need to come in so that you can be in a 
position to educate the people so that if these people want to come back for the 
second time they are not given a chance and that the people would not only be 
waiting for you because AMISOM had done quite a good job in Somalia for an 
example but then what would happen is that they would flush out Al-Shabaab but 
then they would stay in the villages or districts for a few days and then leave, and 
what would Al-Shabaab do?  They would come back and kill all those that are 
collaborating with AMISOM and then it’s back to square one” (Interview, 
Participant 4, 22/07/2018).    
In agreement with the sentiments offered by Participant 4, findings of this research offer a criticism 
of AMISOM’s military strategy for its incapacity to establish interim local structures to ensure 
cohesive and effective administration and governance following the elimination of Al-Shabaab in 
certain districts, villages, or cities reclaimed by AMISOM forces.  This research further applies 




that within the traditional framework of approaching terrorism lies a lack of understanding of the 
necessary procedures and processes needed within such an intervention.  This critique offered 
under the framework of CTS corresponds with the view of Participant 4 who contends that “there 
isn’t a holistic approach to the Somalia issue.  There should never be a vacuum left” (Interview, 
Participant 4, 22/07/2018). 
Crouch (2018) states that AMISOM’s territorial negligence post-Al-Shabaab elimination has led 
to the re-emergence of clan-driven conflicts in many of the AMISOM liberated areas as a result of 
mal-administration and a lack of local governance structures.  An example provided by the 
Saferworld (2018) report asserts that the inter-clan contestations for political power in Marka town 
in Lower Shabelle by the Biyomaal and Habr Gedr as well as other significant local clans is a 
result of the power vacuum left behind by AMISOM. Further, the same Saferworld (2018) report 
provides views shared by clan militia leaders who contend that Al-Shabaab had made efforts to 
reconcile clan-contestations and disputes; however, with the elimination of Al-Shabaab, clan-
contestations amongst opposing clans in the area had risen dramatically.  Typical of AMISOM’s 
lackluster approach in establishing the necessary administrative and local governance structures, 
various clan leaders have criticized AMISOM’s reconciliation efforts by contending that the 
approaches that were suggested were “short-term pragmatic agreements”.   
 
In response to the abovementioned critiques, after applying CTS, one may assert that AMISOM’s 
military approach which is centered on the complete elimination and decimation of Al-Shabaab, 
has taken precedence over dealing with various key drivers and root causes of the issue at hand. 
This approach has neglected to establish legitimate local institutions and accountable structures of 
governance; has neglected to employ non-military approaches such as primarily by utilizing its 
civilian component for addressing the prevalent clan-contestations that exist amongst Somali 
communities. These are a few of the societal dynamics and factors that may encourage individuals 
to embrace the ideological underpinnings of groups such as Al-Shabaab.   
 
Adding to this debate, Williams (2018) argues that the challenges faced by AMISOM’s civilian 
components primarily in recently recaptured Al-Shabaab territories are a result of the Federal 




expanding the Mission’s civilian and police components.   Therefore, the findings of this chapter 
certainly concur with the commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies by contending that counter-
terrorism and stabilization approaches in Somalia and in the broader Horn of Africa cannot solely 
be based on armed security and military intervention, but need to entail a comprehensive multi-
pronged and people-centered approach.  Within the realm of terrorism in Somalia and the broader 
Horn of Africa region, when one assesses AMISOM’s approaches to terrorism, one can argue that 
the Mission has to a large extent neglected the importance of engaging with a wide range of 
stakeholders such as community leaders and clan militia leaders. Further, it has neglected to take 
into consideration the grievances of ordinary people, namely young people, women, and other 
marginalized members of society – a commitment widely held by CTS.   
iv. Failure to Track and Trace Al-Shabaab’s Financial Flows  
Much like the case of Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria, one of the root causes that the African 
Union and its mandated missions have failed to address and tackle is the combating of the terror-
financing of Al-Shabaab. Like all insurgent groups or terrorist organizations, Al-Shabaab is faced 
with the dire task of generating and raising funds, be it from illicit or licit networks.  According to 
a report titled “Somalia: Al- Shabaab- It Will Be a Long War” released by the ICG (2014), Al-
Shabaab pays its members between $150-$500 monthly and cares for the fighters within its ranks.  
In addition, veterans and families of ‘martyrs’ are regularly compensated for their deeds.  
However, the financial channels of the organisation comprise an important point of departure 
which must be examined within this discourse.  
According to Ikelegbe and Okumu (2010:32), in addition to its checkpoint taxes as well as its 
control over various strategic ports in the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab generates its funds through 
robust extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and by imposing war taxes.  In a more expanded assessment, 
Vilkko’s (2011) findings offer an argument that suggests that the external sources of funding for 
Al-Shabaab are Somalis and those who align themselves with the group’s ideological 
underpinnings within the Somali diaspora; Hawala money transfer networks; and Somali business 
networks within the diaspora.  In a similar fashion, the internal financial channels involved are not 
restricted to direct financial control of cash flows, taxations and import duties from strategic ports 
such as the Port of Kismayo.  Furthermore, protection fees collected from industries as well as 




Like many militant organizations, Al-Shaabab must generate revenue in order to compete on the 
military front.  Crouch (2018), asserts that much of Al-Shabaab’s capital flows are generated from 
civilian populations.  Al-Shabaab employs a taxation and revenue-generation system called Zakat 
which has allowed the organisation to sustain itself financially.  The implementation of Zakat on 
essential goods such as livestock and harvest crops has often been enforced through violent means 
as many civilians are killed and maimed for resisting and opposing.  Keatinge (2014:19), suggests 
that the organisation is able to generate its internal revenue from its control over strategic ports 
and markets which has allowed it to substantially advance its strategic capacities.   
Further, a 2018 report released by Saferworld entitled Counter-terror and the logic of violence in 
Somalia’s civil war: Time for a new approach illustrates that regional security agencies have 
attempted to shut down Al-Shabaab’s revenue generation by blocking and targeting its 
international and regional financial flows through the control of major ports and important import 
and export routes.  For example, the Kismayo Port located in Kismayo where Al-Shabaab had its 
‘headquarters’ was able to generate between $35 million to $50 million per year.  In addition to 
the targeting of strategic ports, Menkhaus (2014:156) suggests that Al-Shabaab acquires its income 
through the collection of taxes at strategic and popular checkpoints.  This implication is supported 
by Anderson and McKnight (2014:11), who note that amongst some of the various checkpoints 
established by Al-Shabaab, Buula Xaaji Checkpoint requires trucks seeking to pass through to pay 
anything between $250 and $500 depending on the size of the trucks.  Anderson and McKnight 
(2014) contend that in 2013, the large sum of $650,000 worth of tax was collected per month at 
the aforementioned checkpoint.   
In view of this, a number of interviewed senior analysts in the abovementioned Saferworld report 
indicated that the intended strategy by AMISOM and various regional security bodies did not yield 
the intended results because of the inadequacy of governmental management and pointed out that 
AMISOM held ports which forced traders to use Al-Shabaab-held routes for efficient 
transportation of their goods.  Tracing, tracking, and subsequently curbing Al-Shabaab’s financial 
flows will serve as an important step in reducing the organization’s terror activities across the Horn 
of Africa – an approach that AMISOM has blatantly neglected.  Therefore, one can offer a critique 
through the lens of CTS by suggesting that while there have been attempts at tracing and tracking 




organization’s terror objectives, lacked a coherent and effective administrative and management 
strategy to limit and restrict the financial endeavors of Al-Shabaab.   
v. A Disregard of Al-Shabaab’s Effective Global Recruitment Processes  
Al-Shabaab’s leadership structure can be characterized as successfully dense and flexible –  a 
reflection of the organization’s composition of dynamic cells, and widely spread units.  At the top, 
Al-Shabaab is administered by a supreme Commander-in-Chief known as an Emir, who is 
supported by a council composed of ten members.  Shuriye (2012) notes that this ten-member 
council is tasked with the responsibility of serving as an advisory body with limited powers.  By 
analyzing Shuriye’s (2012) assessment, one can contend that the organization’s leadership 
structure borrows the composition of its structure from the Islamic State (IS) in that both political 
and military personal are employed and tasked with the responsibility of overlooking each region 
under the control of Al-Shabaab. An Islamic Police (aysh al-Hisbah) informs the nature of its 
security structures; and a hisbah oversees and administers its religious councils and the Sharia 
courts.   
According to the BBC (2017), there are believed to be between 7000 and 9000 Al-Shabaab fighters 
and between 500 and 3000 foreign fighters who are predominantly Somali, Sudanese, Yemenis, 
Saudi, and Kenyan nationals; all who have joined the organisation for various reasons.  An 
important and beneficial assessment in line with the commitments of CTS is offered by Botha and 
Abdile (2014) who present a study which focuses on the sociological underpinnings of the 
radicalization and recruitment of Al-Shabaab.  CTS espouses the importance of counter-terrorism 
bodies in understanding the reasons why individuals join terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab.  
So, by applying CTS to the discussion above, it becomes clear that when attempting to curb the 
expansion of the threat of Al-Shabaab, the need for the African Union and its security agencies to 
take into account the rationale behind individuals’ joining terrorist organizations is of great 
importance and will be emphasized in this study.  While this study is not comparative in nature, 
CTS is the theoretical framework that is applied to both case studies and therefore, it is important 
that a few similarities are highlighted throughout Chapter 5 in order to afford this study the 
opportunity to concisely critique and eventually recommend appropriate counter-terrorism 




Nigeria, young people in Somalia make up a large portion of the country’s population, and much 
like Boko-Haram, Al-Shabaab’s structures are made up of predominantly young people, of which 
many remain unemployed.   
This writer of this study maintains that it is important to apply CTS in order to gain an 
understanding of some of the key drivers that encourage young people to join Al-Shabaab.  Such 
an assessment will allow the African Union to take into account and address the increasing 
frustrations of young people as a result of the grave socio-economic realities that have encouraged 
them to join groups such as Al-Shabaab.  By applying the theoretical framework of CTS, one can 
argue that the orthodoxies within the currently adopted counter-terrorism strategies by the African 
Union – AMISOM, in this particular context – have disregarded the importance of addressing 
(amongst other social issues) the challenge of youth unemployment and the lack of access to 
education which encourage young people to join Al-Shabaab.  More important, through the lens 
of CTS, one can assert that the orthodox approaches currently upheld by the African Union’s 
mandated missions and operations in Somalia have failed to prioritize the importance of 
formulating policies, and implementing programs dedicated to assisting young people to 
participate in the socio-economic processes of society – an approach suggested in this study that 
would play an important role in discouraging young people from joining such organizations.   
 
The study conducted by Botha and Abdile (2014) referred to earlier, supports the aforementioned 
assertion.  This study indicates that the reasons why individuals, in particular young people, join 
terrorist groups, include a broad spectrum of factors namely economic difficulties, religious 
motivations, and a lack of basic education.  Above all, the assessment presented above is yet again 
a reflection of the significance of employing a CTS framework when examining various factors 
and drivers that inform Al-Shabaab’s scourge of terror in the Horn of Africa.  While it is important 
to flush out the militant objectives of Al-Shabaab, a simple straightforward orthodox method that 
is symptomatic in nature cannot be considered sufficient and therefore, it remains important for 
the African Union and its security agencies to adopt a theoretical framework such as CTS in order 
to assess the complexities and factors – such as widespread youth unemployment – that have 
opened up gaps for Al-Shabaab to effectively conduct mass recruitment across the Horn of Africa. 




than ideological underpinnings in its terror campaign across the region.  The brutality of its 
activities and attacks in the Horn of Africa not only garners the attention of the international 
community, but more important, draws the attention of its local populations, who are more likely 
to be persuaded by elements of financial inclination, legitimate security, and accountable 
governance.  In answer to this, CTS attempts to include these elements and factors in order to build 
a more profound, holistic comprehension of some of the ways in which the African Union and its 
security agencies can counter Al-Shabaab.   
5.5.  Adopting an Effective Counter-terrorism Approach in Somalia 
While the previous section applied CTS to critique some of the pertinent gaps that exist within the 
AU’s military-driven approaches to the threat of Al-Shaabab, this section of the chapter seeks to 
provide a series of recommendations which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.   
As previously mentioned, the application of CTS throughout this study does not position this 
theoretical framework as an immediate cure of terrorism in Somalia; rather it emphasizes the 
importance of the African Union being assessed from a critical perspective, in order for a set of 
effective recommendations to be suggested.  Moreover, while the African Union Mission in 
Somalia has had its successes, this chapter of the study suggests that the African Union should 
endorse a number of adjustments and amendments within the current counter-terrorism operations 
in Somalia.   
It is important to reiterate that the present researcher does not disregard the importance of 
combating the military aggression of Al-Shabaab, and therefore suggests that in order for the 
African Union to be successful in its military endeavors, it is important that troops of contributing 
states prioritize resource allocation for its joint task forces and missions through consistent 
financial support; through the steady turnover of human capital and well-trained military 
personnel; and dependable and advanced military artillery.   
In line with the above suggestions, outcomes of this study emphasize the limitations of orthodox 
and extremely military-driven approaches to countering Al-Shabaab, and propose that the African 
Union along with its various security agencies in Somalia and the Horn of Africa should prioritize 
non-military forms of intervention and counter-terrorism measures – an approach that has been 




Boko-Haram in northeastern Nigeria and how it combats Al-Shabaab in Somalia.  This writer 
suggests that regional cooperation between troops of contributing states and AMISOM could open 
up opportunities for effectively implementing non-military forms of intervention, namely through 
dialogue and engagement with Al-Shabaab’s leadership.  
Further findings from this study suggest that it is important that the African Union and its mandated 
missions and operations consider various socio-economic and political factors that influence the 
undertakings of Al-Shabaab, such as issues of clan-divisions, youth unemployment, poverty, 
political and economic marginalization, amongst other factors causing dissatisfaction.   Even more 
important, is the fact that Somalis should be at the helm of the conversation and dialogue on 
peacekeeping and peace-building operations.  It is clear that the military approach to combating 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia has not yielded its intended objectives, and therefore, in this study it is 
proposed that the African Union Mission and other security agencies in Somalia create institutions 
and structures committed to playing a role in assisting Somalis to recommend potential policies, 
resolutions, and approaches to solving the issue of Al-Shabaab in their country.  Setting up public 
platforms of engagement is a necessary approach and a step in the right direction, which could 
lead to establishing frameworks which take into account the socio-economic and political factors 
that have influenced individuals to join Al-Shabaab.   
5.6.   Conclusion 
In Chapter 5 a critique has been presented of some of the orthodoxies that inform the military and 
symptomatic-centered counter-terrorism approach undertaken by the African Union in Somalia 
and in the broader Horn of Africa, particularly within the various components that make up 
AMISOM.  In this chapter the framework of CTS has been applied to the case study by assessing 
the scope of terrorism in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Somalia. Further, an 
assessment of the approaches undertaken by AMISOM in countering Al-Shabaab has been 
presented.  The approaches adopted by AMISOM were fundamentally critiqued for their neglect 
in addressing some of the most pertinent root causes and issues that inform the Al-Shabaab crisis, 
namely: socio-economic grievances and political marginalization; the problematic nature of 
AMISOM’s armed forces; a lack of state capacity and widespread mal-administration; as well as 
competing national priorities in the form of clan contestations.  While the researcher acknowledges 




military, police, and civilian components, in this chapter the critiques of AMISOM are based on 
its over-emphasis of a military-centered counter-terrorism approach based on its stringent “degrade 
and destroy” point of departure; thereby neglecting some of the key drivers and root causes of Al-
Shabaab’s strategic terrorism.   
In relation to the critiques offered throughout this chapter, this research shows that as a result of 
the magnitude of Al-Shabaab’s regional presence in the Horn of Africa, African Union counter-
insurgency bodies including AMISOM will have to acknowledge that only once the symptoms as 
well as the root causes become the focus of analysis (as opposed to merely the military decimation 
of Al-Shabaab) will its counter-terrorism approaches begin to reap the intended results in line with 
its objectives.  Therefore, the critiques provided throughout this chapter acknowledge that the 
strategic terrorism espoused by Al-Shabaab present a multi-faceted threat to the Horn of Africa 
region and therefore a multi-dimensional strategy is required to deal with the issue.  
Furthermore, the critiques of AMISOM’s current approaches to the challenges presented by Al-
Shabaab have illustrated that there must be increasingly concerted efforts by a range of 
stakeholders including neighboring governments and various multi-lateral institutions across the 
region.  Enhanced collaboration amongst regional actors will play a pivotal role in reducing Al-
Shabaab’s regional territorial presence; limit the cross-border funneling of money and weapons; 
and constrain the organization’s ability to move freely across borders.   
To this end, the following chapter concludes this study.  In Chapter 6, key findings of the study 
are reviewed and its primary contributions are recapped.  Chapter 6 subsequently recommends 
how the critiques offered in Chapters 4 and 5 can assist the African Union, its various security 
agencies, and its allies, to reassess its largely military-driven counter-terrorism approach to the 
threats posed by Boko-Haram and Al-Shabaab in northeastern Nigeria.  Finally, the study’s 






CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSION 
6.1.   Introduction 
The key objective of Chapter 5 was to examine the counter-terrorism strategy currently employed 
by the African Union, in particular AMISOM; to discuss the applicability of its strategy, and to 
assess the effectiveness and efficiency of such an approach in relation to the strategic terrorism 
waged by Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region.  By applying Critical 
Terrorism Studies as the theoretical framework for a critique of AMISOM’s counter-terrorism 
efforts, Chapter 5 endeavored to answer the fourth supportive research question which was:   
How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union 
in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?  
Chapter 6 begins by recapping the research problem and explicitly answering the research 
questions.  Thereafter, a brief overview of Chapters 2 to 5 forms an integral part of this chapter.  
In a conclusion to the aforementioned chapters, this chapter will review the primary findings of 
the research while simultaneously considering the theoretical limitations of the research study.  
The final focus of this chapter will be to offer a set of recommendations for future research on the 
necessary counter-terrorism strategies on the African continent, coupled with a summary of 
concluding remarks.   
6.2.  Research Problem and Questions 
The focus of this study is to describe, explain, and further critique the efforts adopted by the 
African Union in addressing and tackling the scourge of terror waged across the African continent.  
More important, the focus of this research is the assessment of the development, expansion, and 
undertakings of Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and simultaneously, of Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region. By applying the theoretical framework of Critical 
Terrorism Studies, the aim of this research study is to critique the African Union’s counter-
terrorism approaches to these two case studies with the purpose of eventually proposing 
recommendations for the currently upheld approaches to terrorism in the cases specific to Boko 




The continued scourge of terrorism across northeastern Nigeria and the broader Horn of Africa 
region gave rise to the research problem that was concisely stated and presented in Chapter 1 of 
this research study.  This research has problematized the military-driven strategy currently adopted 
by the African Union and its various security agencies which merely confront and counter the 
symptoms of the terror activities waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, consequently 
disregarding the root causes of terrorism.  This approach is unlikely to lead to a sustainable and 
far-reaching amelioration of terrorism, not only in the abovementioned regions but across the 
African continent.  Based on the research problem stated above, this study intends to highlight the 
value of Critical Terrorism Studies critiques of the orthodoxies that exist within the traditional and 
military-centered approaches currently upheld by the African Union and its various mandated 
institutions. Furthermore, by interrogating the research problem, this study has the primary 
objective of eventually uncovering how these critiques and further recommendations may assist 
the AU to adopt increasingly multi-dimensional strategies in its efforts to fight terrorism on the 
continent.  Therefore, the main research question guiding this study is:   
How and to what extent have the African Union’s counter-terrorism policies contributed 
to adequately combating terrorism in northern Nigeria and Somalia?  
In order to facilitate the answering of the main research question, four supportive research 
questions have been framed.  Therefore, the study’s first research question reads:  What counter-
terrorism strategies does the African Union currently employ?  The literature review offered in 
Chapter 2 had the task of answering this. Chapter 2 introduced the reader to concepts and 
contending perspectives within the study of terrorism.  In this chapter, the theoretical framework 
of Critical Terrorism Studies which was widely employed as the theoretical anchor throughout this 
research study, was discussed.  In addition, Chapter 2 provided a historical outlook on the origins, 
evolutions, and ideological developments of both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively.  
More important, Chapter 2 uncovered the origins and background of the African Union’s counter-
terrorism policies as well as its primary institutions mandated to prevent and rid the continent of 
the scourge of terrorism.  The analysis deduced from the literature review suggests that many 
scholars hold the view that a multi-dimensional approach centered on addressing and attacking 
both root causes and symptoms of terrorism has the ability to ameliorate the threat of terrorism 




The remaining three supportive research questions were considered in relation to the theory 
supporting this research study.  Thus, while Chapter 2 intended to provide a detailed and 
comprehensive review of existing literature, Chapter 3 had the primary objective of answering the 
research study’s second supportive research question which reads:   
Does the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) approach as presented by Richard Jackson 
(2007) and Lee Jarvis (2009) have the theoretical scope to identify, describe, explain, and 
critique the counter-terrorism strategies employed by the African Union in northern 
Nigeria and Somalia respectively?   
Chapter 3 focused on contextualizing Critical Terrorism Studies in order to assess the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and applicability of the African Union’s current counter-terrorism 
methods, interventions, and missions in relation to Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab. The theoretical 
framework of CTS in Chapter 3 concurrently critiqued the orthodox field of terrorism studies 
which inherently continues to be the dominant approach employed in the development of both 
regional as well as global counter-terrorism policies, frameworks, and mechanisms.  Moreover, 
the utility, analysis, and considered value of CTS within the African context was discussed 
comprehensively.   
While the main research question guides Chapters 4 and 5, both these chapters have the central 
aim of answering the study’s third and fourth supportive research questions.  Chapter 4 seeks to 
assess and critique the counter-terrorism strategies currently employed by the African Union, and 
therefore serves the purpose of answering the study’s third supportive research question which 
reads:  
To what extent have those strategies been helpful in combating terrorism in northern 
Nigeria?  
In this chapter, the African Union’s counter-terrorism approach in northeastern Nigeria in relation 
to Boko Haram was examined and CTS is applied in order to offer a critique of the effectiveness 
and plausibility of its counter-terrorism approach.   




How effective and appropriate are the current strategies employed by the African Union 
in combating the various challenges posed by Al-Shabaab in Somalia?  
The primary focus of Chapter 5 was to provide an overview of Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism in 
Somalia and across the Horn of Africa and subsequently to employ CTS as a theoretical framework 
in assessing and critiquing primarily the African Union Mission in Somalia’s (AMISOM) counter-
terrorism approaches.   
6.3.  Main Findings  
The main argument presented in this study is that the counter-terrorism approach adopted by the 
African Union in its fight against the threat of both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab has been largely 
centered on dealing with the symptoms of terrorism while disregarding the driving factors and root 
causes of the issue at hand, and therefore, it has not been able to yield the intended results.  
Furthermore, in this study, an attempt was made to apply the framework of Critical Terrorism 
Studies in order to broaden the knowledge and understanding of terrorism undertaken by both 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, and further widen the scope for future knowledge production and 
research into the necessary approaches to dealing with the threat of terrorism on the African 
continent.  The threat of terrorism on the African continent continues to develop and evolve at an 
exponential rate, and for this reason, some of the most recent acts of terror may not have been 
considered in the study.    
6.3.1. Critical Terrorism Studies:  A Necessary Alternative Approach in Terrorism Studies 
 
By recapping the body of literature discussed throughout this research study, it is clear that Critical 
Terrorism Studies represents terrorism-associated research centered on the skepticism around 
state-centric and traditional underpinnings of terrorism.  This study has shown that CTS seeks to 
broaden the study and field of terrorism by considering subjects that are often rejected and 
disregarded under the orthodoxies of traditional and mainstream terrorism studies.  The study 
adopted a skeptical approach to the most prominent theories within the orthodox strands in 
international relations, namely the Realism/Neo-Realism and Liberalism/Neo-Liberalism schools 
of thought.  Within the analysis of both these theories, this study examined their broad emphasis 
on the various forms and types of violence employed by ‘terrorists’ and how to counter these 




and key drivers that influence these ‘terrorist’ behaviors to begin with.   
It was also pointed out that in the case of AMISOM in Somalia, aspects of gender and human 
rights abuses were perpetuated by AMISOM troops.  Further, this study utilized CTS to gain an 
understanding of the reasons why particular actors commit violent acts of terror.  This was an 
important development that was emphasized and expanded throughout the research study and 
corresponds with the study’s critique of orthodox approaches to terrorism which simply deal with 
the symptoms of terrorism as opposed to employing a multi-pronged consideration that 
incorporates addressing both the root causes and the symptoms of terrorism.  Such a multi-pronged 
approach involves a military approach that does not take precedence over a civilian and people-
centered approach, but rather equally tackles socio-economic disparities in the form of economic 
marginalization, poverty, and unemployment; political alienation by corrupt political elites; and 
ethnic and religious tensions and contestations that are prevalent in both Nigeria and the Horn of 
Africa.   
By upholding the commitments of CTS, this research has shown that it remains necessary for the 
African Union and its various security agencies to move away from the orthodoxies that exist 
within its currently adopted counter-terrorism agenda. This agenda seeks to use military force in 
order to combat its enemy in this context; through military checkpoint checks; military raids; 
intelligence operations; and the employment of drone airstrikes and other military-driven offences 
towards Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  The researcher has argued that traditional approaches to 
terrorism continue to disregard the acts perpetuated by Western states against civilians.  More 
important, through applying the principles of CTS, the researcher asserts that mainstream 
approaches to terrorism consider opposition to the state by non-state actors as illegitimate.  
However, the researcher contends that terrorism as a tactic to obtain socio-economic and political 
objectives can be undertaken by both state and non-state actors.   
6.3.2.  The Multinational Joint Task Force Position in North-eastern Nigeria 
Boko Haram has plagued the northern-most region of Nigeria and its neighboring countries and 
this research has proven why the group has been considered one of the deadliest terrorist 
organizations in modern times.   The growing regionalization of Boko Haram on the African 




to defeat the threat.  One such coalition that has been highlighted throughout this study which has 
proven to be playing an active role in its efforts to curb Boko Haram, is the Multinational Joint 
Task Force which is deployed under the leadership of the Chad Basin and mandated by the African 
Union Peace and Security Council.    
Taking into account that the Multinational Joint Task Force which is mandated by the African 
Union and commanded by the Lake Chad Basin Commission has achieved relative success in 
flushing out Boko Haram from a number of strategic territorial bases, this research study also 
presents a critique of its lackluster approach to the threat of Boko Haram.  In addition, this study 
presents a critique of the orthodoxies that exist within the symptomatic and military driven 
counter-terrorism strategy adopted by the African Union in its efforts to fight the scourge of 
terrorism waged by Boko Haram in Nigeria.  The military strategies – including airstrikes; military 
raids; military checkpoints; and attempted intelligence operations amongst other approaches – 
employed by the African Union’s armed forces, were further critiqued for failing to address the 
root causes, namely existing socio-economic disparities; political and religious marginalization; 
the drive to implement a Sharia form of governance; and the failure to curb the terror-financing of 
Boko Haram.  The strategies were critiqued for aligning with orthodox approaches to terrorism, 
while disregarding a multi-dimensional approach aimed at tackling both the root causes and 
symptoms of terrorism which is broadly recommended within the principles of Critical Terrorism 
Studies.   
In addition, the critiques offered in relation to Boko Haram illustrate that cooperation between the 
African Union and the Nigerian government and its neighboring states is necessary in order to deal 
with the issue of porous borders which have given rise to a cross-border supply of weapons and 
money for the organisation.   
6.3.3.  AMISOM’s Involvement in Somalia 
Similar to Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab’s strategic terrorism is largely influenced by the consequences 
of its rich history which informs the current socio-economic and political realities of present-day 
Somalian society.  The consequences of colonialism have contributed to the clan-divisions and 





Similarly, to the African Union’s counter-terrorism approach to Boko Haram, the strategies 
adopted by AMISOM were critiqued for their neglect in addressing some of the most pertinent 
root causes and issues that inform the Al-Shabaab crisis, namely socio-economic grievances and 
political alienation; the abuses perpetuated by AMISOM’s forces; broad mal-administration; and 
clan-divisions.  While this research has shown that AMISOM has attempted to take the initiative 
in applying a multi-pronged strategy across its military, police, and civilian components, the 
Mission has been critiqued for its over-reliance on a military-driven approach in combating Al-
Shabaab, neglecting the fundamental root causes and key drivers that inform the strategic terrorism 
waged by the organisation.   
The researcher maintains that in order for the African Union’s counter-terrorism operations to 
combat the threat of terrorism waged by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, there must be increasingly 
concerted efforts by a range of stakeholders, namely the MNJTF and AMISOM.  Enhanced 
cooperation amongst regional actors will play a fundamental role in diminishing the two 
organizations’ regional territorial presences, and limit their capacity to move freely and wage their 
scourge of terror across borders.   
6.4.  Recommendations 
In order to explain the counter-terrorism approaches employed by the African Union in relation to 
the threat posed by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab in their respective territories, a number of 
academic journals, books and online databases were consulted in order to collect data.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, while secondary sources were used for the most part of this research study, 
both primary and secondary sources were applied in the study for the collection of data and 
information. Primary data collected from field research, particularly in relation to engaging with 
current or former members of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab was unattainable, due to potential 
threats and risks that may have arisen.  However, this research benefited immensely from primary 
data obtained from semi-structured interviews with experts and officials from relevant institutions 
within the African Union Peace and Security Architecture, specialists, academics, professionals, 
and political risk analysts with substantial experience and knowledge in the spheres of terrorism 
and counter-terrorism respectively.   




recaps the two case studies discussed in this research study, it is clear that there is still an 
abundance of research to be done and gaps to be filled in relation to understanding the internal 
structures and operations of terrorist groups, and more important, how governments, multilaterals, 
and various stakeholders can play a productive role in addressing and tackling potential threats.  
While this writer contends that CTS does not necessarily position itself as the immediate “fix” that 
will suddenly cure the threat of terrorism and instability in north-eastern Nigeria and Somalia, it 
maintains that one cannot disregard that it has proved to be a valuable framework that will serve 
as a path in the necessary direction within the fields of terrorism and counter-terrorism.  
Throughout this study, the theoretical framework of CTS was applied in order to question the 
processes of knowledge production in relation to terrorism studies, especially through the critique 
of orthodox approaches to terrorism.  Therefore, one can conclude that challenging these processes 
gives researchers an opportunity to gain a broader and wider understanding of the threat of 
terrorism which could lead to a change in how experts, scholars, multilaterals, and various actors 
view, address, and tackle the scourge of terrorism.   
As was established in Chapter 1 of this study, terrorism across the African continent is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon which has manifested as a result of a combination of factors and drivers, 
and therefore, requires analysis, assessment, and responses from multiple perspectives.  This 
research acknowledges the complexities that exist within the study of “terrorism” and the nuances 
and complications that are linked within the definitional position and contextualization of 
terrorism, particularly with reference to questions such as “Who is defined as a terrorist?” and 
“Who does the defining?”.  This research suggests that terrorism and counter-terrorism 
researchers, experts, and stakeholders should move away from merely perceiving terrorism as a 
criminal act to understanding it as a strategic tool or mechanism which has the objective of 
addressing fundamental grievances.  By simply tweaking the conventional underpinnings of 
terrorism, this research suggests that an array of gaps open up for the possibility of future research 
on the matter.  
Furthermore, this study emphasized these complexities, particularly through the continuous 
assessment of and focus on the socio-economic and political reasons and factors which have 
encouraged the emergence of terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab and 




indicated that there are resounding similarities between the two organizations in the study, 
particularly in relation to the drivers and root causes influencing their acts of violence, there are 
some stark differences in their modus operandi, especially in the manner in which their shared 
ideology of Jihad manifests.  While both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab share an ideology that 
embodies radical Salafisim which is deeply rooted in the condemnation of any opposition of Islam, 
it would be extremely naïve for the African Union, policy-makers and various stakeholders to 
employ the exact same strategies in dealing with the strategic terrorism waged by these two groups.  
As previously mentioned, while they may have shared ideological underpinnings, there are some 
differences in their modus operandi which the African Union and its various security agencies 
must take into consideration when formulating counter-terrorism frameworks and approaches.   
Moreover, it is clear that within the study and field of terrorism, it is important that the religious 
beliefs that influence groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab should be studied in greater 
depth.  In view of the ideological underpinnings of both these groups, it was stressed in this study 
that their shared ideology of Jihad is encouraged by their absolute rejection of Western systems, 
in particular Western forms of governance, which in both case studies was a result of the legacies 
left behind by colonialism. This point of departure was alluded to on countless occasions 
throughout the study and forms a basis for future research to enquire into, in order to understand a 
significant driving factor that influences terrorism on the African continent.   
In view of the above suggestions, both groups have been clear about their discontent in relation to 
widespread international and external involvement in the territories which they occupy or attempt 
to take control of.  While the outcomes of this study suggest that regional involvement and 
cooperation are integral in the fight against both these organizations, they maintain that perhaps 
the reduction of international involvement and an increase in regional integration may increase the 
likeliness of successfully implementing strategic non-military approaches such as dialogue and 
engagement with both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.  
In addition, the limitations of the orthodox and extremely military-centered approach to countering 
both Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have opened up opportunities to formulate and implement 
alternative approaches to the threat of terrorism waged by these organizations in their respective 




premium on non-military forms of intervention and counter-operations – a point of analysis that 
has been emphasized throughout and formed the focus of this study.   
With that in mind, it is important that the AU should strengthen its resource capacity if it is to play 
a significant role in the alleviation and prevention of terrorism on the African continent.  The gaps 
that are found between the intended approaches and the measures currently adopted lie within the 
allocation of resources – human, financial, and military – and for this reason, there is an over- 
reliance and dependence on foreign stakeholders and actors.   To realize this, it is important that 
the African Union should work together with its various security institutions to provide its joint 
taskforce operations with adequate and efficient human, financial, and military capacity.  In this 
respect, this researcher suggests that there should be a sense of unity, common objectivity, and 
mutually beneficial networks amongst the troop of contributing member states of the African 
Union and its regional security agencies in order for any counter-terrorism frameworks and 
agendas to be effective.     
Findings of this research study suggest that by continuously engaging Boko Haram and Al-
Shabaab through the means of military combat, while neglecting an approach which seeks to 
politically address the primary drivers and roots encouraging the form of violence waged by both 
these two groups, the African Union and its various security agencies will merely sustain the threat 
of violent activities undertaken by them.  Upon observing the strategic acts of terror waged by 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, it becomes clear that future operations instituted by the AU should 
be informed by frameworks which consider the socio-economic, political and historical factors 
that have informed many of the grievances which encourage individuals to join violent and 
extremist groups such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab.   
When trying to understand why Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab’s violent terrorism have not yet been 
curbed, it becomes necessary to apply the principles and commitments of Critical Terrorism 
Studies.  Through the application of CTS, the researcher has shown that the violence waged by 
Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab affects predominantly Nigerians and Somalis.  In addition, it has 
proven that terrorism on the African continent came into existence as a result of a number of 
historical factors, in particular the legacies left behind by colonialism, which consequentially 




their violent acts of terror. Therefore, this study recommends that the Nigerian and Somali 
citizenry must be considered in conversations around peace-building initiatives.  The African 
Union should set up think-tanks and institutions that are dedicated to assisting the citizens of both 
these countries to recommend the necessary policies and potential resolutions. Given that the 
largely military-driven approach in both cases has not ameliorated the threat of terrorism, perhaps 
an alternative to the militaristic approach should be seriously considered – an approach that the 
findings of this study explicitly support.  It is important to take into consideration that such a 
process entails thorough research to examine not just the general consensus, but the plausibility of 
such a process – bearing in mind the various risks and threats of all actors, stakeholders, and 
constituencies involved.   
This is precisely why this research study should be adopted by future terrorism researchers and 
counter-terrorism policy-makers.  While, the African Union’s counter-terrorism approaches have 
their strengths which have undoubtedly resulted in a number of successes, particularly through the 
measures adopted by its various joint taskforce operations, this research has demonstrated that the 
recommendations from this research could serve as a reliable, realistic, and alternative guide to the 
currently adopted frameworks of the threat of terrorism throughout the African continent.  To this 
end, it is clear that Africa’s struggle against the plague of terrorism can be curbed if there is mutual 
co-operation between the African Union and its relevant stakeholders and member states.  The AU 
should consistently think of new ways in which to improve its counter-terrorism policies and 
strategies. 
6.5.   Concluding Remarks 
The key objective of this study was to assess whether the currently employed policies, agendas, 
and frameworks of the African Union address the current scourge of terrorism, and simultaneously 
to offer a critique of the widely-employed approaches currently in use for addressing and dealing 
with the strategic terrorism embraced by Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab respectively. By 
considering the research questions presented in Chapter 1, this final chapter sought to provide a 
set of recommendations for the counter-terrorism measures that are currently in place within the 
structures of the African Union.   




have severely critiqued the measures and mechanisms adopted by the AU’s counter-terrorism 
programs, this chapter demonstrates the commendable achievements of the AU, taking into 
account the many challenges and obstacles that it faces, particularly in relation to security.  
However, findings and recommendations from this research reiterate that the various programs 
and frameworks that have been established by the African Union should be translated and 
converted into proactive action if the brief of the continental organisation is to be taken seriously: 
that of an intergovernmental body dedicated to eradicating terrorism across the continent; and if it 
is to achieve its desired goals and objectives of combating and defeating terrorist organizations in 





7. BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
Abrahamsen, R. 2004. A Breeding Ground for Terrorists? Africa & Britain's 'War on Terrorism'. 
Review of African Political Economy, 31(102):  677–684. 
Abshir, K.M. 2018.  ‘The politics of security in Somalia’, Centre on International Cooperation. 
 
Adekanye, S. 2006.  “African Challenges and Capacity in Countering Terrorism, Regional 
Differences in Coordination of Counter Terrorism Efforts Regarding The UN Anti-
Terrorism Technical Assistance to Africa”.  1-5. 
Adetoro, R. A.  2012.  Corruption in Nigeria’s democratic governance–the case of oil  
 
African Union Commission on Terrorism in Africa.  Report of the Chairperson of the 
Commission on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa at the Peace and Security 
Council 455th Meeting at the Level of Heads of State and Government, Nairobi, Kenya | 
African Union [Online] Available at: https://au.int/fr/node/25397 [Accessed 14 February 
2018]. 
African Union Mission to Somalia. 2016. AMISOM Mandate.  [Online] Available at: 
http://amisom-au.org/amisom- mandate/ [Accessed 10 August 2019].  
African Union Mission to Somalia. 2017. AMISOM Background. [online] Available at: 
http://amisom-au.org/amisom- background/ [Accessed 09 August 2019].  
African Union Mission to Somalia. 2019. AMISOM Key Documents.  [Online] Available at: 
http://amisom-au.org/key-documents/united-nations-security-council-resolutions/ 
[Accessed 09 August 2019].  
Agathangelou, A & Ling, L. H. M. 2004. Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence 
and Desire from September 11. International Studies Quarterly. 48(3): 517-538. 
Agbiboa, D.E.  2013. Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective. African 
Conflict and Peace Building Review, 3(1). 
 
Aina, V. 2016. Domestic Institutions and the Spread of Boko Haram in Nigeria.  Masters. 




Akanni, A. A.  2014. History of terrorism, youth psychology and unemployment in Nigeria.  The 
Journal of Pan African Studies, 7(3): 67. 
Albert, I.O. 2017. Rethinking the functionality of the Multinational Joint Task Force in 
Managing the Boko Haram Crisis in the Lake Chad Basin. Africa Development, [online] 
Available at: https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/167098  [Accessed 13 July 
2019],  42(3): 119–135. 
Al Jazeera news.  2015. AU calls for regional force to fight Boko Haram. [Online]. Available at:   
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2015/01/au-calls-regional-force-fight-boko-haram-
150130032244124.html [Accessed 12 February 2018]. 
Allison, S. 2014. Somalia: AMISOM Failures Show that Godane’s Death is no Quick Fix.. 
[online] Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/201409082013.html [Accessed 03 
October 2019]. 
Allison, S.  2015. Good talk, not enough action: The AU’s counter-terrorism architecture, and 
why it matters. Policy Brief, 66: 1-5. Institute for Security Studies. 
 
AMISOM.  2014. World Report 2014: Rights Trends in World Report 2014: Somalia. [online] 
Human Rights Watch. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-
chapters/somalia [Accessed 16 June. 2019]. 
 
AMISOM.  2016. AMISOM Military Component - AMISOM. [online] AMISOM. Available at: 
http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component/ [Accessed 8 June 2019]. 
 
Anderson, D. M., & McKnight, J.  2014. Kenya at war. Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern 
Africa. African Affairs, 114(454): 1–27.   
Aubrey, S.M. 2004. The New Dimension of International Terrorism. Zurich: vdf 
Hochschulverlag AG.  
Bayo-Ogunrotifa, A.  2012.  Research on Terrorism:  An Overview of Theoretical Perspectives.  
A Sian Journal of Research in Social Science & Humanities, 2(9): 11-16. 
 
BBC News.   2017.  ‘Nigerian Air Strike Error Kills Dozens in Refugee Camp’, [online] 
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38654991 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38654991 [Accessed 24 June 2019]. 
 
Berkouk, M. 2008. Terrorism: An Eymo-epistemological Analysis. Understanding Terrorism in 




Borárosová, I., Walter, A. & Filipec, O.  2017. Global Jihad: Case Studies in Terrorist 
Organizations. Gdańsk: Research Institute for European Policy. 
 
Botha, A. & Abdile, M. 2014. Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia. ISS. 
 
Brigaglia, A. 2012.   Ja‘far Mahmoud Adam, Mohammed Yusuf and Al-Muntada Islamic Trust: 
Reflections on the Genesis of the Boko Haram phenomenon in Nigeria. Annual Review of 
Islam in Africa, 11:  35–44. 
Brinkel, T. & Ait-Hida, S. 2012. Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria. Scientia Militia, South 
African Journal of Military Studies, 40(2): 4-23.  
Brubacher, M., Damman, E. & Day, C.  2017. The AU Task Forces: an African response to 
transnational armed groups. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 55(2), pp.275-299. 
 
Bruce, G. (2019). Definition of Terrorism – Social and Political Effects. [online] Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/293080933_Definition_of_Terrorism_-
_Social_and_Political_Effects [Accessed 11 May 2019]. 
 
Buluma, G. 2014. Al-Shabaab: The Threat to Kenya and The Horn of Africa. United States 
Army War College.  
Burnham, P. Lutz, K.G. Grant, W & Layton-Henry, Z. 2008.  Research Methods in Politics. 2nd 
Edition. New York. Palgrave MacMillan. 
Buzan, B. 1983. People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International 
Relations. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Buzan, B. 1991. People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition. Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO, and London. 
 
Callaway, R. L., & Harrelson-Stephens, J. 2006. Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security 
as a Determinant of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29(8): 773-796.  
Carr, C. 2002. The Lessons of Terror. New York: Random Home Incorporated. 
 




Cloke, K. 2001. Mediating dangerously: The frontiers of conflict resolution. San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass.  
Cook, D. 2014. Boko Haram: A new Islamic state in Nigeria. Religion and Public Policy 
Working Paper, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. [Online] 
Available at: http://bakerinstitute.org/files/8573/ [Accessed 01 June 2018].  
Crelinsten, R. 2009. Counterterrorism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Crenshaw, M. 2014. Terrorism research: The record. International Interactions, 40(4): 556- 567.  
Crouch, J.  2018.  Counter-terror and the logic of violence in Somalia’s civil war: Time for a 
new approach. Preventing Violent Conflict. Building Safer Lives. Saferworld.  1-25. 
 
Crowley, R. and Wikinson, H. 2013. Boko Haram: A new threat in West Africa, in OECD 
Conflict Over Resources and Terrorism: Two Facets of Insecurity, OECD Publishing. 
[Online] Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264190283-6-en [Accessed 10 May 
2019]. 
Curran, C. 2011. AEI Critical Threats. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/global-ambitions-analysis-al-shabaabs-evolving-
rhetoric-february-17-2011 [Accessed 13 June 2019]. 
Damme, T. 2015.  From neglect to hyperactivity: The regional force against Boko Haram. 
[Online] Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317407522_Boko_Haram_and_the_African_U
nion's_Response [Accessed 13 August 2019]. 
 
Der Derian, J. 2004. 9/11 and its Consequences for the Discipline. Zeitschrift fur 
InternationaleBeziehungen. 11(1): 89-100. 
Desmidt, S.  2019. Conflict management and prevention under the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) of the African Union. Africa Journal of Management, 5(1): 79-97. 
 
Ejiofor, C.  2015. Nigerian soldier allegedly kill 30 civilians in plateau. [Online]. Available at: 
www.naij.com/431664-nigeria-soldiers-allegedly-kill-30-civilians-in-plateau.html 





Elliot, A. & Holzer, G.S. 2009. The invention of ‘terrorism’ in Somalia paradigms and policy in 
US foreign relations. South African Journal of International Affairs. 16(2): 215-244. 
Engel, U. & Porto, J.  2009. The African Union's New Peace and Security Architecture: Toward 
an Evolving Security Regime? African Security, 2(2-3): 82-96. 
 
Ewi, M. and Aning, K.  2006. Assessing the role of the African Union in preventing and 
combating terrorism in Africa. African Security Review, 15(3): 32-46. 
 
Fiala, A.  2002.  Terrorism and the Philosophy of History: Liberalism, Realism, and the Supreme 
Emergency Exemption. [online]. Available at: https://philpapers.org/rec/FIATAT-2 
[Accessed 12 June 2019]. 
 
Ganor, B. 2002. Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter? 
Police Practice and Research, 3(4), pp.287-304. 
Gartenstein-Ross, D. 2009. The Strategic Challenge of Somalia's Al-Shabaab [Online]. Available 
at: http://www.meforum.org/2486/somalia-al-shabaab-strategic-challenge [Accessed: 02 
May 2019]. 
 
Gatuiku, P. 2016. Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya. Masters. 
University of Nairobi: The Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies. 
Gottlieb, S. (Ed.).  2013. Debating terrorism and counterterrorism: conflicting  
perspectives on causes, contexts, and responses. CQ Press. 
 
Grosscup, B. 2006. Strategic terror: The politics and ethics of aerial bombardment. New York: 
Zed Books. 
Gunning, J.  2007. A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies? Government and Opposition. 42(3): 
363-393. 
Herring, E.  2008.  Critical terrorism studies: an activist scholar perspective. Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, 1(2): 197-211. 
Hesse, B.J. 2010. Lessons in successful Somali governance. Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies. 28(1): 71-83.  
Hesse, B.J. 2016. Two Generations, Two Interventions in One of the World’s Most-Failed 




Studies, 51(5): 573-593. 
Hassan, M. 2012. Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-Shabab, 5(8): 
18–20. 
Hoffman, B. 2009. A counterterrorism strategy for the Obama administration. Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 21 (3): 359-377. 
Hoffman, B.  2013.  Inside terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Human Rights Watch. 2017. "The Power These Men Have Over Us". [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/node/128407 [Accessed 14 July 2019]  
Ikelegbe, A and Okumu, W.  2010. “Introduction: Towards Conceptualization and 
Understanding of the Threats of Armed Non-State Groups to Human Security and the 
State in Africa”, in Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe (eds.) Militias, Rebels and 
Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa. Institute for Security 
Studies, Pretoria: South Africa.  1-44 
 
International Crisis Group. 2017.  Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State. [online] Crisis 
Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalia-
move-beyond-failed-state [Accessed 12 May 2019]. 
 
International Crisis Group (ICG).  2014. Somalia: Al Shabaab- it will be a long war. Crisis 
Group Africa Report.   
Irwin, N.  2015. The complexity of responding to home-grown terrorism: Radicalization, de- 
radicalization and disengagement. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
Terrorism, 10(2): 166-175.  
ISS African Terrorism Bulletin. 2004. [Online] Available at: 
https://oldsite.issafrica.org/uploads/0104_2.HTML [Accessed 09 February. 2018]. 
Jackson, R.  2007. The core commitments of critical terrorism studies. European Political 
Science, 6(3): 244-251. 
 
Jackson, R., Smyth, M., and Gunning, J. (eds.), 2009.  Critical Terrorism Studies: A New 
Research Agenda, London: Routledge. 
 




Jacobs, O. 2015. End of days for Boko Haram. African independent news. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.africanindy.com/news/end-of-days-for-boko-haram-1231617/  [Accessed 11 
February 2018]. 
Jarvis, L. 2009.  The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies.  Security Dialogue, 40(1): 
5-27.  
Joseph, J. 2009.  “Critical of what? Terrorism and its study.” International Relations 23 (1): 93–
98. 
Keatinge, T.  2014.  The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.  Royal United Services 
Institute, Whitehall Report 2-14.  [Online]. Available at:  
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201412_whr_2-14_keatinge_web_0.pdf [Accessed: 04 
May 2019].    
 
Kelly, R. 2007. Is Terrorism Always Wrong?.  Perspectives on terrorism, 1(1.1.): 16-17. 
Kimani, J. 2013.  AMISOM: A Ray of Hope? Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). 
Occasional paper.    
 
King, M. and Taylor, D. M. 2011. The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists: A Review of 
Theoretical Models and Social Psychological Evidence. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 23(4): 602-622.  
Kodjo, T. 2018. Communiqué of the 749th meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council, at the 
level of Heads of State and Government, on the theme: “Towards a Comprehensive 
Approach to Combatting the Transnational Threat of Terrorism in Africa” -African 
Union - Peace and Security Department. [online] African Union,Peace and Security 
Department. [Online]. Available at:  http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-
the-749th-meeting-of-the-au-peace-and-security-council-at-the-level-of-heads-of-state-
and-government-on-the-theme-towards-a-comprehensive-approach-to-combatting-the-
transnational-threat-of-terrorism-in-africa [Accessed 01 March 2018]. 
Laqueur, W. 2006. The New Terrorism. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Lentini, P. 2008. Understanding and combating terrorism: Definitions, origins and strategies.  




Ligawa, W.  2018.  AMISOM`s Influence Towards Peacebuilding in Somalia. Phd. Masinde 
Muliro University of Science and Technology. 
 
Maszka, J.  2017.  A Strategic Analysis of Al Shabaab. PhD. Bournemouth University. 
 
McQuaid, J. and Asfura-Heim, P.  2015. Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Boko Haram: The 
Case for a Regional Strategy. [online] Cna.org. Available at: 
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2014-U-009462-Final.pdf [Accessed 12 July 
2019]. 
 
Menkhaus, K.  2014. State Failure, State-Building, and Prospects for a “Functional Failed State” 
in Somalia. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
656(1): 154-172. 
Menkhaus, K. 2009. Somalia: ‘They created a desert and called it Peace(building)’. Review of 
African Political Economy. 120: 223-233.  
Mingst, K. A. and Karns, M. P. 2006. The United Nations in the 21st Century. Westview Press, 
Boulder. 
 
Mohamed, A. 2009. US Strategic Interests in Somalia: From Cold War Era to War on Terror. 
Faculty of Graduate School of the State University at Buffalo.  
Momanyani, S.M. 2015. The Impact of Al-Shabaab Terrorist Attacks in Kenya. Tromsø: The 
Arctic University of Norway.  
Mwangi, O.G. 2012.  State Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, and Legitimacy in Somalia.  
Neuman, W.L. 2005.  Social Research Methods Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches. 6th Edition. Boston, Pearson. 
Neus R. 2013.  The Role of the African Union in Somalia: Where to go from here with 
Nigeria. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 7(3): 67. 
 
Nossel, S.  2004. Smart Power. Foreign Affairs, 83(2): 131-135. 
 
Nurudeen, I. (2012). multi-dimensional. Masters. University of Pretoria. 
Nwabueze, B. 2013. Nwabueze: North-South Divide, Obstacle to Nation. Igbo Focus. [Online]. 
Available at:  www.igbofocus.co.uk/nwabueze--north-south-divide--obstacle-to-




OAU Assembly.  1992. Resolution on Overdue Reports, Twenty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, 29 
June - 1 July 1992, Dakar, Senegal.  [Online]. Available at:   
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/africa/resoverdue.html [Accessed 1 March 2018]. 
Ochonu, M. 2014. The Roots of Nigeria’s Religious and Ethnic Conflict. Global Post.  [Online]. 
Available at:  
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/nigeria/140220/nigeria-
religious-ethnic-conflict-roots [Accessed 21 February 2019]. 
 
Onuoha, F. C.  2012. Boko Haram: Nigeria’s extremist Islamic sect. [Online]. Available at:  
http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2012/2/29/2012229113341793734BOKO
%20HARAM%20NIGERIAS%20EXTREMIST%20ISLAMIC%20SECT.pdf [Accessed 
28 February 2019]. 
 
Oyini, B. 2009. A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria. In: W. Okumu and A. 
Botha, ed., Domestic Terrorism In Africa: Defining, Addressing And Understanding Its 
Impact On Human Security, 1st ed. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.  43-54. 
Ozoiogbo, B. I., 2008. Federal Balancing in Nigeria: A Paradigm for Sustainable Democracy. 
[Online]. Available at:  www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/download/52329/40954 
[Accessed: 17 February 2019]. 
Parker, R.  2003. Terrorism and the Assumptions of Classical Liberalism.  [Online]. Available at:  
http://www.parapundit.com/archives/000970.html [Accessed 12 February 2019].  
Peck, S. 2007. Fierce Street Battles Erupt in Somalia.  [Online]. Available at:   
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1546280/Fierce-street-battles-erupt-in-
Somalia.html [Accessed 02 May 2019] 
Pedhazur, A., Eubank, W. & Weinberg, L. 2002. The War on Terrorism and the Decline of 
Terrorist Group Formation: A Research Note. Terrorism and Political Violence, 14(3): 
141-147. 
Philpott, D. 2002. The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations. 
World Politics, 55(1): 66-95. 
Price, G. and Elu, J. (2015). The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism in Africa. The Oxford 
Handbook of Africa and Economics, 1. 
Ramdeen, M.  2017. Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa – ACCORD. 
[online] ACCORD.  [Online]. Available at:  https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-




Rapoport, D. C. & Alexander, Y. 1982. The rationalization of terrorism. University Publications 
of America. 
Richmond, O. 2003. Realizing Hegemony? Symbolic Terrorism and the Roots of 
Conflict. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 26(4): 289-309. 
 
Roberts, A. 2015. Terrorism research: Past, present, and future. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
38(1): 62-74.  
Rogers, P.  2012. Nigeria: The generic context of the Boko Haram violence.  
Routledge.  34-48. 
 
Sageman, M.  2014. The stagnation in terrorism research. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26: 
565–580. 
Samatar, S.S. 2010. An Open Letter to Uncle Sam: America, Pray Leave Somalia to its own 
Devices. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 28(3): 313- 323.  
Schmid, A. & Jongman, A. 1988. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Acotrs, Authors, 
Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature. Oxford, North Holland. 
Schmid, A. 2004. ‘Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
16(2): 197-221. 
Schmid, A.P. 2011. Glossary and Abbreviations of Terms and Concepts Relating to Terrorism 
and Counter-terrorism, in A.P. Schmid (ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism 
Research. New York: Routledge.  598–706.  
Schwartz, M., Millar, A. & Shetret, L. 2019. Rethinking International Counterterrorism 
Assistance to the Greater Horn of Africa: Toward a Regional Risk Reduction 
Strategy. Perspective on Terrorism, 7(6): 100-112. 
Shuriye, A.  2012.  Research: Al-Shabaab’s Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology | Horn 
Affairs.  [Online]. Available at:   https://hornaffairs.com/2012/05/07/research-al-
shabaabs-leadership-hierarchy-and-its-ideology/ [Accessed 15 July 2019]. 
 
Silke, A. 2009.  ‘Contemporary terrorism studies: issues in research’, in R. Jackson, M. B. Smyth 
and J. Gunning, eds. Critical Terrorism Studies: A new research agenda. Abingdon: 
Simon, M. 2016. The 2015 Al-Shabaab’s attack in Garissa, Kenya. An immersion into the 




Silke, A. (2014). Terrorism: All That Matters. Hodder & Stoughton. 
Sinai, J. 2008. Resolving a Terrorist Insurgency by Addressing Its Root Causes. Analysis 
Cooperation. Democracy and Security, 1(1): 63-71.   
Sluka, J.A. 2009. The contribution of anthropology to critical terrorism studies. Critical 
terrorism studies. A new research agenda, London and New York: Routledge.  138-155. 
Smith, M.L.R. 2003. Guerrillas in the mist: reassessing strategy and low intensity  
warfare. Review of International Studies, 29(01), pp.19-37. 
 
Smith, M.L.R.  2005. Why Clausewitz is still more relevant than his critics.  
Rethinking the Nature of War, pp. 28-64. 
 
Smith, S. 2004. Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and 
September 11.   International Studies Quarterly 48(3): 499-515. 
Solomon, H.  2012. Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram. The RUSI 
Journal, 157(4): 6-11. 
 
Solomon, H.  2014. Somalia's Al Shabaab: Clans vs Islamist nationalism. South African Journal 
of International Affairs, 21(3): 351-366. 
Solomon, H.  2015. Critical Terrorism Studies and Its Implications for Africa. Politikon, 42(2): 
19-234. 
 
START. 2015.  Boko Haram: An assessment of strengths, vulnerabilities, and policy options. 
Report to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment Office, Department of Defense, and the 
Office of University Programs, Department of Homeland Security. Maryland: National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of 
Maryland. 
Stump, J. L. & Dixit, P. 2012. Toward a Completely Constructivist Critical Terrorism Studies. 
International Relations. 26(2): 199-217. 
Taylor, M. 2014.  If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here: Response to Marc Sageman’s ‘‘the 
stagnation in terrorism research’’. Terrorism and Political Violence, 26: 581–586. Taylor 




Tilly, C. 2004. ‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’, Sociological Theory 22(1): 5–13. 
Tine, A. (2017). African Criminal Court: Consultation On Malabo Protocol To Be Held In 
Dakar May 2-3 - TrustAfrica. [online] Trustafrica.org.  [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.trustafrica.org/en/resource/news/item/3315-african-criminal-court-
consultation-on-malabo-protocol-to-be-held-in-dakar-may-2-3 [Accessed 17 July 2018]. 
 
Toros, H.  and Gunning, J.  2004.   Peace with Hamas? The transforming potential of political 
participation‟, International Affairs, 80(2): 233-55. 
 
Turk, A. 2004. Sociology of Terrorism. Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1): 271- 286. 
Ucha, C. 2010. Poverty in Nigeria: Some Dimensions and Contributing Factors.   
 
Ugorji, B. 2016.  Ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria. New York: International Center for Ethno- 
Religious Mediation. [Online]. Available at:  http://www.icermediation.org/ [Accessed 29 
February 2019]. 
 
Umar, A.  2013. Nigeria and the Boko Haram sect: adopting a better strategy for resolving the 
crisis. Masters. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA).  2010. “Africa and 
International Counter Terrorism Imperatives.” Expert Paper prepared by the Office of the 
Special Adviser on Africa. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/Osaa/events/2015/idtfaz20150630.shtml U.S. Department of 
State [Accessed 08 April 2018]. 
Usman, S. 2015. Unemployment and poverty as sources and consequence of insecurity in 
Nigeria: The Boko Haram insurgency revisited. African Journal of Political Science and 
International Relations, 9(3): pp.90-99. 
 
Vermeulen, A.  2014.  Reassessing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Africa:  A Critical 
Terrorism Study. Masters. University of the Freestate. 
 
Vilkko, V. 2011. Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extraction. Department of 




http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/57537_MFS_paper_Vilkko.pdf [11 September 2019]. 
 
Walker, A. 2008.  What is Boko Haram.  United States Institute of Peace.  [Online] Washington 
D.C.: Special Report, pp.2-14. Available at: 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR308.pdf [Accessed 10 May 2019]. 
Walker, A. 2012. United States Institute of Peace: What is Boko Haram?: Special Report No. 
308. [Washington, DC]: United States Institute of Peace. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR308.pdf [28 May 2019].  
Walt, S.  2003. International relations.  Warfare. Review of International Studies, 29(01): 19-37. 
 
Williams, P. D.  2015. “Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa,” Council on 
Foreign Relations Special Report.   
 
Williams, P.D., Machakaire, J., Rupesinghe, N., Helal, A., Darkwa, L., D’Alessandro, M. and de 
Coning, C. 2018.  Assessing the Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). Oslo, Norway: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.  1-105. 
 
Williams, P.D. 2016. AMISOM under Review. The RUSI Journal, 161(1): 40 – 49.   
 
Zondi, S. 2016. Assessing Policy Responses of African and International Actors on the Threats 
of Transnational Terrorism to Africa’s Security and Stability.  Institute for Global 
Dialogue.  128: 1-5. 
 













The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews held with key 
informants of the study:  
 
APPENDIX A: BASIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 




Country of Residence: 
 
Highest Qualification:  
Years of experience:  
Other:   
b).  May I please have consent to record this interview?  
2. From the political, economic, socio-cultural, historic, geographical, technological and 
military factors influencing, which do you think is the most decisive in aiding Boko 
Haram’s terrorist activities? And which do you think is the most influential factor? 
3. Given your experience and academic expertise, what do you identify as factors aiding to 
the ineffectiveness of the African Union’s response to the Boko Haram crisis? 
4. Where do you think that the African Union’s attempts at resolving the Boko Haram crisis 
is directed at? 




b)  The Symptoms of the conflict? 
c) Both?  
5. Where do you think that the African Union’s attempts at resolving the Boko Haram crisis 
SHOULD be directed at? 
a) The root causes? 
b)  The Symptoms of the conflict? 
c) Both?  
6. Strategies and tactics used by the African Union in its attempts to destroy Boko Haram 
a) What strategies and tactics have you identified as being used by the African Union? 
b) Which of those tactics do you think are the most effective? 
c) Which of those tactics do you think should be altered or completely rejected? 
7. What other issues do you think are influential in understanding the African Union’s current 
approach in tackling Boko Haram?  
8. In your opinion, why has the African Union yielded such poor results in its fight against 
Boko Haram? 
9. How best can the African Union  effectively resolve the Boko Haram crisis? 
It is important to note that the questions above, are only a basic and preliminary source of 






APPENDIX B: BASIC INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 




Country of Residence:  
Highest Qualification:  
Years of experience:  
            b).  May I please have get consent to record this interview?  
2. From the political, economic, socio-cultural, historic, geographical, technological and 
military factors influencing, which do you think is the most decisive in aiding Al-Shabaab’s 
terrorist activities? And which do you think is the most influential factor? 
3. Given your experience and academic expertise what do you identify as factors aiding to 
the ineffectiveness of the African Union’s response to the Al-Shabaab crisis? 
4. Where do you think that the African Union’s attempts at resolving the Al-Shabaab crisis is 
directed at? 
a)  The root causes? 
b)  The Symptoms of the conflict? 
c) Both?  
5. Where do you think that the African Union’s attempts at resolving the Al-Shabaab crisis 
SHOULD be directed at? 




b)  The Symptoms of the conflict? 
c) Both?  
6. Strategies and tactics used by the African Union in its attempts to destroy Al-Shabaab 
a) What strategies and tactics have you identified as being used by the African Union? 
b) Which of those tactics do you think are the most effective? 
c) Which of those tactics do you think should be altered or completely rejected? 
7. What other issues do you think are influential in understanding the African Union’s current 
approach in tackling Al-Shabaab?  
8. In your opinion, why has the African Union yielded such poor results in its fight against 
Al-Shabaab? 
9. How best can the African Union  effectively resolve the Al-Shabaab crisis? 
It is important to note that the questions above, are only a basic and preliminary source of 





APPENDIX C: KEY INFORMANTS  
 
DD Maselane:  Interview conducted on 30 June 2018.  DD Maselane is an intelligence analyst for 
the Horn of Africa region at the South African State Security Agency. DD Maselane has 
represented South Africa as a foreign service officer in various capacities in the East Africa region.     
Participant 1:  Interview conducted on 7 July 2018.  Participant 1 is an intelligence desk officer 
at the South African State Security Agency focusing on the broader Horn of Africa region.  
Participant 1 has represented South Africa as a foreign service officer in various capacities in 
missions in the Middle East and North Africa region.   
Participant 2:  Interview conducted on 9 July 2018.  Participant 2 is an intelligence desk officer 
at the South African State Security Agency, focusing on the East Africa region, with a particular 
concentration on Somalia and Kenya.   Participant 2 has represented South Africa as a foreign 
service officer in various capacities in missions in a number of countries within the Southern Africa 
and East Africa region.     
Participant 3:  Interview conducted on 17 July 2018.  Participant 3 is an intelligence analyst at 
the South African State Security Agency, focusing on the West Africa region.   
Participant 4:  Interview conducted on 22 July 2018.  Participant 4 is an executive director for an 
NGO focusing on dispute resolutions in Africa.  Participant 4 has been part of various delegations 
to Somalia in efforts to assist in the establishment of sustainable peace in the East African nation.    
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
